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Moiseyev on Vienna Military Doctrine Seminar

*WA3001205090 Moscow TRUD in Russian
23 Jan 90 p 3*

["Impressions" of Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of USSR General Staff, on international seminar on military doctrines held in Vienna: "Military Doctrines and Security"; date not given]

[Text] A seminar on military doctrines, in which high-ranking military leaders of 33 European states and also the United States and Canada are taking part, is being held in the Austrian capital. At the request of Lieutenant Colonel V. Nikanorov, member of the staff of the USSR Defense Ministry Press Center; General of the Army M.A. Moiseyev, head of the Soviet delegation and chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, who had returned to Moscow following the completion of the first stage of the seminar, shared his impressions of this important international forum specially for TRUD readers.

The seminar in Vienna is truly an unprecedented event in history, and not only European history, General of the Army M.A. Moiseyev emphasized. Chiefs of the general staffs of states of East and West assembled for the first time at a common table to compare military doctrines and take one further step toward confidence-building and, consequently, toward strengthening security. In my view, it is very important that not only representatives of the states of the two most important military and political alliances but all the military leaders of all participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe are taking part in the seminar. This affords an opportunity for considering the viewpoint of the neutral and nonaligned states, which make an appreciable contribution to world politics. The program of the seminar does not provide for the adoption of a final document or the signing of any disarmament treaties Its main mission is to contribute to an expansion of glasnost on military issues helping remove mutual suspicion and overcome the heavy legacy of the "cold war".

I believe that the exposition at the seminar of the USSR's new defensive military doctrine contributed to this process. Introduced in 1987 and closely linked with the doctrines of our allies, it clearly determines the priorities of our state in the military sphere. The Soviet state does not connect its present and future with a military solution of international problems. Our military doctrine is geared not to preparations for war but to its prevention. After all, war as a means of achieving political ends today is entirely out of date and has become unacceptable and impermissible.

The Soviet Union considers the highest value common to all mankind the preservation of peace. It will never, under any circumstances, be the first to commence military operations against any state and will not resort to such operations at all unless it is itself a target of aggression and armed attack. We will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. I once again set forth this firm Soviet position when addressing the seminar in Vienna.

A decisive factor in the prevention of war now is, as before, the approximate military balance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The Soviet Union will do everything to maintain this balance at an increasingly low level. True, this level does not depend on us alone.

The process of surmounting outdated stereotypes in the West is moving far less quickly than required by reality. NATO's plans to "modernize" nuclear weapons in Europe have yet to be consigned to the archives, and broad-based programs for the development of the armed forces of the states of the North Atlantic bloc are being actively implemented. "America must be strong," U.S. President G. Bush declared literally a few days ago. And he explained that what was implied by this was, as before, "strong defenses and armed forces which are ready and at the height of efficiency." Adherence to the notorious "nuclear deterrence" concept was also heard distinctly in the speeches of certain Western participants in the seminar. It cannot be forgotten that this adherence is "buttressed" by giant nuclear potential. So as long as the organizational development and training of the armed forces of the states of the North Atlantic alliance are based on the principle of "nuclear deterrence," we will be forced to concern ourselves with maintaining our armed forces in readiness for the accomplishment of defensive assignments given any version of the possible development of events.

The Soviet Union does not aspire to military superiority. In moving toward large-scale unilateral reductions in our Armed Forces and arms we have shown convincingly that words with us are not at variance with deeds. We would like, of course, for the West also to follow our example. After all, general security could only benefit from a lowering of the level of military confrontation. Considering the appreciable thaw in the international climate in recent years, the Soviet Union and the United States and the Warsaw Pact and NATO could perfectly well assume a joint commitment on no first use of nuclear weapons. The new atmosphere in the international arena also permits the assumption of a commitment on not being the first to start a war using conventional weapons either.

I am convinced that military security in our missile-space age is indivisible and cannot be fully guaranteed for any one state or alliance of states individually, however well armed they are. Aspiring to security, it is necessary in our time to proceed not from a balance of forces but from a balance of interests. This is why the conversion of the Warsaw Pact and NATO from military and political into political and military alliances which is getting under way cannot fail to raise our hopes.

The seminar in Vienna should be a step forward on this path. The frank exchange of opinions at the seminar and the constructive dialogue of its participants are reason to believe that this forum will make a pronounced contribution to the development of relations between the states of East and West in the military sphere on the basis of openness and reciprocity and will make easier the way toward a lowering of the level of military confrontation and the consolidation of peace and the peoples' security.

Report of New U.S. Missiles Termed 'Strange'

LD3001114490 Moscow TASS in English 1124 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 30 TASS—By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

The United States plans to deploy 450 new air-launched nuclear missiles, SRAM-T, in Europe, the London-based SUNDAY CORRESPONDENT newspaper reported quoting sources in Washington. At least 160 of these missiles will be based in Britain.

Frankly speaking, this report sounds strange under present circumstances. The plans to build up nuclear weapons on the continent hardly tally with the increasing improvement in relations between the USSR and the United States, the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic alliance, and the general warming of the climate in Europe.

The fulfillment of the Soviet-American treaty on eliminating intermediate- and shorter-range missiles is proceeding apace. The Soviet Union withdrew 500 nuclear warheads (166 of them are air- launched) from the territories of its allies. It is also reducing, as part of its unilateral moves to cutback the strength of its troops and armaments in Europe, nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, including tactical missile launchers.

The USSR expressed readiness to move toward a further unilateral reduction in tactical nuclear missiles stationed in Europe, if the NATO countries are prepared to conduct talks on tactical nuclear weapons. It does not modernize its battle-field-range nuclear missiles and together with its allies in the Warsaw Pact is calling upon the North Atlantic alliance states to renounce on the mutual basis modernization of tactical nuclear weapons. Importantly, the date of signing the first agreement on slashing conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe is approaching.

It seems that, mindful of all this, it will be difficult to explain the Washington-planned move to the West European public. The Pentagon will hardly succeed in finding a plausible rationale for the expediency and need of a new twist in the nuclear arms race.

Why did the United States need to sign agreements on abolishing medium- and shorter-range missiles if these are to be supplanted by aircraft turned into flying launchers of high-accuracy and long- range missiles, which are capable of striking reliably fortified targets in the USSR and other member-states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization?

Some U.S. Administration officials are right when they voice apprehensions that the proposed plan will encounter difficulties in NATO in view of the new political situation on the continent. It is not by chance that West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, answering recently a question by British journalists on his attitude to the plans to modernize tactical nuclear weapons, remarked with sarcasm: "You must be joking. Whom should they be pointed at: At Lech Walesa?"

As for the answer to the question of whom new U.S. missiles are trained at, one should frankly say that they will be trained against detente, against the arms limitation and reduction process, and against the aspiration further to stabilize the situation on the European Continent.

TASS Reports Perfilyev 30 Jan News Briefing

LD3001222490 Moscow TASS in English 2157 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 31 TASS—A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman on Tuesday expressed concern over reports that the U.S. Administration was going to ask Congress to considerably increase allocations on the Strategic Defence Initiative.

Vadim Perfilyev said that the Soviet Union "has repeatedly emphasised that the creation of space weapons can only destabilise the strategic balance and increase the threat of nuclear war."

The spokesman then commented on a report in the British newspaper SUNDAY TIMES that the Pentagon plans to deploy in Europe 450 new air-launched nuclear missiles SRAM-T.

He said Washington's plan to build up its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe "defies logic and shows a complete lack of political flexibility."

Perfilyev said this plan would implement part of the NATO programme to modernise the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The programme was endorsed in the past as compensation for the elimination of missiles with a range of over 500 kilometers under the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.

"The Soviet Union regards this programme as a destabilising factor when the levels of military confrontation are being lowered between the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO," he said.

U.S. actions create a qualitatively new situation around the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on nuclear tests and may undermine the support U.S. and Soviet efforts for the stage-by-stage termination of nuclear tests enjoy in the world, Perfilyev said.

He was commenting on the U.S. State Department January 22 statement about the U.S. intention to postpone further negotiations on nuclear tests with the Soviet Union until after the 1974 and 1976 treaties are ratified by the Senate.

"The Soviet Union views the Geneva negotiations as an integral process, which will lead to the complete termination of nuclear tests," Perfilyev said.

"It is important that there are no breaks that could violate the unified and progressive movement towards freeing the world from nuclear tests."

Perfilyev said the Soviet Union and Hungary had reached agreement on the beginning of talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. The talks will begin on February 1 in Budapest.

Speaking about the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel, the spokesman denounced the use of this issue in attempts to justify the occupation of Arab lands and described it as a "completely unacceptable action."

Talks in Budapest 1 Feb

LD3001155490 Moscow TASS in English 1544 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 30 TASS—The Soviet Union and Hungary reached agreement on the beginning of talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Vadim Perfilyev told a news briefing here today.

The talks will begin on February 1 in Budapest.

The Soviet delegation will be headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Aboimov and the Hungarian delegation by Foreign Ministry State Secretary Ferenc Somogy, Perfilyev said.

The delegations will also include officials from the Ministries of Defence and Finance.

U.S. Missile Buildup

LD3001183590 Moscow TASS in English 1819 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 30 TASS—Washington's plan to build up its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe defies logic and shows a complete lack of political flexibility, Vadim Perfilyev, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, told a briefing here today. He commented on a report in the British newspaper SUNDAY TIMES that the Pentagon plans to deploy in Europe 450 new air-launched nuclear missiles SRAM-T.

This plan would implement part of the NATO programme to modernise the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The programme has been endorsed in the past as compensation for the elimination of missiles with a range of over 500 kilometres under the treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles.

The Soviet Union criticised the programme more than once, regarding it as a destabilising factor when the levels of military confrontation are being lowered between the Warsaw-Treaty organisation and NATO, Perfilyev said.

Presently, relations beween the Soviet Union and the United States are becoming warmer, new political relations are shaping in East-European countries and there is tangible progress at the Vienna talks on conventional armaments. Washington's intentions to build up tactical nuclear armaments are absolutely unacceptable.

The question arises, why does NATO need additional means of nuclear deterrence at a time when all Warsaw Treaty countries are reducing their forces, when the Soviet Union and some of its allies are conducting negotiations for complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from their territories, the Foreign Ministry spokesman asked.

He noted that the Soviet Union favours the immediate opening of talks on tactical nuclear weapons.

Criticism of SDI Funding

LD3001185990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1636 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 30 Jan (TASS)—At a briefing held here today, a spokesman for the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed concern over reports in the United States about the U.S. Administration's intention to ask Congress for considerable increases in allocations for the "Star Wars" program.

Recalling that the USSR and the United States agreed in Malta to take things in the direction of completing work by the end of this year on a treaty on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons, Vadim Perfilyev, first deputy head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said: "Why, in light of forthcoming reductions of this kind, build up efforts for the SDI? Surely the threat is not growing?" Besides, he continued, there also arises the question of whether the work on SDI, for which additional allocations are being requested, is in keeping with the provisons of the ABM Treaty.

The USSR, said the Soviet diplomat, has repeatedly stressed that the creation of space weapons might only lead to the destabilization of the strategic balance and increase the danger of nuclear war. A majority of Soviet and overseas scientists and public figures also holds a similar opinion. "This step also does not follow the direction of international policy in security matters, which has become the mainline direction in recent years: ensuring security through ways of reducing armaments, rather than building them up," he said.

Nuclear Test Talks

LD3001184190 Moscow TASS in English 1820 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 30 TASS—U.S. actions create a qualitatively new situation around the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on nuclear tests and may undermine the support U.S. and Soviet efforts for the stage-by-stage termination of nuclear tests enjoy in the world, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Vadim Perfilyev told a briefing today.

Perfilyev commented on the statement by the U.S. State Department of January 22, 1990, about the U.S. intention to postpone further negotiations on nuclear tests with the Soviet Union until after the 1974 and 1976 treaties are ratified by the Senate.

Perfilyev described pronouncements by State Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler at a Washington briefing on January 25 as an attempt to "remove concern prompted by the above-mentioned statement by the State Department".

Tutwiler claimed that the statement did not imply any changes in the U.S. stand but rather the desire to have some time to monitor the fulfilment of protocols to the 1974 and 1976 treaties so that the sides could accumulate experience in using the new methods of control elaborated for these protocols.

The Soviet Union views the Geneva negotiations as an integral process, which will lead to the complete termination of nuclear tests, Perfilyev stressed. The Soviet Union joined these negotiations on the condition that the United States agreed with this approach.

Breaks between negotiation rounds to report to governments and receive new instructions are inevitable and even useful, as they are a part of the negotiation process. However, it is important that there are no breaks that could violate the unified and progressive movement towards freeing the world from nuclear tests, Perfilyev stressed.

He noted that bilateral talks with the United States are one means by which to reach the complete termination of nuclear tests. He conveyed the Soviet assurance that it is necessary to step up multi-sided efforts to solve this problem, including efforts at the conference on disarmament.

Perfilyev recalled that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev recently confirmed Soviet readiness to stop all nuclear tests at any time, if the United States will agree to do likewise.

Recent Ortega Declaration

LD3001222390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1633 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 30 Jan (TASS)—The Government of Nicaragua is undertaking practical measures to implement the accords of the presidents of the five Central American countries directed toward the further democratization of political life in the country and national reconciliation. Vadim Perfilyev, first deputy chief of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said this at a briefing today. He cited as new evidence of this the recent declaration by Daniel Ortega, the president of Nicaragua, that all individuals convicted of counterrevolutionary activities and service in the Somoza Guard will be released if there is a victory for the Sandinist National Liberation Front in the 25 February elections this year.

It is appropriate to recall, the representative of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, that in July of last year the Nicaraguan Government released about 1,900 former Somoza Guards.

Shevardnadze Interviewed on Talks, Warsaw Pact

LD3001110890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0927 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 30 Jan (TASS)—USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has answered questions from

Bogdan Ivanov, special correspondent of the Bulgarian newspaper VECHERNI NOVINI. Text of the interview follows.

Question: What is the USSR foreign minister's view of the world in late January-early February?

Answer: It is going through renewal and, in the process, it is becoming increasingly aware of its integrity. This a world in which the preeminence of values common to mankind, proclaimed by the new political thinking, is turning from a theoretical postulate into a real reference point for practical deeds aimed at solving today's most important tasks. This is a world taking a sharp turn away from the arms race toward disarmament, from an ecological abyss toward restoring the environment, from neglecting human rights toward making their most lofty ideals a reality, and from schism toward unity.

This is how I see its development, and Soviet foreign policy is working precisely in this direction.

Question: Are we getting nearer to the common European home? What promotes and what hinders this process?

Answer: There can be no doubt that the idea of building a common European home, porposed by Mikhail Gorbachev, serves as a powerful intellectual and political stimulus for developing the European process. The concepts of "European confederation" and a "confederative European community," suggested by French President Francois Mitterand and Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens are in tune with this idea and have originated under its obvious influence.

The processes of perestroyka and renewal, which are going on in the USSR and East European countries, make a crucial contribution to the advance toward the common European home. Progress at the talks on reducing conventional armed forces in Europe, where an accord can and should be attained as early as this year, is an important element. Measures within the framework of the Helsinki process, among which the ecological forum that was held in Sofia recently has taken a prominent place, are being successfully implemented. On the whole, fairly vigorous accumulation of "positive stock" is taking place.

I would include in the category of "interference" the fact that the dynamic changes on the continent have made certain Western politicans giddy and prompted them to pursue their own ambitions rather than those of the European peoples. It would be to nobody's benefit were there a destabilization of the situation in Europe.

In this context, Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal for staging a summit level meeting this year of the heads of the European states, the United States, and Canada carries particular weight. Such a meeting could, on the one hand, provide fresh impetus for the pan-European process, while on the other clarify the points threatened by destabilization.

Question: Significant changes for the better have started in relations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. But nevertheless, does it not seem to you that there exists an imbalance between them? Does it not seem to you that the Warsaw Pact has gone further along the road of rapprochement than NATO in the political and military sphere?

Answer: I think that the Warsaw Treaty Organization can be proud of the fact that it was the one to come forward with a number of very important initiatives in the political and military sphere. That means the proposal to start talks on a reduction of military forces from the Atlantic to the Urals, the declaration on the defensive character of its military doctrine, the major unilateral reductions in armed forces and weapons, and their restructuring in accordance with the defensive doctrine.

Have these steps found a response in the West? Have they led to a change for the better in the situation in Europe?

Without a doubt, they have. They have played a noticeable role in a substanital warming of the European climate. Talks on conventional armed forces are proceeding successfully. NATO is having to consider the nature of its military doctrine, and this issue has become a topic of discussion at the representative seminar in Vienna.

In certain NATO countries the question of reducing their own armed forces is arising on a practical level.

Could the NATO countries have reacted more boldly to the initiatives of the Warsaw Pact, and gone further in their steps in response? They probably could. But after all, the process is not yet complete; the dialogue, the contacts, and the talks are continuing.

In general, I want to say that there are still many unexploited possibilities in the dialogue between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. This was shown by my recent visit in Brussels to NATO headquarters and my conversations with Manfred Woerner, secretary general of NATO, and representatives of this organization's member countries. A further "fortress" was taken; one more stereotype of the "cold war" was destroyed.

Question: What is the current state of the Warsaw Pact? How are relations between its members?

Answer: It is of fundamental importance that all the Warsaw Pact members continue to understand this organization's importance from the point of view of their own national interests. The Warsaw Pact is an essential element in the stability on the European continent.

Times are changing; the nature of our organization is changing too. It is evolving from a military-political alliance into a political-military one. We are convinced that The Warsaw Treaty Organization should continue—right up to mutual disbandment along with NATO—to take an active role in the final defeat of confrontation and the demilitarization of Europe.

Question: What is your appraisal of the changes in East European countries, bearing in mind that certain communist parties have lost their position in these states?

Answer: There is no point in denying that the fate of communist parties in East European countries concerns us, and their misfortunes do not delight us. We hope that they will overcome their period of crisis.

At the same time, we respect the will of the peoples who are currently bringing other political forces to the forefront.

Whatever the case, the countries of Eastern Europe remain our neighbors, allies, and friends. We intend to continue close cooperation with them. Any other plans would not correspond to the interests of our peoples.

Question: Do you think that the world is progressing toward the elimination of local conflicts?

Answer: There are tangible achievements in this difficult matter. Namibia has gained independence. The process of a political settlement in Central America has progressed a long way, although the United States invasion of Panama has again led to exacerbation of the situation in the region. The mechanism for promotion of a Cambodian settlement has been established and has become more active of late. The situation in the Near East, also, does not seem to be a dead end, given a more flexible stance from Israel. The obvious fruitlessness of military methods, I think, will all the same compel opposition forces to opt for a political solution in Afghanistan.

Thus the prospects for the closing of very old wounds seem quite realistic.

But there is a broader question. The international community can and must set itself the task of preventing international conflicts. Here, obviously, the United Nations, which is experiencing a real renaissance, will have to play a leading role.

Question: in accordance with the principles of the new political thinking, you, on behalf of the Soviet Government, are doing everything possible to achieve a relaxation of tension and a rapproachement of world peoples. At the same time, in the Soviet Union itself the situation in the Baltic republics is a very delicate one, there are bloody conflicts on national grounds in the Transcaucasus, and there are big difficulties in the economy. Some commentators are saying that perestroyka has reached an impasse, that it has little time left.

Do you agree with such an opinion, and what is your assessment of the situation in the country and of the country's future?

Answer: I categorically do not agree that perestroyka has reached an impasse. Perestroyka remains the main direction of the development of our state and society. There is no alternative to it. The country is currently going through its most difficult transitional period, namely the transition from administrative- command socialism to democratic-humane socialism, from a harshly centralized economy to a self-financing market economy, from an essentially unitary state to a genuinely federative one. This is a genuine peaceful revolution.

The difficulties of the transitional period—considerable under any conditions—are exacerbated by the fact that many problems engendered by the deformations of socialism, previously either ignored or simply suppressed, have surfaced. They must now be tackled, and this must be done "on the move," so to speak, all the while advancing the cause of perestroyka.

Our huge country and great people have colossal reserves and resources. Perestroyka is mobilizing them. Therein lies the guarantee of its assured ultimate success.

Question: Are you satisfied with your achievements as the USSR's foreign affairs minister?

Answer: I am satisfied with the way that our state's foreign policy has changed. Suffice it to recall the reception accorded to Mikhail Gorbachev on the streets of cities even in those countries where until quite recently we were regarded with suspicion, if not hostility. We have more friends and are better understood. The international prestige of the Soviet Union has undoubtedly grown.

As for my personal achievements in my post as minister, I think not so much of those as of what remains to be done. I am constantly aware of the burden of responsibity.

Ponomarev Views Reforms, Problems Cited

PM3001112990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jan 90 First Edition p 3

[Observer Manki Ponomarev article under rubric "World Today: Problems and Views": "Considered, Realistic..."]

[Text] Perestroyka is going through a critical time [moment].... These words, which can now be seen in official documents, in press articles, and in radio and television broadcasts, already seem to have become familiar and ceased to be perceived as an alarm signal. And yet they reflect such facts of life concerning both our entire society and each one of us that we must not fail to ponder them. And ponder them today, without delay: Tomorrow could be too late.

Of course, the critical factor [moment] in the development of perestroyka is, above all and chiefly, of an internal nature. It is determined by delays in realizing the economic reform, by the unbalanced nature of the country's national economy, by the braking encountered by the reform of the political system, and by the growth of interethnic tension, which in the Transcaucasus has now reached the point of armed clashes bringing blood, death, and destruction. But, for all the dramatic nature of these realities of our life, I would like to address another aspect of the matter—the external aspect. Or, to put it more accurately, the way people in the West are reacting to the processes taking place in the Soviet Union. And what follows from this. I will at once stipulate that I cannot claim to be giving an all-embracing account. Nevertheless...

Perestroyka within the country and the new thinking which has stemmed from this and which has now been made the basis of Soviet foreign policy have brought our country a credit of confidence. Not at once, not in all spheres, not in all areas equally, but we do now have it and we can enjoy it quite widely.

Let us recall that it took G. Bush 9 months after entering the White House to define his attitude toward the Soviet Union. They were months of hesitation, doubts, and analyses. In the end the conclusion was drawn. "I want perestroyka to be a success," the President declared, "and I want cooperation with the Soviet Union." This thought has recently been repeated quite frequently. Here are other words by the head of the White House: "I hope that Gorbachev will not only hold out but also preserve his strength, since I believe that the success and progress of perestroyka accord with our interests."

Official circles and the broad public in other Western countries also adhere to the same position. There is no need to speak about this in detail—the facts are well known. I will cite just one statement by FRG Foreign Minister H.D. Genscher: "We all have an interest in the success of the reforms in the Soviet Union, since there cannot be a peaceful order in Europe without the USSR." This is a typical expression of opinions.

Why does the West show such interest in the success of our perestroyka? Because it leads to stability in the international arena, to our policy's predictability, and to the lessening of military confrontation and of the threat of war. Another quote: "Although the Soviets retain considerable military potential, the political likelihood of their using this potential against us or our allies in Europe is now the smallest it has been in recent decades." This statement comes from such an authoritative person in the military sphere as General C. Powell, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It should be said that there also exists on the other side of the ocean a different viewpoint, to which representatives of the most conservative U.S. circles adhere. Their new credo was made public recently. An article signed "Z" appeared in the journal DAEDALUS. Predicting "the imminent collapse of communism all over the world," its author urges Western countries at least not to help "communist states" so as not to delay "the collapse of the communist system." This is how some people on the other side of the ocean perceive perestroyka in our country and the events occurring in central and East Europe.

This program of the rightists must be taken seriously, for powerful forces are behind it. But all the same it is not they who today determine the West's attitude toward the USSR. This was clearly shown by the nature of the international reaction to the events in the Soviet Transcaucasus.

For all the diversity of the responses and the shades of opinion and assessment, a considered, realistic approach prevails. Here is the official U.S. position in connection with the situation which has taken shape in Azerbaijan: "We hope that conditions will soon have been created under which a political dialogue can be effected. Such a dialogue must accord with the aspirations of all the republic's peoples... Chairman Gorbachev himself has declared repeatedly that relations between Moscow and the republics must be changed and that the Soviet political system must be open to greater public involvement. Since 1933 we have recognized the USSR's territorial integrity. Any changes to this country's status—on condition that they are implemented peacefully and in a constitutional manner—are a question to be decided by the sides concerned."

This is probably the typical reaction of Western countries to events in our country. Many states' leaders emphasize that they are aware of the need to restore legality and order in the Transcaucasus and declare that this is an internal matter for the Soviet Union. Consequently, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the Soviet leadership's actions aimed at settling the interethnic conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia have been perceived with understanding by the majority of governments and by world public opinion. At the same time, according to the WALL STREET JOURNAL, the conclusion is being drawn in the United States that "Mikhail Gorbachev will pursue a differentiated policy to control the intensifying interethnic crisis and will thus retain powers to continue the policy of easing military confrontation with the West."

There is also, it is true, a somewhat different approach to the events occurring in the Transcausasus. Two trends are noticeable in Iran, for example. Whereas the Soviet leadership's actions to end the bloodshed meet with approval, at the same time there is an undoubted expression of sympathy with the actions of militants on the part of Muslim fundamentalists, who even support the idea of creating a "great Islamic Azerbaijan." But it should not be forgotten that extremist circles would like to incorporate in it both the northern provinces of Iran and certain regions of Turkey. All this cannot fail to cause concern in Tehran.

Great concern is also being shown in Turkey. The Turkish leadership is having to steer between the need to observe the principle of noninterference in the USSR's internal affairs and the reaction of certain local public circles, their anti-Armenian mood, and their attitude toward coreligionists in Azerbaijan.

Western countries are also trying to take a realistic approach to the other problems which the Soviet Union is encountering. There are many examples here. I will name just one more.

For a long time the United States and certain other countries refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Baltic republics' incorporation in the USSR. Many noisy propaganda campaigns were mounted to condemn the "enslavement" and "oppression" of those republics' peoples. But, as perestroyka has developed, nationalist forces in the region have begun raising increasingly sharply the question not only of improving the USSR's federative structure but also of seceding from it. You might think that the West should have seized on this idea, for it is, after all, a question of weakening the USSR. But in fact? In fact, the Baltic nationalists are not receiving the expected support. This is because the West's interests are met today by a strong, stable Soviet state, not by a country weakened by political, economic, and national disorder, in which power could end up in the hands of right-wing or left-wing extremist forces.

Yes, the events in the Transcaucasus and the Baltic region, the other difficulties which the Soviet Union is experiencing, and also what is happening in East Europe are giving rise to certain fears in the West and making people ponder on the further development of events. France's LE MONDE believes that the most important problem for the USSR at present is not the correlation of forces in the party or the USSR Supreme Soviet but the impossibility of central power maintaining control over the country. Similar thoughts can be encountered in the pages of the press in other countries too. Many of them give expression to the risk that the crisis in the USSR could lead to unforeseen results. And this would have a very serious impact on the situation throughout the world. The course of events could be reversed, and the consequences would be unpredictable.

Hence the conclusion: If stability in the Soviet Union's internal situation is strengthened, its international position will also be strengthened. If it is weakened, new threats will begin to arise. And if we have every reason to say that a considered and realistic approach predominates in the West today with regard to the USSR, we must remember that this is only for the time being. And it must become permanent. This will only be possible when such an approach accords with the fundamental interests of everyone—both us and our partners abroad. The USSR's strong international position is an important guarantee of the success of perestroyka, with which we have linked our destiny.

Petrovskiy Discusses General Assembly Session

PM3001161390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jan 90 Second Edition p 5

[Interview with V.F. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister and deputy chief of Soviet delegation to 44th Session of UN General Assembly, conducted by unnamed own correspondent: "Working Atmosphere at United Nations"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Correspondent] At the present session the Soviet and American delegations put forward a joint initiative in support of the United Nations. How do you rate the significance of Soviet-American cooperation at the United Nations for the development of the international situation?

[Petrovskiy] The deepening Soviet-American dialogue, moving from mutual understanding to collaboration, including at the United Nations, has exerted a positive, you could even say saluatary, influence on the session. The support given the Soviet-American initiative by all states shows that such collaboration is in tune with the needs of the time. Let us hope that it will make a considerable contribution to establishing multilateral cooperation and strengthening security on an all-embracing, multifaceted basis.

[Correspondent] The enhancement of the peacemaking role of the United Nations in settling regional conflicts is now acquiring special significance. The international community enthusiastically welcomed the results of the free elections held in Namibia under UN auspices. What have been the basic decisions adopted by the session regarding conflict situations in the world and, in particular, the situation in Afghanistan?

[Petrovskiy] By general assent the Assembly has again advocated an all-embracing political settlement in Afghanistan through proper implementation of the Geneva accords and the establishment of inter-Afghan dialogue.

Securing the agreement of all to this approach has been one of the session's most important results. We intend to proceed on this basis in our further action to secure a final solution of the problem of Afgfhanistan and achieve peace for its people. We are relying on other countries moving in the same direction, particularly those directly involved in the conflict. Our support for the UN secretary general's efforts to find a just solution to the Afghan tragedy remains unchanged.

It is characteristic that the session reached consensus on decisions on Central America and—for the first time in many years—on the Western Sahara.

The United Nations' tasks in maintaining international security are not exhausted by the solution of existing conflict situations. It is important—and we have said this at the General Assembly—to work toward developing preventive diplomacy and creating a crisis-prevention mechanism.

[Correspondent] The human factor is assuming increasing significance in international relations at the present stage. How have problems of human rights been reflected in the session's work.

[Petrovskiy] Our new approaches to human rights questions found their most complete conceptual expression in Mikhail Gorbachev's UN address in December 1988. We clearly advocate the universalization of international relations in defense of human rights and the improvement of verification mechanisms to ensure that they are observed. We think that the norms enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international pacts on human rights, and other fundamental documents form a strict framework within which every state should operate. The session adopted a whole series of decisions designed to put these norms into practice everywhere and to form a community of rule-of-law states. The approval of the convention on combating the use of mercenaries is a manifestation of the search for common moral principles in international affairs.

The assertion of panhuman values is inseparable from the assertion of the priority of international law in politics. Herein resides one of the bulwarks of stability in a fast-changing world. It is our impression that awareness of such realities is an area of not only growing agreement but mutual conceptual enrichment. While putting forward our own proposals we have actively supported the proposals of other states and above all the nonaligned states' initiative proclaiming the nineties to be the decade of international law.

Council of Europe Overtures to East Europeans

PM3001151190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jan 90 Second Edition p 5

[Dispatch by PRAVDA and TASS own correspondents N. Miroshnik and V. Drozhzhin under "Democracy and Law" rubric: "Under Auspices of Council of Europe"]

[Text] Venice, 26 Jan—To date 17 West European states have joined the international commission for the development of democracy through law. But, as its chairman, an Italian named A. La Pergola, told journalists, the first step will be to draft rules for the admission of new members, above all those who do not belong to the Council of Europe, since the commission was specially conceived not as an organ of the Council but merely under its auspices so that involvement by all council members is not mandatory and third countries are afforded the opportunity to participate.

But it was the Council of Europe which initiated the formation of the commission as an instrument facilitating the emergence of a "European legal entity" and as a center to study the activity of democratic institutions and to strengthen and develop them.

One of the Council's main tasks is to draw up common legal standards in the most diverse spheres, ranging from social rights to the behavior of sports fans in stadiums. Some 130 international conventions and declarations have been prepared with the help of its specialists.

And yet the Council of Europe did find itself "fenced in," as it were, for a pretty long time. It was only last May that its governing body—the Committee of Ministers—came out in favor of stepping up its activity and raising its political prestige. A declaration signed by ministers noted that the development of ties with socialist countries should become one of the main thrusts of its work.

And such ties are being established. A session of its Parliamentary Assembly, in which representatives of member states' national parliaments sit, decided to grant the status of "special guest" and the right to take part in deliberations but not vote to the parliamentarians of several socialist states, including the USSR. Last November Hungary and Poland signed the European Convention on Education and Culture.

It is not fortuitous therefore that the envoys of nine socialist states came to Venice—for the time being as observers. The USSR was represented by Deputy Foreign Minister A. Adamishin. We asked him to comnnent on the results of the conference.

"Our country attaches great significance to this initiative," A. Adamishin said. "But I would wish to refrain from excessive optimism: It still has to be established which questions the commission will actually deal with, what its final composition will be, and which direction its work will take. However, judging by first impressions, it will be a useful instrument."

Anticommunist Organization, NTS, Discussed

PM3101095590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jan 90 Second Edition p 2

[Yuriy Zhukov "Publicist's Remarks": "Who Are They? An Anticommunist Organization's Self-Portrait and Several Amplifications Thereto"]

[Text] PRAVDA reader O. Vishnevskiy from Bryansk sent in a letter accusing me of being "insufficiently specific" in my articles about the recently intensified activity of our political opponents who conduct anticommunist propaganda in the country. "You do not give their names," he remarks reproachfully. "You do not cite the names of their organizations, nor do you identify their 'prompters' abroad." He actually has doubts: Could it be that these are not political opponents at all, but simply dissidents?

Similar doubts are voiced by S.I. Fedinin from Gorkiy: "Why is it that Yu. Zhukov did not identify the anticommunists by name?" "It is logical to assume," he declared, "that those whom he describes as anticommunists are creatively thinking fighters against the administrative edict system."

Very well, these doubts and suspicions are not hard to dispel. Let us do no more than take a closer look at the activity of the oldest anticommunist organization, one which calls itself the "People's Labor Alliance of Russian Solidarists" [NTS]. Let us look at its program, which was published in Frankfurt (FRG), where this organization's leadership center is located, and at the public statements by so-called "overt members" of the NTS who are in the USSR (this is how they describe themselves, emphasizing in the process that other members operate illegally from the underground).

This, for example, is what was said about the goals of the NTS in the August 1989 issue of the journal POSEV which it publishes—it is printed in Frankfurt and delivered to this organization's "overt members" for dissemination in the USSR: "The NTS is struggling for the elimination (!) of the regime existing in the USSR."

The tasks which the NTS sets for itself are outlined in greater detail in the program document adopted by its leadership organ in November 1987—a leaflet containing the text of this document was acquired for R3 from an individual in Moscow's Pushkin Square. It advocates the selfsame objective—the "overthrow of bolshevism" and the "dismantling of socialism." Page 6 of this document contains an outright call to "resolutely and openly overthrow" the "burden of Lenin's heritage."

It is typical that the document's authors frankly declare that they are the heirs and successors of "those who, ever since October 1917, were convinced of the falsehood (!) of the path taken by our country at that time, of those who defended Russia's honor and freedom (?) during the Civil War against Bolshevik violence," to use their own malicious expression.

In order to somehow embellish their self-portrait, the Frankfurt lot right away add that the NTS is supposedly a "democratic organization" advocating "people's power" [narodopraviye], the creation of a "self-regulating society," "cooperation between classes" on the basis of something called "Christian solidarism," and so on and so forth. But all these meaningless words are incapable of concealing the main point: The NTS was conceived and created and it operates as an organization which has set itself the goal of overthrowing the state system created by our people as a result of the socialist revolution. And, for this goal's sake, it eagerly allies itself with all anticommunist forces, right down to nationalists and separatists.

A reminder to this effect was provided by recent statements made by NTS "overt member" V. Senderov in the Riga newspaper ATMODA, which the U.S. news agency AP described on 26 October 1989 as "frankly anticommunist."

Way back on 19 June last year, ATMODA carried an interview with V. Senderov who called on Latts and Russians to wage a joint struggle against our state system:

"We have a common enemy in communism, and we can defeat it only jointly," he wrote. "I see no other way... The Baltic region will manage to gain independence only after we have defeated our common enemy."

Some time later, on 4 September, that selfsame Riga newspaper carried, under the headline "What Is the NTS?", a detailed program statement by that same figure, which took up an entire newspaper page. It emphasized that the NTS wants "for Russia a future which would organically stem from its past." "I do not think I would be wrong," this statement said, "if I were to say that the policy of Stolypin (the czar's minister of internal affairs and later head of government, who cruelly put down the revolutionary movement in 1906-12)... is closer to us than the Constitutional Democrats' alternative of 'purely Western democracy.'"

Later on, this interview provides interesting details of how the NTS operates in USSR territory. "Some time in the past," this document says, "a 'molecular structure' of NTS organization was adopted and it exists to this day. Individual people or cells, with a maximum of five members, operate independently of one another and have contacts (if possible) only with the Center. In the event of one such 'molecule' failing, the others remain unharmed."

At the same time, in V. Senderov's words, there are about 15 "overt members" of the NTS in operation, engaged mainly in propaganda by distributing literature delivered from Frankfurt by emissaries of the "Center" and supplying the journals published by the NTS with information reports transmitted by telephone.

The NTS leadership has recently been stepping up its attempts to engage in "overt" anticommunist activity in USSR territory. A so-called "overt sector" of the NTS, headed by its "Executive Bureau" Chairman Yu.B. Bryuno, was created in Frankfurt to lead it.

According to information coming in from the FRG, the "overt sector" of the NTS has now decided to concentrate on work with approximately 50 informal associations, with main attention given to the notorious "Democratic Union."

A whole series of NTS emissaries visited the USSR in 1989 under the pretext of tourism, including "leadership circle" members Frizen, Pushkarev, Rybakov, the same old Shchetinskiy, and the same old Zekinskiy who gained fame as a "French citizen." A public lecture on the innocent-sounding topic of "Russian Emigres Today" was organized in the Saltykov-Shchedrin State Library with help from Rybakov's friends. In reality, V. Rybakov delivered a report on the activity of the NTS which he lauded and advertised by all possible means.

Having reminded his audience that a "covert" organization is operating in USSR territory in addition to the "overt members" of the NTS, this emissary from Frankfurt emphasized, following in the steps of Senderov who expressed similar opinions in the newspaper ATMODA: "The NTS Council believes that it is still early for the covert organization to come out of the underground... We are anticommunists. I am an anticommunist... Consequently, we believe that the system must be changed."

V. Rybakov's guest appearance in Leningrad ended ingloriously: He was reminded that the spread of anticonstitutional propaganda is not a part of a tourist's activities, and he had to urgently cross the USSR border on 21 October.

But the "overt" and "covert" NTS representatives are energetically pursuing their activity. This organization's leaders are now obviously sounding out opportunities to take advantage of the atmosphere of democratization and glasnost for their own purposes.

First, the print runs of literature being dispatched to the USSR are swelling. The opportunity of using certain cooperatives for its distribution is being examined.

For example, back in December 1989, V. Batshev, one of the leaders of the "Dedal" Cooperative operating in the public catering sphere, gave a press conference in Moscow and suddenly announced that he is... the "authorized agent" of the NTS "Posev" Publishing House. His "agency," as he said, intends to run subscriptions for the NTS journal GRANI and to "supply and sell" books printed by "Posev" in Frankfurt so as to "promote pluralism in the humanitarian sphere." In Batshev's words, the "Dedal" Cooperative has concluded a "direct links" contract with "Posev."

A soiree devoted to the activity of the "Posev" Publishing House was held in the Central House of Literary Workers 10 January. That selfsame cooperative member Batshev (who was also introduced as editor of the "unofficial journal" KHRISTIANSKIY VESTNIK) went all out to laud this activity there. He was joined by other orators, including even some Soviet writers who are not averse to having their work published by the NTS publishing house.

It is said that one of the debate speakers, someone by the name of Yu. Karabakchiyevskiy, frankly said that the journal GRANI published by "Posev" is "an anticommunist journal, and this is why we love it!" In passing, he spoke approvingly of the fairly well known Radio Liberty, figuratively comparing its staffers with people besieged in a stronghold with "bolshevik bullets" whistling above their heads. Meanwhile, subscriptions for the journal GRANI were being accepted in the lobby of the Central House of Literary Workers...

But matters go much further than just propaganda of NTS publications. This anticommunist organization is studying the possibility of pushing its own people in the soviets. For example, NTS "overt member" R. Yevdokimov, a resident of Leningrad, has already been nominated as candidate deputy to the Leningrad City Soviet from Petrogradskiy Rayon by the collective of the Leningrad All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Super-Pure Biological Compounds, even though he has absolutely no connection with this institute.

What sort of a man is he? An "hereditary" NTS member (his father was also an NTS member), he is devoting his efforts to anticommunist propaganda. This, in actual fact, is the total extent of his activity—he has no other work. By way of camouflage, he has proclaimed himself to be a representative of the "Russian Section" of the "International Human Rights Society," whose center is also over there, in Frankfurt.

There is a new development in the activity of the NTS—it is now making active attempts to infiltrate workers' collectives. This is how the objectives of this new action by the NTS are defined in the instructions bulletin "Forum of the NTS Friends," which is shipped to the USSR and distributed.

"The first stage of the workers movement is to create in industrial enterprises underground (!) groups of like-minded people which could be styled 'workers solidarity committees.' This is a painstaking daily labor which demands patience. The main goal of the workers movement is the broadest possible coordinated preparation to pressure the authorities (!) by means of strikes." It is furthermore emphasized that "substantial results can only be achieved if the strikes swell into a steady flow all over the country."

Advertising themselves by all possible means as "fighters for freedom," the NTS figures are trying to disown historical facts which have been repeatedly proved and testify that many NTS members were on the side of Hitler's Germany during the war.

The Soviet press has repeatedly identified by name NTS figures who committed the filthiest of crimes during the war. They did not even once refute these facts, limiting themselves to clumsy excuses that, supposedly, during the war "the NTS tried to create a 'third force,' neither with Stalin nor with Hitler, but an independent Russian force." This is why, you see, "NTS members were on some 'self-management' organs in German-occupied territory" and "could (!) fight in Vlasov's Army," and moreover "some of the alliance's members were close (!) to General Vlasov himself" (see the newspaper ATMODA 4 September 1989).

Some of these figures, even though already elderly, still occupy important positions in the NTS leadership. For example, issue No. 6 of the NTS journal POSEV in 1989 published a report that a sitting of the NTS Council on 21-22 May reelected V.D. Poremskiy to its leadership for the period 1989-93. The journal MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN wrote about him in its issue No. 9 in 1987:

"VLADIMIR POREMSKIY. Offspring of a white emigre family. Served with the French police before the war. Cooperated closely with the Gestapo during the occupation of Paris. Was promoted and transferred to Berlin. Joined the Imperial Security Directorate, and later the Propaganda Ministry. In 1941, over Radio Berlin, called on Soviet soldiers to surrender. Worked in Hitler's propaganda schools, was held to be a specialist on race questions. After the routing of fascism, ended up in a British jail, but was quickly released as a needed 'specialist.' Became one of the NTS leaders. Was elected its chairman in 1955."

The NTS is also disowning its current "chiefs." But I have in my hands a rather curious document—referring back to 1956, true enough—but it is no less topical. It is a circular from the leadership of Britain's "Secret Intelligence Service" [SIS] distributed to its residents in the United States, the FRG, Turkey, and Sweden. It announces that the SIS is terminating its cooperation with the NTS and its payments for the latter's services, placing it at the CIA's disposal.

Appendix "A" to this message specifically says:

"At a conference between the CIA and SIS held in London 28-29 February 1956, SIS made a statement outlining the reasons behind its wish to terminate its support for the NTS. The SIS involvement was always limited to the collection of secret intelligence data about the USSR, with propaganda along the NTS and 'cold war' lines perceived only as a means to attain this goal, rather than as a goal in itself. Evaluating the results achieved over its 7 years (!) of cooperation with the NTS, SIS drew the conclusion that the amount of intelligence reports collected by the NTS does not justify the expenditure of money, resources, and—apart from all else—the time invested by SIS in this operation. Furthermore, in the opinion of SIS, it cannot be expected that the intelligence reports supplied by NTS would improve quantitatively and qualitatively in the future to an extent making it expedient to continue this work."

According to this document, the British intelligence service terminated its financing of the NTS as of 30 June 1956, and this organization's maintenance was completely taken over by the CIA. SIS residents were instructed:

"a) we are obligated to submit for CIA evaluation a description and detailed information on the work by NTS operatives whom we use for peripheral operational work;

"b) we are obligated to give the CIA detailed information on sums of money paid to groups and individuals along NTS lines."

The question is: In view of all this, is there any value in the clumsy assurances by NTS "overt member" Senderov, who claims in ATMODA that "the first few members of the NTS illegally entered Russian territory even though this entailed mortal danger" for the sole reason of "understanding what is happening to the country and seeing everything for themselves," and that the "molecular structure" they have now created is supposedly engaged in nothing but the distribution of literature for the sake of "preserving Russian culture?"

Of course, the plans being hatched by what is already the third generation of our political opponents, whose family trees go back to White Guards who fled abroad in the early twenties, are not destined to materialize. Their schemes are alien to the Soviet people. This is precisely why the "overt members," trying to disseminate their crazy ideas, are not subjected to administrative influence measures even though that selfsame Senderov claimed in an article published by the NTS journal POSEV last summer that "preparations for the settlement of scores with the political opposition are already completed."

Probably someone in Frankfurt would very much like to depict some of the NTS "overt members," who are now playing the role of some sort of decoy ducks, as innocent martyrs for the sake of launching yet another campaign about "violations of democracy" in the USSR. People in our country are not administratively persecuted for "dissidence." But actual subversive actions aimed against our state system will continue to be resolutely terminated—strictly in compliance with the law recently adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet. There should be no doubts at all about this.

United States & Canada

President Bush Telephones Gorbachev 31 Jan

LD3101161790 Moscow TASS in English 1609 GMT 31 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 31 TASS—U.S. President George Bush rang up Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev today.

They exchanged opinions on topical international issues, predominantly concerning Europe, and on prospects for the arms reduction negotiations. They reaffirmed their determination to act in the spirit of the Malta accords, noted the importance of regular Soviet-American summit contacts and favoured the consolidation of an atmosphere of mutual understanding and cooperation.

U.S., Soviet Presidents Congratulate Academies

LD3001225990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2209 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Excerpts] Washington, 31 Jan (TASS)—Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and George Bush, the U.S. President, sent congratulatory messages to the presidents of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the USSR Academy of Sciences on the 30th anniversary of cooperation between the two centers of academic thought. [passage omitted]

"I convey my sincere congratulations on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of scientific cooperation between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences," says the Soviet leader's message. "During past years scientific contacts between Soviet and American scientists have made a huge contribution to the development of science and the improvement of mutual understanding between the peoples of our countries. I express hope that cooperation between the scientists of the two academies will continue to become stronger in the interests of world scientific progress and the well-being of the peoples of the USSR and the United States." [passage omitted]

Shevardnadze-Baker Meeting Postponed to 8 Feb

LD3001221990 Moscow TASS in English 2216 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Washington January 31 TASS—The American-Soviet meeting at the level of foreign ministers will be held one day later. It will be held in Moscow on February 8, Thursday, and February 9, Friday. Spokeswoman for the U.S. Department of State Margaret Tutwiler told a briefing here on Tuesday. She said Secretary of State Baker will arrive in Moscow Wednesday afternoon, February 7.

Dubinin: New U.S. Military Budget Too Large

LD3001144390 Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] The Soviet ambassador to Washington, Yuriy Dubinin, has described the new U.S. military budget as too large in the light of substantial cuts in his country's military potential. The Soviet Union, he told newsmen at the embassy, consistently reduces its arms and troops and therefore the United States enormous military spending is a waste of funds. The USSR, the ambassador stressed, will continue its policy of arms reductions regardless of what the United States does. He commented on the request for nearly $307 billion for the next fiscal year submitted to the Congress by the Bush administration. The budget estimates provide for a 2 percent cut in general military allocations. This involves the closing or conservation of dozens of military facilities in the United States and overseas. At the same time, funds for the Star Wars program and for strategic offensive weapons will increase considerably.

'Skirmishes Inevitable' on U.S. Draft Budget

PM3001193990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Jan 90 First Edition p 5

[Dispatch by own correspondent V. Gan: "Skirmishes Inevitable. Bush Administration Presents Draft Budget"]

[Text] Washington, 30 Jan—It weighs more than 2 kilograms and it has 1,592 pages. These are the external dimensions of the draft federal budget for fiscal 1991, which the Bush administration today sent to the U.S. Congress for its consideration. The "filling" is also impressive. The expenditure side of the President's proposed budget is $1,233.3 billion and the revenue side is $1,170.2 billion.

People were looking forward to the current White House incumbent's first independent budget plans—last year he just made a few minor amendments to the budget elaborated by the Reagan administration. It is true that the country's main financial document enables one to form a more or less objective idea of the President's political-economic philosophy and his appreciation of national priorities. Hence the keen disappointment with which Congress greeted the draft budget, calling it "misleading" and "unjust."

Judging by Bush's proposals, he is following firmly in his predecessor's footsteps. The brunt of the struggle against the federal budget deficit—in the current fiscal year it is expected to be of the order of $123.8 billion—will continue to be borne by domestic programs, which it is recommended should be cut or eliminated altogether. Aid for farmers, the child care program, public transport, education, Medicare programs, restrictions on the growth of government employees' pensions, loans to small businessmen hit by natural disasters—these are among the biggest victims. Bush says that all these put together will make it possible to more than halve the excess of expenditure over revenue, which is to be reduced to $63.1 billion.

Despite all the talk about the "peace dividend" that can be heard in the capital in connection with the political transformations in the Soviet Union and East Europe, the administration has decided not to attack in any significant way the Pentagon's immoderate appetite. The overall military budget, taking into account the Energy Department's nuclear programs for the next fiscal year, is set at $306.9 billion. The administration plans to allocate directly to the Pentagon $295.1 billion, $292.1 billion of which is intended for specific military programs.

Admittedly, there are plans for such steps as the partial or complete closure of a number of military bases, which will result in the elimination of 29,000 jobs and the disbandment of two tank divisions, and a number of other measures. But this is only "scraping the fat" off the unprecedented military development that ballooned under the Reagan administration, costing the country more than $2 trillion. All the Pentagon's main programs remain intact. The White House is demanding that appropriations for SDI be increased to $4.8 billion and advocates the acquisition of "Stealth" bombers, new submarines and fighters, and so on. "I do not think we need a new strategy. In my view, a slight adjustment is needed, a few changes, but the overall strategy we have adhered to for 40 years remains completely reasonable," U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney declared, leaving no room for any doubt as to how the Pentagon is reacting to the changing world.

Congress reacted immediately to the draft budget. Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee J. Sasser declared that the document submitted by the administration "is a combination of cold war survivals and renovated Reaganism." Commenting on the Pentagon request, S. Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said: "We must ask ourselves the question—can we allow ourselves all these weapons systems and do we need them?"

Such utterances on the part of leading legislators have resounded in Washington as a kind of artillery barrage before the full-scale political war that is usually waged over the budget. On this occasion it promises to be even more intensive, because this year is the year of the midterm elections. Since domestic program cuts are scarcely going to thrill Americans, given the Pentagon's continuing prosperity, the prediction is for budget skirmishes to find mutually acceptable compromises.

U.S. Defense Budget at 'Usual' High Level

LD3001160390 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] The United States Administration has forwarded to Congress the draft of a budget for the new fiscal year beginning on 1st October. Now a commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov:

The budget, which includes expenditures on arms, has been anticipated with hope this time. Many congressmen and observers have discussed what peace dividends America could get in the new international situation. How much can be reallocated for civilian needs by cutting defense spending? For now, as the White House admits, Soviet-American ties are entering a new era with former dangers and threats being pushed to the background. One thinks that on familiarizing themselves with the administration proposals many Americans will be disappointed. In fact, the administration proposes keeping military expenditures at a high level as usual. The funds may look reduced only if we take into consideration the inflation, but even so they'd be cut only by 2 percent. They may also appear reduced if we compare them with the previous timetable for their annual growth endorsed by the former Administration. If we take net proposed sums it will even indicate some increase in arms spending.

The Pentagon's budget totals nearly $287 billion. Two hundred and ninety two billion dollars, or $5 billion more, has been proposed for next year. To answer the congressmen who suggested a significant cut in defense spending, the Defense Secretary Richard Cheney has been laying the stress on the fact that for the first time in years the Pentagon is not going to boost its budget. He argues that the Pentagon has been somewhat reducing its personnel and plans to reduce the number of military bases. He even promises that by 1995 America will have the lowest level of military expenditures in all the years starting before the war.

But why promises? Why not advance toward this goal now? If you recall, during 1989 and this year Soviet expenditures on defense are cut by more than 14 percent. Within the framework of this reduction funds on arms this year have been slashed by 8 percent as compared to last year. Last year's Soviet defense budget amounted to R77.3 billion, or $119 billion. This year it stands at R71 billion, or $109. Simultaneously over these 2 years munitions manufacture in this country has dropped by almost 20 percent. One can say that the Soviet people are already getting peace dividends from converting a large share of its funds and resources to civilian needs. But such dividends would be more imposing if America embarked on the road of cutting military expenditures, too. In this sense, the United States Administration's proposal to keep arms spending at a constantly high level can't help but arouse disappointment in the USSR.

U.S. Budget's Military Allocations Viewed

LD2901213590 Moscow World Service in English 1810 GMT 29 Jan 90

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Excerpts] The White House has sent to Congress the Federal Budget Bill for the 1991 fiscal year, which begins in the United States on 1 October. Spending will amount to $1 trillion 200 billion, with a planned deficit of more than $63 billion. Here is what Radio Moscow news analyst Yuriy Solton writes about the budget's military allocations.

First of all I'd like to point out that the improvement of the international climate and the reduction of the military danger are to a certain extent reflected in the new military budget. True, spending still remains tremendous—more than $300 billion. This means that 1 out of every 4 dollars will (?go) for military needs. Actually the sum is bigger than the present military expenditure, leaving out inflation. On the other hand, if we take the real value of the dollar, military appropriations have now been cut by 2 percent. a moratorium is introduced on new contracts on military construction. Outdated military bases in the outside the country are being closed. The numerical strength of the armed forces of the United States is also somewhat reduced.

This of course is a positive trend, though it is only starting. However, on the whole the peace dividends which could be gained from the lessening of international tension, and growing confidence between the Soviet Union and the United States falls short of the expectations of the Americans. The Washington administration intends to continue implementing the major military program. This includes the Strategic Defense Initiative or the Star Wars program, as it is also called. It is planned to build the strategic B-2 Stealth bomber, and the MX or Midgetman in the continental missile. [as heard]

The White House budget director (Richard Barman) has tried to justify spending on major military programs by claiming that they are necessary for defense from the still-existing Soviet military (?process), he said, and for conducting disarmament talks with Moscow from the position of strength. Such assertions have been met with skepticism in the American Congress. [passage omitted] All this indicates that there will probably be a sharp debate in Congress when approving the country's military spending. And the administration will hardly be able to push through all its proposals, writes Radio Moscow news analyst Yuriy Solton. Incidentally, the Soviet Union is reducing its military spending for the 2d year. [passage omitted]

U.S. Media Cited on Draft Federal Budget

PM3001164590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Own correspondent A. Shalnev dispatch: "What Will Be In the Budget"]

[Text] New York—The draft federal budget is supposed to be a secret document. Until, of course, it is officially submitted to Congress by the U.S. President. But the details of the draft for the next fiscal year, 1991, which starts 1 October, are already filling the newspapers.

In my view, the most detailed "leak" of budget information was provided by THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, which reported Thursday that "next week the President will propose cutting the Armed Forces by at least 50,000, abandoning a series of arms purchasing programs, and possibly scrapping approximately 100 military bases" in the United States and abroad. According to the newspaper, citing sources in Congress and military-industrial complex enterprises, total military spending is planned to be $232 billion. In principle this is higher than total spending for this year, but if one takes into account inflation, it turns out that in actuality, spending is being cut by around 2 percent.

Among those arms systems further purchases of which the White House and the Pentagon intend to abandon are M-1 tanks, F-15 fighters, and a number of others. According to THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, the Pentagon, in addition to the reductions and cuts planned for fiscal 1991, "is examining plans to cut the Army by 100,000 men over the next 5 years and to decommission almost 200 Air Force fighters and dozens of ships, including several nuclear submarines. According to some of the budget scenarios being developed by the administration, military spending from 1991 through 1995 will fall by 2 percent per year after allowing for inflation."

Judging by the poll whose results were published in Thursday's NEW YORK TIMES, Americans will give their blessing to the Pentagon's intentions. The newspaper states that three out of every four U.S. citizens believe that the warming in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union paves the way to military spending cuts, and two out of every three are convinced that the money obtained as a result of those cuts—that is, the "peace dividend"—should be used to solve domestic problems, above all, the problem of the fight against drugs. It is worth noting that in January 1981, when Ronald Reagan—who initiated a program to build up military might unprecedented in American history—came to power in the United States, 61 percent of Americans advocated increasing military spending and only 7 percent were opposed. Another notable fact is that, according to the poll figures, more than one-half of Americans believe that the "cold war" is not yet over, but 31 percent of that half still advocate cutting military appropriations.

But there is a bit of a fly in the ointment of the Bush administration's plans. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL reports that the draft budget will leave virtually untouched the basic nuclear missile development [sozdaniye] programs and will stipulate increasing spending on research into the strategic defense initiative—that is, the "Star Wars" program—by approximately 30 percent.

Incidentally, even Richard Perle, who was assistant defense secretary under Reagan and a particularly vigorous advocate of more intensive military building—regardless of the compromises or agreements with the Soviet Union—now says that he thinks it expedient to abandon plans to deploy the MX and Midgetman strategic nuclear missiles.

But THE WALL STREET JOURNAL reports that it is expected that the administration will request around $1.2 billion for the draft budget for 1991 for "work on nuclear-tipped missiles."

TASS Reports Closing of U.S. Korean Bases

LD3001133890 Moscow TASS in English 1244 GMT 30 jan 90

[Text] Tokyo January 30 TASS—Three U.S. auxiliary air bases in South Korea will be closed by July 1992, a spokesman for the South Korean Defence Ministry said on Monday.

He said U.S. Air Force units stationed at the Suwon, Kwangju and Taegu bases will be re-deployed to air bases in Osan and Kunsan, where the main forces of the U.S. tactical air fleet are based.

The U.S. command also plans to withdraw 2,000 service personnel from South Korea.

The announced measures do not entail, however, any drastic reduction of the U.S. military presence in South Korea. At present, South Korea hosts a 43,000-strong expeditionary corps, including the Seventh Air Force Fleet, equipped with 48 F-16 fighter-bombers, 36 F-4E fighters, RF-4Ci reconnaisance aircraft, and other military equipment.

According to South Korean press reports, the U.S. command plans to airlift an additional number of F-16 fighter-bombers to South Korea to reinforce the air force. Beginning in 1993, it will also begin to re-equip the South Korean Air Force with the latest FA-18 Hornet fighters.

In addition, three American bases, two of which are in Taegu and Kwangju and are hardly used even now, will be mothballed. They will still be able to be used for joint operations of the U.S. and South Korean air forces.

The presence of American troops in South Korea and the expansion of bilateral military cooperation will be a major topic at the negotiations between U.S. Secretary of Defence Richard Cheney and South Korean leaders in Seoul in mid-February.

During the visit Cheney will also discuss possible cutbacks in the U.S. land forces in South Korea, the YONHAP News Agency reports. The results of the talks will be summed up in a report that the Bush Administration intends to submit to the U.S. Congress by April 1.

Customs Delegation Makes U.S. Visit

PM3101145990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Knowing Each Other Better"]

[Text] Washington, 29 Jan—The preparation of an agreement on cooperation between the U.S. and USSR customs services is the main aim of the visit to the United States by a delegation from the USSR Council of Ministers State Customs Control Main Administration headed by V.K. Boyarov, chief of the State Customs Control Main Administration.

As economic and humanitarian contacts develop and expand between our countries and joint enterprises are created, the customs officers are faced with two main tasks: regulating the growing streams of passengers and freight and fighting smuggling, primarily the illegal shipment of narcotics, V.K. Boyarov said in an interview with a TASS correspondent. These questions were in fact the basis of the first agreement on cooperation between the U.S. and USSR customs services, whose elaboration is at the concluding stage. They were the subject of discussions between the Soviet delegation and Carol Hallett, leader of the U.S. customs service, Melvin Levitsky, assistant to the U.S. Secretary of State for International Affairs connected with narcotics, and John Lawn, drug enforcement administration administrator.

"The elaboration of a new customs tariff is in full swing in the USSR and computer systems are being introduced for the processing of freight turnover," V.K. Boyarov stressed. "The Americans have accumulated great experience in these fields. We must seek a language of communication in order to use mutually acceptable forms and methods of customs control and to exchange experience. We are meeting with interest from the U.S. side and the readiness to cooperate on a broad range of questions, including in the field of cadres training and the exchange of information. This gives us the certainty that it is possible to set up effective collaboration between our countries' customs services."

During the visit the Soviet delegation will be acquainted with the system for training U.S. customs men in the federal training center at Glinko [name as transliterated] in Georgia and with the organization of customs control at air, ground, and sea border crossing points in various parts of the United States.

East Europe

Further Reportage on Gorbachev, Modrow Talks

Gorbachev Urges 'Responsible Actions'

LD3001124890 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1144 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—Negotiations between GDR Premier Hans Modrow and Soviet state and party leader Mikhail Gorbachev opened in Moscow this morning.

USSR Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and the head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, Valentin Falin, took part.

Prior to the talks, Mikhail Gorbachev spoke to journalists about the problem of the rapprochement of the two German states. Asked about the Soviet stance on this question, he spoke in support of responsible actions. "It seems to me there is a certain agreement among Germans in East and West and among the representatives of the four powers that, in principle, German unification is not doubted by anyone."

The Soviet head of state added that the course of current events in the world, Europe, the Soviet Union, and the GDR makes it necessary for the course of events to be thought out carefully. Time is now beginning to have an effect on this process and has clearly accelerated it.

"But I think this is a very important point in European and world politics. All of us, in the GDR, the FRG, and, I am convinced, in all European capitals, and most of all in those of the four powers, must act responsibly," Gorbachev stressed.

"I think that the Germans in the FRG and the GDR also require that this important question, which concerns their fate and that of other peoples of Europe, be solved responsibly. I believe it must not be solved on the street."

The points of departure for this process are clear to him, Mikhail Gorbachev continued. "There are two German states, there are the obligations of the four powers, there is the European process—and it is proceeding tempestuously too—all this must be brought into harmony. This is in our common interest. In no event must the interests of the Germans be allowed to diminish, because I am favor a realistic process. But if we have said that history will decide—and I have said that many times—then it will be so. And I believe that it is already introducing its corrections."

Modrow Holds News Conference

LD3001153290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1450 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 30 Jan (TASS)—Alliance with the USSR is of prime importance for the GDR not only in the sphere of security policy, but also in the economic sphere, Hans Modrow, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, stated here today at a meeting with journalists. He stressed that the GDR's relations with the USSR go far beyond the bilateral framework, and are of decisive importance for equilibrium in Europe and for the process of strengthening peace on the continent.

Hans Modrow gave a high appraisal to perestroyka in the USSR, stressing that this process created favourable conditions for renewal in the GDR.

As the head of the GDR government reported, a central topic in his talks in Moscow with the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and USSR Head of Government Nikolay Ryzhkov was the question of relations between the two German states. Touching on the "German reunification" problem in connection with this, Hans Modrow noted that it can be resolved only within the framework of the pan-European process. He pointed to the need for stage by stage development in this direction, stressing that hasty, ill-considered steps must not be embarked on in this matter. Hans Modrow categorically excluded the possibility of restoration of a "unified Germany within the 1937 borders," stating that the existing borders along the Oder-Neisse are unshakeable.

Replying to a question about right-wing extremism in the GDR, Hans Modrow said that although this phenomenon is heavily exaggerated, a definite stepping up of the activities of such forces is indeed taking place. The GDR authorities are carefully following the development of this negative process and have no intention of ignoring the threat of growing right-wing extremism, he stressed.

Hans Modrow indicated that his country attaches great significance to the development of economic cooperation with the USSR. At the same time, he said, the difference in the rate of economic reforms in the two countries dictates the need to give bilateral economic ties new content.

Replying to a question about possible normalization of relations between the GDR and Israel, Hans Modrow reported that talks are currently in progress on the establishment of diplomatic relations.

Moscow TV Coverage

LD3001203790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 30 Jan 90

[From "Vremya" Newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] A news conference was given by Hans Modrow in Moscow today.

[Reporter A. Zholkver, identified by caption] Interest among journalists in the GDR head of government's meeting with the Soviet leaders is enormous. In the hall, I counted a good dozen television cameras alone. Both Soviet and, especially, foreign journalists' attention was focused on the subject of relations between the two German states and the possibility of their unification. Incidentally, answering one of the many questions on this topic, Hans Modrow spoke out against the word reunification. The point is that some people understand by that a return to Germany's borders of 1937, but that is unacceptable for the overwhelming majority of European states, including the GDR itself, which has signed a treaty with Poland on the inviolability of the Oder-Neisse border.

In turn, the head of the GDR Government spoke in favor of broad interaction between the two German states at the level of treaty-based cooperation, which may develop in the direction of a confederation. Such a development would proceed within the framework of the pan-European process.

Hans Modrow sharply condemned attempts by nationalist forces to exploit the renewal process in the GDR. He stressed that the GDR Government is aware of its responsibility for peace and stability on the European continent and for bestowing a new quality on its traditional relations of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. [video shows Modrow addressing press conference from rostrum]

Silayev, Modrow Cited on Commission Results

PM2601154990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "Republic's Turbulent Days"]

[Text] I.S. Silayev, head of the Soviet delegation at the intergovernmental commission session, was received by H. Modrow, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers. In a friendly conversation the results of the current commission session and prospects of the development of cooperation between the two countries at a qualitatively new level were discussed.

I.S. Silayev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, said in an interview with a TASS correspondent: We have set up a working commission under the cochairmanship of the ministers responsible for the development of foreign economic ties to implement the decisions adopted at the Sofia CEMA session. They have been given 3 months to elaborate a concrete program to switch our relations to new principles. Characterizing the state of the coordination of national economic plans for the coming 5-year plan, it has to be said that it is in this sphere that we have advanced furthest with the GDR. While retaining regulation and state influence in key areas, we intend to grant more freedom in the development of direct links to the two countries' associations and enterprises to ensure that this form of cooperation complements more and more effectively our reciprocal goods exchange.

The former GDR leadership had also expressed itself more than once in support of the development of direct links, but the concrete results in this sphere left much to be desired. How do you view the current stage of this development? the TASS correspondent asked H. Modrow. I believe that direct links are not only a matter of interest, but also of vital necessity for both sides, the head of the government replied. Their developments was never before planned on such a scale as now, as a result of the current session of the intergovernmental commission in Berlin. The GDR has given new powers to its combines in the sphere of international trade which will enable them to give concrete content to their agreements on the establishment of direct ties with Soviet partners. We proceed from the premise that this will favorably influence the development of scientific and technical progress in both countries, H. Modrow stressed.

GDR Neo-Nazis To Take Part in 6 May Elections

PM2601113790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Lapskiy dispatch: "Brown Shadows in GDR Beer Cellars"]

[Text] Berlin—A report has appeared in the newspaper BERLINER ZEITUNG which must have shocked many people. It opened as follows: "The district city of Parchim will become the capital of the 'Republicans' in the GDR in a few days' time. An ADN correspondent learned this from Hans-Rudolf Gutbrodt." The report went on to state that some 500 people had already joined the Republican Party in this small city in the northwest GDR.

Who is Gutbrodt? He is 40 years old and works as an auxiliary at a slaughterhouse. Last December, while on a visit to the FRG, he joined the Republican Party. He says that the constituent congress of the right-wing radical party in Mecklenburg will open no later than early February, most probably in Parchim.

My interview with Peter Krueger, the prominent documentary producer, opened with this piece of news. A few days ago Berlin television screened the first part of his new movie "It Happened in the Gray Month of November," which is devoted to neo-Nazism in the GDR.

"The local neo-Nazis are much more dangerous than the West German ones," P. Krueger says. "Why? In the FRG right-wing radicalism developed in conditions of political pluralism, their neo-Nazis, if you like, have acquired basic democratic skills, they are housebroken, so to speak. Neo-Nazism in the GDR grew up in the underground. It is better organized, cemented by iron discipline and a code of honor borrowed from the SS, and it is more fanatical."

[Lapskiy] Until recently it was sincerely believed in our country that there was no room in the GDR for a rebirth of Nazi ideology. And suddenly....

[Krueger] By no means suddenly. The symptoms of neo-Nazism became visible long ago, but people categorically refused to acknowledge them for fear of undermining the GDR's reputation. Only isolated cases were mentioned. Neo-Nazi thugs who beat up Jews and foreigners, daubed swastikas on the graves of Soviet soldiers, and defiled them were usually tried as common criminals. This untied their hands. The former leadership refused to recognize neo-Nazism as a phenomenon.

[Lapskiy] What causes led to the spread of neo-Nazism, in your opinion?

[Krueger] It would be wrong to think that in 1945 an end was put to Nazism once and for all. The Nazi state was dismantled, but not the Nazi ideology. Foreseeing the collapse of the "Third Reich," the leaders of the Hitler party, and specifically Baldur von Schirach, created a top-secret Nazi network in Thuringia. They supplied it with funds, which were later invested in small private enterprises and workshops, restaurants, and plots of land. This network, or rather its second and third generation, if it is possible to put it this way, has survived to the present day. I have incontrovertible evidence of this, which I included in my movie. However, the main reason, I believe, was the political, moral, and ideological climate established in the GDR after its formation. The Stalinist methods of leadership, the persecution of dissidents, surveillance, and the dual morality—one kind at school and at work, another kind at home and in the beer cellar, the widening gulf betwen propaganda and reality. Ultimately everyone saw that the leaders who were preaching modesty, thrift, and economy in everything were denying themselves nothing, living in villas, and abusing power. This led to moral degradation in the country and prepared the ground for neo-Nazism. During the last few years of his rule Honecker, pitting the GDR against the Soviet Union, deliberately or otherwise, instilled in our citizens nationalism and a sense of superiority over others. At the same time he kept the people isolated from the West, separated by a solid wall. Sooner or later this was bound to bear fruit.

[Lapskiy] Our newspaper has reported the latest neo-Nazi outrages, and specifically the defilement of the Soviet soldiers' graves in Treptow Park. What objectives do they pursue by their actions?

[Krueger] True, they defile the monuments to Soviet soldiers, daub Nazi slogans on walls, threaten people with reprisals on the telephone (I, too have been threatened), and try to frighten people with bomb hoaxes. However, this is not all. They were among those who stormed the building of the former Ministry of State Security last week. I suspect they were looking for files on Nazis. The GDR is experiencing a deep crisis, the government has been weakened, power in the country, as Gregor Gysi told U.S. correspondents a few days ago "is up for grabs." The neo-Nazis want to create chaos and an atmosphere of fear and confusion in the country in order to compromise the democratic parties and show that they are allegedly incapable of establishing order. In such conditions they have a better chance to make headway. Similar situations have occurred in modern history.

[Lapskiy] Do you concede that the neo-Nazis may make headway?

[Krueger] Here in the GDR and abroad people underestimate the danger posed by the new brownshirts, they believe that they are only a shadow of the past, a gloomy reminder of the past. But they are already on the march, their step can be heard. They intend to take part in the 6 May elections along with the others. They are not likely to describe themselves as neo-fascists or even "Republicans," they will find some other diversionary title. However, this does not mean that their essence will have changed.

[Lapskiy] In your opinion, are there many active neo-Nazis in the GDR?

[Krueger] I believe that there are tens of thousands. The flareup of nationalism around the slogan of Germany's unification is rapidly swelling their ranks. I repeat, they are well organized and disciplined, and they train constantly in their cells.

[Lapskiy] Where do they meet?

[Krueger] Naturally, they cannot hope for halls and stadiums today. As a rule, they meet in beer cellars. They are well known there. Frequently waiters are on their side.

[Lapskiy] Could you name such beer cellars in Berlin?

[Krueger] Of course. However, I am currently shooting the second part of my movie in Berlin and also in Erfurt. I am shooting with a hidden camera. Therefore it would be premature to name them. You will see them in the movie.

[Lapskiy] As is known, the national security department has been disbanded and subsequently also the service for the protection of the constitution, which was set up as its replacement. So who is combating the neo-Nazis, as laid down in the GDR Constitution?

[Krueger] A special police department has been set up. It is only just organizing itself. Unfortunately, much time has been lost.

Gorbachev Congratulates New Polish Party Leaders

LD3001194190 Moscow TASS in English 1910 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 30 TASS—Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev warmly congratulated, on behalf of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, Aleksander Kwasniewski, chairman of the Chief Council of the Polish Social Democracy and Lesek Miller, general secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the Polish Social Democracy, on their election to the posts.

The left forces, the message says, being an inalienable part of Polish political and social life, will undoubtedly contribute to the steady development of a friendly Poland along the path of democracy, social justice and progress.

Gorbachev wished Kwasniewski and Miller success in their activities.

Party Property Topic of Sejm Clash Talks

PM2601121790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Jan 90 Second Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "Poland: Extremists' Action"]

[Text] Several dozen young people belonging to extremist groupings burst into the building of the Krakow Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] Committee on Monday and occupied it for several hours.

Sejm deputies and representatives of the local citizens' committee negotiated with those who staged this unlawful action. The leadership of the Krakow PZPR Committee declared that it was handing over the building and also the building of the party ideological training center to the city's mayor until the Sejm had adopted a decision on parties' property. Following this, the extremists who had occupied the building departed.

This is by no means the first forcible action against PZPR buildings and party property, which serves to kindle an atmosphere of hostility and confrontation.

The contradictions which have arisen in the Sejm around the draft law on the property of political parties were discussed at a meeting in Gdansk between T. Fiszbach, vice marshal of the Sejm, representing the PZPR, and L. Walesa, chairman of Solidarity. T. Fiszbach noted that the solution of this problem must be approached without emotion and without taking away from people what belongs to them; it is necessary to add up everything honestly and carefully.

Sejm Official Questioned on Martial Law

PM2601145390 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jan 90 p 3

[Interview in Warsaw with Mikolaj Kozakiewicz, marshal of Polish Sejm, by own correspondent V. Shutkevich; date not given: "What Ails Child of Democracy?"]

[Text] [Shutkevich] Pan Marshal, what, in your view, is the essence of the continuing changes in the East and West European countries? What is it—a repudiation of the former system or a logical consequence of its development?

[Kozakiewicz] I think that the processes taking place in Poland, as in other countries, represent the failure of the former system, which remained too long in an ossified, immobile state. Its adherents failed to notice how it was transformed from a progressive force—and undoubtedly such a period did exist—into a braking force.

The need for change was felt long ago. In fact not a single decade in postwar Poland passed without social explosions. They always gave some impetus to progress, but, unfortunately, they were not so powerful as to lead to qualitative changes in the system itself.

Now many of our politicians are criticizing the past very vigorously, stating that in the past decades nothing was done. A detailed analysis of this era will certainly be made in the future. But, in my view, there is no doubt that 45 years of so-called developed socialism left a very profound impression on the minds of all of us.

[Shutkevich] The newborn democracy, however, has turned out to be an uncommonly restless child which is giving its parents a lot of trouble. Many of our fellow citizens believe that it is precisely democracy which has caused various kinds of conflicts, primarily interethnic ones. What do you think about this?

[Kozakiewicz] I believe that democracy has only exposed those centers of social tension which also existed before. But previously they were contained, hidden, or forcibly suppressed. The Stalinist regime resorted to a number of repressive, punitive measures which cemented the state and created a semblance of unity. If democracy is to blame for anything, then it is only for weakening or entirely destroying these external props and ties based on force. The diseases which were driven deep inside the organism have now come to the surface. Of course, this is very painful. But on the other hand, for the first time, there is a chance to really get down to curing them.

[Shutkevich] What is your opinion on the latest events in our country, in the Caucasus? What, in your view, would the Polish Government do if something similar were to happen in Poland?

[Kozakiewicz] It is very difficult to compare the situations in our countries. First, national conflicts do not exist in our country—at any rate, not as acutely as in the Soviet Union. Second, in past years the Poles have learned to act quite reasonably and to solve their problems not by violent, but by political means. Even the introduction of martial law in Poland passed without great bloodshed.

As for events in the Caucasus, the report of the clashes there and the many casualties has aroused great sympathy and concern in our country. At the same time we believe that everything happening is the Soviet Union's internal affair, and only your government has the right to decide what to do in this situation. Each country must find its own way to solve such conflicts.

[Shutkevich] Pan Marshal, since we have touched on this question of the introduction of martial law in Poland, to what degree was this measure justified, in your view? When can it be used?

[Kozakiewicz] In my view, in the specific situation prevailing in and around Poland toward the end of 1981, the introduction of martial law was an enforced necessity. Although opinions in our society are divided on this question, most agree that any other measures would have been an even worse evil. I would remind you that it was at precisely this time, when the Gdansk shipyards were in turmoil, that Soviet troops went into Afghanistan. The threat of foreign intervention was very real for us. Of course, it is easy to criticize the decision today, when a lot has changed both around us and in the country itself. The point is not even that today "Solidarity" is one-fourth the size that it was back then—it has simply changed. The degree of political maturity of both sides, of both the party leadership and "Solidarity," has changed.

Of course, the introduction of a state of emergency cannot be a panacea for extinguishing all conflicts. As Polish experience testifies, this measure in itself solves nothing, what is more—it objectively deepens the split in society, and leads to the growth of social tension. To a certain extent, the use of it can be justified only if the government makes use of the resultant pause to make radical reforms and fundamental changes in the system itself. Many reproach our previous leadership precisely for the fact that it did not make use of this chance.

[Shutkevich] Among the "infantile disorders" of democracy, and these, in my view, can be seen in Poland today as well as in other countries, is the government's fear of using its power even in those cases wheren this is necessary. I am referring to the disorders outside the Sejm building last Friday, when a group of rampaging youths broke several windows there, prevented parliament from working normally, and then, moving on to the building of the Polish United Workers Party Central Committee, tried to start a fire there. The militia, strange as it may seem, did not intervene....

[Kozakiewicz] What can you do—this evidently is the price you have to pay for democracy.... Of course, I believe that there is a dividing line between democracy and anarchy and it was overstepped in this case. In this situation any government, including the Polish one, has the right to act very resolutely. Why didn't the militia do anything? The leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs cites the fact that the intervention by its employees during an earlier demonstration in which participants were severely beaten up caused a real scandal. But then the demonstration was very peaceful, and there was no need for such violence. In order to avoid such debates in the future, the Sejm intends in the immediate future to adopt a law on meetings that more clearly defines the rights of both citizens and the authorities.

[Shutkevich] Some of our fellow citizens also naively think that democracy relieves them of any responsibility for the results of their labor. Hence their willingness to stop work at every opportunity and the quite unrealistic demands which are sometimes put forward by strikers.... How can they be persuaded that this is not only ruinous for the economy, but also fatal for democracy itself?

[Kozakiewicz] Here it is not strong-arm but economic arguments which are needed. As of the new year, we in Poland started to introduce an economic reform which in a certain sense will force people to work better. First and foremost, I mean the creation of a reserve army of labor, the need for which economists long been repeating. It is still difficult to say how big it will be—say 400,000 or even 1 million unemployed. But in any case this will be quite painful for society. After all, for 45 years people were very certain that there would be enough work for everyone. But now suddenly there is the real danger of losing it. Of course, many people will be dissatisfied. But only by creating a system of economic coercion can the quality of labor be raised, and without that, in turn, it is difficult to talk about our democracy's further development.

NEW TIMES Interviews Romania's Brucan

PM2601085290 Moscow NEW TIMES in English 16-22 Jan 90 pp 6,7

[Interview with Silviu Brucan, member of Executive Bureau of Romanian National Salvation Front, by NEW TIMES correspondent Sergey Svirin in Bucharest; date not given]

[Excerpt] Silviu Brucan is well known in Romania and outside as political scientist, lecturer, ex-ambassador of Romania to the United States, and the author of many books, articles and studies. In spite of the danger to his life when dissidents in Romania were relentlessly persecuted, the professor repeatedly raised his voice of protest against Ceausescu's policy and called his compatriots and party members for energetic action.

Brucan openly condemned the brutal suppression of workers in Brasov in November 1987. In September 1988, at the risk of his freedom, the professor gave a long interview to the Voice of America, in which he severely exposed the real condition of the Romanian people under the Ceausescu regime.

Silviu Brucan was also the initiator of the famous "letter of six" noted Romanian Communists who declared a protest obeying the sense of duty, because "the current policy of Romania discredits the idea of socialism for which we fought and has isolated our country in the world."

The six communists, Brucan included, were subjected to jesuitical methods of persecution for writing this letter.

"When I saw that nothing changed in the Communist Party as a result of my actions, I concluded that I had nothing to do with it." This is how Silviu Brucan explained the reason for his leaving the party of which he was a member for several decades.

Our conversation took place at noon, and in the evening of the same day the free television reported that an Executive Bureau of the Council of the National Salvation Front was elected and that Silviu Brucan became a member of the bureau of this supreme political body of new Romania.

NEW TIMES. How did it come about that the revolution was carried out in Romania practically without the Communist Party?

Silviu Brucan. I shall mention the factors most important in my opinion. First of all, a reformist wing could not take shape in the Communist Party because of Ceausescu's repressive policy. The "letter of six," of which I was the initiator, did not produce the effect on which we counted. It did not cause a political split in the party ranks or in the party leadership. This explains why the Communist Party remained outside the revolutionary process, and it is a distinctive feature of the Romanian revolution. The Romanian public identifies the party with Ceausescu, because in the last 20 years it proved unable to dissociate itself from him in any form.

The present political leadership was formed in the evening of December 22 after the masses had captured the building of the party's central committee. It was there that those who led the movement met for the first time, and it was then that the Communist Party ceased to exist as a political force.

The present political leadership—the National Salvation Front—has gained legality because it led the revolutionary movement. It is an offspring of truly revolutionary effort born in the struggle for power. The Front is a pluralistic organization consisting of people with diverse political and religious views. It includes different political forces and representatives of various social strata. These forces are united by common goals which we formulated on December 22 and 23 in the television centre. It was there that we drafted and edited the Front's first communique and broadcast it. The communique does not even mention the Communist Party, and this reflects the present state of affairs.

N.T. Would you formulate the ideological orientation of the political leadership of new Romania?

S.B. The problem of an ideological orientation has not been decided yet. We think that such notions as socialism and communism have no real sense and basis in Romania today. In Romania, which had a feudal-type superstructure close to the absolute monarchy and per capita national income constituting one-third or one-fourth of that in European socialist countries, there is no ground for terms of this kind. We have no intention to use these notions now. This situation will last until we reappraise our problems.

In our opinion the East European countries seriously lag behind in the theoretical field. We are reaping the bitter fruits of the fossilization of Marxist thought for over half a century, of the ban on theoretical discussions. We do not know in what world we are living, in what direction it is moving, and how it will look tomorrow. It only remains for us to study the social reality in the form it exists in our country at the end of the 20th century, and to revise everything which does not adequately reflect this reality. Such is the task we are setting ourselves.

That is why the only ideological element of the National Salvation Front is that it represents a broad political organization of a left orientation, and no more.

N.T. How much time will it take for the Romanian public to chart ways of the country's further development? Will it be able to do that before or after the April elections?

S.B. I think that the election campaign will provide a good opportunity to learn democracy by crystallizing a new concept. This time we shall proceed from the social reality and not from the theory which was evolved a hundred years ago. During the election campaign the National Salvation Front will put forward its candidates and run as a united organization. Various political parties are being formed outside the Front and, in our opinion, the more parties will appear, the better.

N.Y. Will not the Front's unity be hindered by the activity of members of its council in various parties? For instance, Doina Cornea, a member of the council, is said to be organizing a peasant party.

S.B. It is not so. True, small parties are trying to profit by her name. But she does not take part in their activities. I asked her about that. Political parties are being set up outside the Front and members of its Council have no part in them.

N.T. You are a leading theoretician of present-day Romania. And who is now concerned with the country's economic problems, the elaboration of economic development programmes?

S.B. I must say that an economic reform is not on the agenda in Romania today. THe national economy is in a state of chaos, and the chaos is impossible to reform. First of all, we must determine the real state of affairs and act proceeding from this reality.

N.T. We remember the interview you gave the Voice of America in September 1988. You spoke about your plans and your work on the book "Social History of Eastern Europe." When will it be published?

S.B. The book is to appear in the United States next month. During my trip to Moscow in November 1988 I left the manuscript of the book at the Progress Publishing House. I would be very happy if the book appeared in the Soviet Union too. In general, I think it would be a good idea if works of not only Marxist theoreticians, but also of opponents of Marxism were brought out in the Soviet Union. I consider myself a Marxist theoretician, and my book is based on the Marxist methodology. However, I have not yet received an answer from Moscow.

N.T. Do you authorize us to find out when the Progress is going to publish the book?

S.B. Certainly. [passage omitted]

Lukyanov Receives Romania's Sandru Credentials

PM2601161190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "Presentation of Credentials"]

[Text] On 23 January Romanian Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Vasile Sandru presented his credentials in the Kremlin to A.I. Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

V. Sandru expressed sincere gratitude for the sympathy and solidarity displayed by the Soviet Union in connection with the Romanian people's just struggle, and for the support and assistance given to Romania. The ambassador noted that his country's leadership attaches great importance to the further development of the traditionally friendly, neighborly, allied relations between the Soviet Union and Romania. He stressed that the new Romania's foreign policy will serve to strengthen friendship and peace throughout the world, and ensure the country's full involvement in the process of building a united Europe and a common home for all the peoples of the continent and that all international commitments, above all those adopted in accordance with the Warsaw Pact, will be consistently implemented.

Accepting the credentials on behalf of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and chairman, A.I. Lukyanov noted that from the very start the Soviet Union supported the Romanian people's just struggle for freedom and democracy and welcomed their victory, and was among the first to give them material and humanitarian aid. One would like to express confidence, he continued, that, on the basis of the previously established potential for collaboration, we will be able, through joint efforts, to imbue Soviet-Romanian cooperation with new quality, give it a dynamism that corresponds to each side's interests, and create openings for greater cultural mutual enrichment and wide-ranging contacts between people. Questions of Soviet-Romanian economic links and scientific, technical, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation now require close and careful study. It was stressed that the Soviet Union welcomes the new Romanian leadership's stated intention to observe its commitments arising out of treaties and agreements, including the commitment on the question of inviolability of borders in Europe.

After the presentation of credentials there was a warm, friendly conversation between A.I. Lukyanov and V. Sandru, in which USSR Deputy Foreign Minister I.P. Aboimov participated.

Romanian Salvation Front To Run in Elections

PM2601163390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by own correspondent V. Volodin: "Romania: National Salvation Front Set To Participate in Elections"]

[Text] Bucharest—A plenary session of the National Salvation Front [NSF] Council has been held in Bucharest. It decided that the NSF would participate in free elections on 20 May.

This decision is seen as sensational and, at the same time, as logical. Now the NSF, which is gathering strength daily, will be a common denominator or serious rival for political parties, public organizations, trade unions, and independent candidates in the election struggle. The sensational element is due, in my view, to the Front leaders' repeated statements about not participating in the parliamentary elections.

The miners of Valea Jiului and Maramuresului and the workers of major industrial enterprises in Bucharest insisted that the Front Council revise its original decisions. I. Iliescu, chairman of the NSF Council, told the plenary session participants of numerous telegrams containing such requests from districts of the country, free trade unions, and youth organizations. According to him, it was the demands of the working people, seeing the Front as a political force assuming the burden of leadership of the country in one of the most difficult periods of its history, that prompted the Front leadership to raise the question of the NSF's renouncing its previous decision and participating in free elections.

Judging by the contributions to the debate, many people were uneasy about the moral aspect of the question under discussion. In fact it had been asserted that the NSF was a purely temporary power structure, leading Romania until free elections were held.

It would be no exaggeration to say that I. Iliescu's speech, broadcast on Romanian television, had the entire country's rapt attention. Particularly as the majority of Romanian citizens are aware that at the present stage of the reforms, and given that pluralism of parties and opinions is a reality, the NSF remains the sole guarantee of stability. The outcome of the debate was decided by a public vote. There were eight votes against and five abstentions, but the majority of session participants approved the NSF Council leadership's proposals on the Front's participation in free elections.

In view of the wish of many political parties, the NSF Council approved I. Iliescu's proposal on switching the elections from mid-April to 20 May. The session decided to ban the use during the elections of money and other resources from abroad, and also methods of discrediting political opponents. In accordance with the Front Council's decision, the elections will be monitored by UN observers, whose presence will ensure observance of the provisions of the law on elections and prevent the fiddling and fixing that have occurred in the past.

Front Decision Opposed

PM2601161390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jan 90 First Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Vedrashko dispatch under rubric "Topic of Day": "Three Parties' Position"]

[Text] Bucharest, 25 Jan—As is known, the country's interim leadership, the National Salvation Front [NSF], has decided to participate in the elections scheduled for 20 May. This step has elicited contradictory assessments in the country.

A demonstration has been held in Bucharest's Victory Square. Its participants, mainly young people, were opposed to the decision of the Front Council. But, on speaking with Romanians, acquaintances and strangers, you mainly hear similar opinions: Those who raised over their heads banners with an equals sign between the Romanian Communist Party and the NSF are obvious extremists who, because of their political myopia or conscious intentions, fail to understand the real distribution of political forces.

During the evening hours the city was shrouded in a thick mist. In Victory Square there were many police vehicles, covered trucks, buses, tanks, and armored personnel carriers. People here have already gotten used to rallies and demonstrations. The evening "gathering" ended quietly.

Today the newspaper ROMANIA LIBERA carried a joint statement by the National Peasant Christian Democratic, National Liberal, and Social Democratic Parties in connection with the Front's decision.

The statement says, in particular, that this decision has resulted in the NSF losing its neutrality and its role as the interim wielder of power, as well as losing public confidence.

The three parties voice doubt that the elections will be really free, since, in their opinion, "the NSF has monopolized state management in a manifestly totalitarian manner." The Front is also accused of using television, radio, and the newspapers, which are at its disposal, to "tendentiously inform and misinform the people."

The authors of the statement believe that the Front is at variance with its own originally declared program, thanks to which it won the trust of the public and, in particular, of the three parties issuing the joint statement.

"The anticommunist uprising, which was victorious over tyranny," the statement goes on to say, "is obliged to the heroism of the young generation of pupils, students, and workers who sacrificed their lives in the name of freedom and democracy. That victory belongs to the entire people and cannot be appropriated by anyone. In seeking power no one can release himself from the people's control."

The three parties believe that the NSF's intention to contest the elections jeopardizes the future of democracy in Romania. The National Peasant, National Liberal, and Social Democratic Parties demand that the NSF and the government immediately relinquish the management of the state. It is proposed to create an interim government with legislative powers which will head the country until the future elections. At the same time, the statement points out, the new government must be formed of representatives of active political parties—well-known individuals who have established their authority "in the struggle against the communist dictatorship over 45 years— and representatives of young people."

Only 1 month has passed since the Ceausescu clan's overthrow, but not only have political forces of varying orientation appeared in the country but their delimitation has already begun to emerge. As can be seen from the tripartite statement, the contradictions are of a fundamental nature. But the opinion of the National Peasant, National Liberal, and Social Democratic Parties, even expressed in such a categorical form, does not signify the formation of a "unified" opposition to the NSF: The positions of all the political forces have not yet been fully defined, and it is difficult to say what support a particular party enjoys. It is quite clear, however, that an active and stormy struggle lies ahead in the period preceding the elections.

Bulgarian Roundtable Deems Consensus Possible

PM2601145190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 90 Second Edition p 7

[Own correspondent L. Zhmyrev dispatch under rubric "Topic of Day": "Bulgaria: Political Consensus"]

[Text] Sofia—The "roundtable" debate in which representatives of the opposition Union of Democratic Forces participated together with representatives of the ruling parties—the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] and the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union (farmers)—passed off comparatively peaceably.

The leader of the BCP delegation—A. Lukanov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the BCP Central Committee—emphasized the vital significance that ties with the Soviet Union have and will have for Bulgarian society, the country's economy, and its national security. He spoke of the Bulgarian model of restructuring as a part of the profound and rapid revolutionary transformations in East European countries.

The question of the socialist basis and the socialist prospect of society is fundamental, since this is of concern to millions of people. The BCP is resolutely breaking with the Stalinist model of socialism and its totalitarian management methods. The party comes out in defense of democratic and humane socialism which guarantees the Bulgarian people the optimum combination of economic progress, social justice, and sound spiritual development. This does not mean that the BCP is not ready to seek points of contact with those who advocate a democratic rule-of-law state, regardless of political convictions, A. Lukanov emphasized.

The BCP considers the upcoming free parliamentary elections particularly important and insists on their speediest holding so as not to delay democratic changes. In this connection the National Assembly should adopt new laws even before the elections—laws on political parties, elections, the press and the status of the mass media, rallies and demonstrations, and citizens' associations.

The BCP supports fully and unconditionally the separation of political parties from state and economic organs, as well as the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers. The party supports the creation of a supreme organ of constitutional oversight as a guarantee against relapses into the monopolization of power.

Concerning attacks on the BCP, the speaker declared that the party is aware of the deformations that occurred and that it is not in its interests to conceal anything whatsoever, but it is opposed to "a nationwide witch hunt and to hurting the legitimate feelings of thousands of honest Communists."

Proposals not to lay down in the constitution that Bulgaria is a socialist state were supported during the debate which developed, since this would outlaw political parties with a non-Marxist ideology and hinder a multiparty system. The future president must not fulfill other political functions. He must be elected by the National Assembly with a majority of at least two-thirds of the votes for no more than two terms of 5 years each.

On the whole, the "roundtable" participants arrived at the conclusion that the possibility exists of reaching a consensus with regard to most of the questions discussed. The question of the timing of the future parliamentary elections remains at issue. The BCP insists on holding them as early as May, while the opposition is seeking to postpone them until the fall so as to have time to nominate its deputies.

By agreement, it is proposed to complete the first round of the "roundtable," which its participants are already calling nationwide, in mid-February with the signing of a joint agreement.

Commodity Turnover Protocol Signed With Bulgaria

PM2601151590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jan 90 Evening Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] Talks ended, and an intergovernmental protocol on commodity turnover and payments between the USSR and the Bulgarian People's Republic in 1990 was signed in Moscow 19 January.

The protocol is based on the sides' reciprocal commitments stemming from the Agreement on Commodity Turnover and Payments between the USSR and the Bulgarian People's Republic in 1986-1990, and other accords in the sphere of Soviet-Bulgarian economic cooperation.

The document which was signed ensures conditions for the further qualitative improvement of trade and economic relations between the two countries, and for the solution of topical problems of economic development at the present stage of perestroyka of the economic mechanism in the USSR and the Bulgarian People's Republic.

According to the protocol, this year the USSR will deliver to the Bulgarian People's Republic Soviet metal cutting machine tools, tractors, road building and agricultural machines, trucks and cars, ships, and other types of machines and equipment.

The protocol was signed by K.F. Katushev, USSR minister of foreign economic relations, on the Soviet side, and by Kh. Khristov, Bulgarian People's Republic minister of foreign economic relations, on the Bulgarian side. G. Pankov, ambassador of the Bulgarian People's Republic to the USSR, was present at the signing of the commodity turnover protocol.

Correspondent Queried on Bulgarian Developments

LD2801222190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 28 Jan 90

[Telephone interview with Moscow correspondent in Sofia Viktor Samarin, by studio announcer Irina Myshina—live]

[Text] [Myshina] Viktor Samarin, Soviet radio correspondent in Sofia, has contacted our studio. It is no coincidence that we asked him to go on the air, because there are very many events happening in Bulgaria, and we are receiving many despatches. Viktor, can you hear us?

[Samarin] Yes indeed. I was on business in Moscow for just 3 days, and upon returning to Sofia, I found out as much news as would have sufficed for comment for 3 months in previous times. Today, the upsurge in activity in Bulgarian political life is such that the most thorough forecasts and the most bold prophesies hopelessly lag behind events. Take, for instance, the roundtable of negotiations, in which, as you know, all influential public and political forces of the country are participating. They are participating in order to find the way to a peaceful transition from totalitarianism to democracy, as is stated by them in a declaration.

Last week the stormy arguments concerning procedural issues ended at last; all those who were in the delegations from the government and the opposition agreed to stay on, and talks about the essential issues commenced. But immediately there was an unexpected turn to polemics. Zhelyu Zhelev, leader of the opposition forces, declared that it is now very necessary to accelerate the dismantlement of totalitarianism in Bulgaria, whatever the cost involved in excessive hast. This, allegedly, is required only because the domestic political situation in the Soviet Union has deteriorated and the Bulgarian forces of stagnation might take advantage of that.

[Myshina] Viktor, I have the following question. Many agencies now, including our TASS in the form of correspondent Andrey Smirnov, are sending reports that the situation in the country is continuing to intensify—that meetings, demonstrations and strikes are taking place. Is this so? And if so, why?

[Samarin] Yes, indeed that is correct, and this evidently is due to a certain slowless, so to speak, in the adoption of decisions.

[Myshina] So where is the way out?

[Samarin] The way out lies in the acceleration of perestroyka, in acceleration, so to speak. But the acceleration must be well considered. Incidentally, the latest parliamentary session is doing much in this respect, is clearing things up to a large extent. Only the first round of this latest session of the National Assembly has taken place, and the second round is planned for 8 February. To date, hardly half of the 16 points on the agenda have been examined. But here too it is impossible—just as in our country—to hold votes without detailed discussion, without listening to all the opinions and proposals, although the deputies have managed to get quite a lot done. The law on assemblies, meetings and manifestations, the laws on autonomy of higher educational establishments, on state and people's control, and a number of other laws have been passed in their final version. Some people, true, say that the frequent sessions of the National Assembly in recent times testify to it having woken up from a lethargic sleep of many years. However, those who favor more lengthy parliamentary sessions are clearly correct, because sometimes 1 or 2 days is not enough for one to examine all that has been outlined and pressing affairs are postponed. Notably, the report-back of the government and the examination of its proposals about measures to get out of the economic crisis, which are awaited by all here, have been put back until February. Evidently this is, to some extent, an answer to your question.

[Myshina] Viktor, I also have the following question. We know that on 30 January the extraordinary Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] Congress will begin its work. How are the discussions proceeding about the documents which will be presented to the congress?

[Samarin] All this is being discussed most broadly now, and really one might say that a countrywide debate is underway. Very many materials are being published in the press. Elections to the congress have taken place, and there have been elections to primary organizations. Incidentally, the conference of the Sofia party city committee has been cancelled, because, so to speak, it simply has turned out to be superfluous on the eve of the congress, insofar as the delegates to the congress were elected by the primary organizations themselves.

[Myshina] We have reports that the BCP evidently will be renamed, that there will be some kind of change in its name. Is that so?

[Samarin] Well, there have been such proposals, but all one can say for now is that the congress will show this. It is difficult to tell. In any case, as you know, the party itself advocated, or rather the party's Central Committee itself made the proposal to cancel the leading role declared in the constitution for the party in society and in the state. And the National Assembly has already given this legal status.

[Myshina] Well then, we will hope that people in Bulgaria will find a way out of the situation that has developed. The National Assembly session will show us. We can pin hope on this session of the National Assembly.

[Samarin] Yes, indeed, and, if you still have time, I can say a little more.

[Myshina] You know, unfortunately, our time already is running out. There is little time left.

[Samarin] Indeed a battle has unfolded there.

[Myshina] Yes, we know. We have already had news about this. Well, I think that the extraordinary BCP Congress will also be an important stage in the life of the country. One thing is clear, I think: Unity and consolidation of all who are interested in radical renewal of society is what is needed. Do you agree?

[Samarin] Naturally.

[Myshina] Thank you very much, Sofia.

[Samarin] Good bye, Irina.

Greetings Sent to Bulgarian Communist Party

LD3001135390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee has sent a message of greetings to the 14th extraordinary congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party. The Soviet communists, it says, express solidarity with your party's efforts aimed at constructing democratic socialism and a society of social justice, where everything is geared to serve the man of labor, his well-being and spiritual development. We proceed from the fact that increasingly favorable preconditions for developing equal and mutually beneficial cooperation of the two fraternal peoples will be taking shape with the deepening of social transformations in the USSR and Bulgaria. The CPSU values the close and sincere interaction with the Bulgarian Communist Party and is prepared to enrich it within the entire spectrum of the problems of socialist rejuvenation in the future, too.

CSSR Federal Assembly Decisions Reported

PM2601163190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own correspondent L. Kornilov: "CSSR: President Havel Initiative"]

[Text] Prague—Touching on his upcoming visit to Moscow during a session of the Federal Assembly, Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel said: "I will be very glad to personally make to Mr Gorbachev important and interrelated proposals, including the proposal that his future meeting with President Bush be held in Prague. Naturally I will make the same proposal to President Bush shortly afterward, during my state visit to the United States."

The president presented to the chairman of the Federal Assembly a bill to change the name of the state and its constituent republics. The name Czechoslovak Republic, which was changed in 1960, will be restored. This involves removing the term "socialist," which, according to the president, "has lost meaning in our linguistic context." However, he did observe that "even compromised words may have their original meaning restored, and I have no doubt that various renewed or newly arising parties of a left persuasion will succeed sooner or later in restoring content to the word 'socialism.'" But this is not the main thing; the main thing, he said, is that "no ideological feature of the existing social and economic system should be present in the title of the state."

At the same time the president proposed a new state emblem for the Czechoslovak Republic. Two Czech two-tailed lions wearing a crown (rather than today's five-pointed star) and the Slovak double cross mounted on the middle of three hills will figure on a heraldic shield divided up into four sections. The ancient emblem of Moravia will feature in the center.

According to the president's bill, the Czechoslovak People's Army should be simply called the Czechoslovak Army.

The session also examined other important issues. It began by discussing the new draft law on the recall and reselection of deputies belonging to representative bodies. The crux of the draft is that both the recall and by-elections should be carried out by those actual organizations rather than by the electorate. The Chamber of Nations—or more accurately, the section of it representing Slovakia—did not approve the draft law. Readers know about this from the Vremya television program. But while the program was being broadcast changes occurred: Deputies from Slovakia approved the law after extra discussion in a parliamentary committee. The law was thus adopted.

The Czechoslovak parliament has adopted two other important laws. The first is a law on political parties. Henceforth the following conditions must be met to set up a new party: The party's name, address, and aims which are not of an undemocratic nature must be indicated. It should have at least 1,000 members. After this a group of like-minded people is entitled to register as a political party.

The second law is on economic provision for the church and religious organizations. This constitutes a fundamental change in the status of the Church in Czechoslovakia, which has hitherto been determined by a 40-year-old law.

New Czechoslovak Agricultural Party Viewed

WA2301210990 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 18 Jan 90 p 3

[S. Pomerantsev report: "Provincial Congress"]

[Text] Slusovice-Prague—The Czechoslovak Agricultural Party is a newcomer on the country's political scene. Its constituent congress was held far from the capital—in southern Moravia, on the grounds of the "Slusovice" Cooperative Agrarian Integrated Works. However, this is also a capital in a sense of modern agro-industrial production and S&T progress in Czechoslovak agriculture.

The preparations for the creation of the party were distinguished by rapidity of action and clarity of intention and also by an absence of buzzer-sounding and noisy demonstrations, which have become an obligatory precursor of important political decisions here of late. The organizing committee was formed at the beginning of December. The program statement said unambiguously: "We wish to become equal partners in the formulation of state policy, agrarian policy particularly." This demand was highlighted also in the party program adopted at the constituent congress: People who produce and supply bread for the nation have not only the right, but also the duty to participate in the exercise of state power and the democratic ideals of society.

The Czechoslovak Agricultural Party sees itself as the spokesman for the interests of all who are involved in the production of foodstuffs and related types of activity and also of the entire rural population. It proclaims as the goals of its economic policy facilitating the creation of a strong and healthy economy and securing a sufficiency of foodstuffs—high-quality and unharmful to man. This should be achieved on the basis of the principles of a market economy, rejection of monopoly by anyone, the equality of all forms of ownership and free direct cooperation of the enterprises among themselves and with foreign countries. The party's aims in the environmental and social spheres and in the sphere of legal protection of the farms and the individual peasants were formulated also.

The new party got off to a difficult start. Even prior to its emergence it was ascribed the role of refuge under whose roof "rehashed communists," the figures responsible for the mistakes and deformations in the recent past, would hide. On the other hand, the situation preceding the elections to the country's parliament made a definite mark on the process of formation of the party. There is natural interest, therefore, in the Czechoslovak Agricultural Party's attitude toward other political forces. Primarily toward the Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCz] and also toward its former members, including the people who have become disenchanted with the policy of the party and who have recently quit the CPCz.

"Of course, we can under no circumstances cooperate with the people from the CPCz who have compromised themselves," Frantisek Trnka, who was elected chairman of the party Central Committee, said. "However, there are among the former members of the CPCz many honest workmen—tractor drivers, animal specialists, milkers. Announcing that we have no wish to see them in our ranks would be inhumane and unjust and the equivalent of the position which the Communist Party itself occupied in the past. On a number of problems we could have views similar to its present leadership. And it stands to reason that we will cooperate in their solution—anything else would simply be contrary to our interests. We refuse interaction to no one if their intentions are good."

This was the response to journalists' questions by the chairman of the Czechoslovak Agricultural Party Central Committee when it was still a few hours away from birth. Nonetheless, the viewpoint formulated in respect even to these complex problems, which have evoked serious disputes, would seem realistic and balanced, in typical peasant manner, against the background of the actions of the forces which pay lip service to political pluralism, but which in practice are for political intolerance.

The new party is the child of the changed social and political situation in the country. Throughout the postwar period, the defense of the interests of the peasantry has been assumed by different political forces. Although in Czechoslovakia, as distinct from a number of other socialist countries, agriculture has developed into a highly productive, normal sector of the economy, the people whose hands worked for this public wealth have at best had merely their own nonpolitical organization, and even that had for many years been inactive. And this in a country where the traditions of political association of the rural producers go back to the beginning of the 1880's. As a result the demands of the Czechoslovak countryside were frequently ignored even by those who declared themselves the defenders of these demands. Unjustified and incompetent incursions into the farms' affairs were made simultaneously.

In the new situation brought about by the events of November- December 1989 various political formations exhibited a desire to increase their influence in the "unorganized" rural environment. However, the peasants, schooled in the experience of recent decades, reasoned otherwise, creating their own political party.

Soviet-Hungarian Export Restriction Noted

LD1901183490 Budapest MTI in English 1333 GMT 19 Jan 90

[Text] Budapest, January 19, 1990 (MTI-ECONEWS)—Eduard Kosobuko, deputy head of the Soviet trade representation in Budapest, while expressing understanding at the Hungarian Government's decision to revoke and re-issue export licenses, said in a statement published on Friday that both sides will be adversely affected by the resultant reduction in Soviet-Hungarian trade.

The Soviet partner does not see the move as an outright freeze but merely as an attempt to redress the situation, he added. Negotiations on 1990 bilateral trade are currently stalled over how to meet Hungary's short-term claims of almost 782 million roubles.

With the current economic situation in the Soviet Union such that it cannot do without imports of foodstuffs and consumer articles, Mr Kosobuko confirmed that the machine industry which move will be hit hardest by the move, particularly companies which are dependent on the Soviet market [sentence as received].

The Soviet commercial adviser added that he believes that Hungary is unlikely to adopt the proposal that the Soviets and Hungarians switch over to convertible accounting from 1991.

Party Divisions Deepened at LCY Congress

PM2601150990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jan 90 Second Edition p 6

[PRAVDA and TASS correspondents Ye. Fadeyev, A. Bocharov, and V. Kuznetsov dispatch: "Where Is the Way Out of the Crisis?"]

[Text] Belgrade, 23 Jan—So the worst predictions have come to pass: Delegates at the 14th (extraordinary) congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY] have decided temporarily to suspend the forum's work as the result of a demarche by the League of Communists of Slovenia delegation, which refused to participate in further discussion and walked out of the sessions hall tonight. By an absolute majority of votes, the forum came out against splitting the LCY into a Communist Party and a Socialist Party and also rejected the Slovenian delegation's proposal to turn the LCY into "a union of independent republic organizations freely united in the LCY."

Ciril Ribicic, president of the League of Communists of Slovenia Central Committee Presidium, declared at a news conference that the delegates of this republic party organization repeatedly made unsuccessful attempts to change the course of the debate, but support was not given either to the proposal to transform the LCY into "a union of independent republic organizations" or to "our right to have our own opinion before the decision is adopted to draw up the party's new programs and statutes." In his opinion, the LCY declaration, the forum's chief document submitted for examination, whose discussion has been completed, does not meet the Slovenian delegation's expectations.

The secession of the League of Communists of Slovenia from the LCY, he emphasized, does not mean the republic's refusal to be part of the SFRY. In any case, C. Ribicic remarked, our decision not to participate in the work of the 14th (extraordinary) congress must not mean the end of the LCY's existence; this is the start of "a serious discussion of the party's future structure." He cited two reasons for the decision adopted: First, in its activity the LCY is trailing behind the demands of the times and the democratic processes occurring in Slovenia, Yugoslavia, and Europe; second, the conflicts shaking the LCY are strengthening separatist trends not only in Slovenia but also in other parts of the country. According to C. Ribicic, if the decision adopted by the Slovenian Communists to quit the congress helps to establish a dialogue and to develop democracy, this will only strengthen Yugoslavia, not weaken it.

Once again, for the umpteenth time in recent months, such a topical question as the unity of party ranks has appeared on the agenda in all earnestness. Having taken only the first step to formulate the Yugoslav Communists' urgent tasks and to implement the planned reforms in the economic and political system and the party itself, the 14th (extraordinary) congress "stumbled," as it were, at the very first attempt to reduce to a common denominator the profound differences between individual republics in their approach to the paths of further development of the SFRY and the LCY.

But why is this?, many millions of Yugoslav working people are asking. For the LCY seems to have made an accurate diagnosis and the treatment is proceeding correctly, but the state of affairs in the party and the country is continuing to worsen? It is true that the LCY is today facing a test of its political maturity, but it is also true that for the time being its 2-million-strong detachment is not keeping in step but breaking step. No one has any doubts that the "reconstruction" of the Yugoslav party is now regarded as an obligatory precondition for improving the economic and political system, as a necessary condition for the planned transformations. But, to use the figurative expression of local commentators, "the SFRY now resembles a ship which is having difficulty keeping afloat. The engine of a ship in need of capital repair—that is, the LCY—has conked out."

A "pause" has now come about in the work of the 14th LCY Congress, and no one knows how long it will last. The LCY Central Committee will announce at a future date when the forum's next plenary session will take place. For the time being, the LCY Central Committee, its Presidium, and other organs are fulfilling their functions and making the necessary contacts with a view to continuing the work of the congress.

In the opinion of the majority of delegates, the time has come to dot the "i's," since, as the newspaper POLITIKA remarked, "a battle is being waged for a federative, self-managing, socialist Yugoslavia, and we must on no account embark on a path of splits and confrontation."

It is hard to predict in which direction events will develop now. During the 3 days of the congress' work almost 1,000 delegates spoke from its rostrum and in three thematic commissions while discussing the basic document—the LCY declaration. The debate, during which a total of 599 substantial comments, additions, amendments, and amplifications were advanced, was quite critical in nature and frank, but its tone, which was sometimes lacking in self-control, did not do credit to the delegates to such a representative forum, it is thought here.

A plenum of the party's Central Committee is taking place as I write these lines. It is discussing ways out of the "impasse." The results of its work will be announced later. For the time being the situation is this: There are as many opinions as there are republics and autonomous provinces in Yugoslavia. Some are campaigning for the resumption of work, others believe that "Yugoslavia can manage without the party," yet others adhere to the viewpoint that the LCY must remain "united and indivisible," while yet others shrug their shoulders.

Clearly, there is no need to explain that what has happened is what Yugoslav Communists so feared: The party's split has not only become apparent but has also been deepened. One thing is clear today: The restoration of unity and the preservation of the LCY as a national political force is in the hands of the Communists themselves.

Soviet-Yugoslav Cooperation Commission Meets

PM2601151390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
20 Jan 90 Moscow Evening Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] The 27th sitting of the Soviet-Yugoslav Intergovernmental Committee for Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation ended 19 January. The delegations were headed by I.S. Silayev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and A. Mitrovic, deputy chairman of the SFRY Federal Executive Council.

The state of economic, scientific, and technical cooperation between the USSR and the SFRY and the prospects of its further development in the context of the perestroyka of the mechanism of the USSR's foreign economic ties with socialist countries were examined. Accord was reached in principle on switching to freely convertible currency and current world market prices in mutual payments and trade between the two countries as of 1 January 1991.

West Europe

UK Reaction to Base Closure Announcement Viewed

PM3001200190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
31 Jan 90 First Edition p 5

[Tomas Kolesnichenko dispatch under "Correspondent Comments" rubric: "United States Pulling Out?"]

[Text] London, 30 Jan—THE TIMES knew about this yesterday. And today the British Ministry of Defense confirmed the news which had caused sensation here: The United States is pulling out of three major military bases in Great Britain and drastically reducing its military personnel at a fourth. This applies to Fairford in Gloucestershire, Wethersfield in Essex, and Greenham Common in Berkshire.

The poignancy of this piece of news lies in the fact that it came as a complete surprise to London, despite the fact that both the foreign secretary, Douglas Hurd, and the secretary of state for defense, Tom King, are currently in Washington for talks with their U.S. colleagues precisely about possible arms reductions "in connection with the changes in East Europe." The foreign secretary, clearly annoyed, even "rebuked" Washington for its "hasty decision."

"I do not believe," he told journalists, "that we should be in a hurry as regards arms and armed forces reductions."

At first glance, one is inclined to view the curtailment of the U.S. military bases in Britain primarily in the context of certain cuts in the U.S. military budget. However, it is difficult to shake off the impression that another factor here is also the shift of focus in Washington's policy from the British Isles toward the continent, and above all the FRG. Washington is today adjusting its European policy via Bonn rather than London.

THE TIMES claims that the withdrawal of U.S. servicemen from the British bases will not seriously affect domestic politics in Britain. However, it seems to me that this is arguable. First of all, Washington's decision comes on top of an internal conflict taking shape within the British Government between the prime minister and the new chancellor of the exchequer, Major. The latter, it has become known, plans to announce a drastic reduction of the country's 20-billion-pound military budget in March. This is openly opposed by Thatcher and King. According to one of the prime minister's closest aides, "Major's plans are based on the future results of the talks between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. However, that means counting chickens before they have hatched. In my opinion these chickens are not even in the eggs yet."

We will leave the imagery of this metaphor to the conscience of Thatcher's close adviser. However, this statement is not so much a reflection of a pessimistic attitude toward the arms talks as an expression of the desire to preserve Britain's military budget at a very high level. It is, at the moment, one of the highest in Europe and totals around 5 percent of GNP. For the sake of comparison, the French military budget totals 4 percent, and FRG's 3 percent.

And second, Britain will have to somehow fill the economic gap left by the withdrawal of the U.S. GIs. There is a total of 66 U.S. military installations in Britain at which 30,000 servicemen, 2,000 civilians, and 30,000 dependants are located. At Greenham Common alone the servicemen "invest" 24 million pounds annually in the local economy by their spending.

However, is it worth grieving over this loss? After all, the "gains" from the reduction of the military bases are very high even if they are not expressed in convertible currency.

Falin Receives UK's Waldegrave 23 Jan

PM2601115790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jan 90 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report under general headline: "Official Reports"]

[Text] V.M. Falin, head of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, had talks 23 January with W. Waldegrave, British minister of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs.

The talks discussed the situation in central Europe and events in the Soviet Transcaucasus.

Falin Meets With L'HUMANITE Director

PM2601142590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Jan 90 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Meeting Held"]

[Text] A meeting was held 20 January between V.M. Falin, member of the CPSU Central Committee and chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, and R. Leroy, member of the French Communist Party [PCF] Politburo and director of L'HUMANITE.

There was an exchange of opinions on certain aspects of the contemporary international situation, the activity of the CPSU and the PCF, and the prospects for interparty cooperation.

French Failure To Revise Strategy Deplored

PM3001141990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jan 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences Colonel V. Konobeyev: "'Defensive Bulwark' or How Paris Understands Military Policy in Conditions of New Thinking"]

[Text] There is a gradually growing conviction in the world that the new times and present-day realities demand new policy. However, the facts show that to rise above the protracted cold war condition to achieve the level of the new political thinking is not easy. For example, military-political thinking in certain circles in France, as in the past, is often determined by concepts such as nuclear deterrence and so forth. On the problems of nuclear disarmament, military doctrine, and military policy France now occupies a special position, as they say there.

What is special about it?

If you take, for example, the problem of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, France, through the mouth of its top politicians, generally supports the ideas of disarmament and rates positively the conclusion and implementation of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and the talks on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms. As President Mitterrand has stated, France "is seeking to establish an arms balance at the lowest possible level" and believes that "in an age when the two blocs are participating for the first time in the disarmament process it would be absurd to go in for superarmament." When explaining the French stance, which is based on the concept of nuclear deterrence, Defense Minister J.-P. Chevenement noted that France forms its own military policy on the principle of minimum sufficiency for defense.

But the question here is: What does Paris mean by minimum sufficiency? For the nation's nuclear forces they are proposing a level which would ensure the ability to "deter" a potential enemy, in other words, the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy. More specifically, France's strategic nuclear potential, according to figures in L'HUMANITE, enables it to annihilate 25-34 million people and 16-25 percent of the industrial potential of the USSR, and in 1995 those figures will rise to 81 million and 66 percent (when the seventh new-generation nuclear missile submarine is commissioned).

Given that the disarmament process has really begun, the French interpretation and realization of the level of minimum sufficiency for defense seems illogical, to put it mildly. Take, for instance, the statement that France will join the USSR and U.S. nuclear arms reduction process only when their level falls to that of France. For Paris to put the question like that would, in my view, contain a certain element of logic if France agreed to "freeze" the present level of its nuclear potential. But in fact this continues to be built up, a move which Paris presents as "a compromise step" toward narrowing the gap between nuclear levels.

The interpretation of the concept of the "sufficiency" of the French nuclear potential is equally original in another sense, too. Whereas the USSR understands sufficiency as a move from the present level to a lower one, which is conditioned by the whole logic of disarmament, it seems that France understands "sufficiency" as a level which has yet to be achieved. In other words, a level far in excess of the present one. How else can one view the specific measures and plans to further build up the nuclear arsenal?

When visiting the Soviet Union in April 1989, Defense Minister Chevenement stated that it would be good if arms spending stopped increasing, because that is necessary to promote the dynamics of disarmament. But then in August he advocated an increase in military budget appropriations when the French cabinet was ratifying "Army 2000," the plan for the reorganization of the country's armed forces.

In the development of the French Armed Forces priority is being given to building up and improving the strategic nuclear forces. Last year Fr40.7 billion, or 22.3 percent of the military budget, was spent on their development. For 1990-1993, however, it is planned to spend approximately 40 percent of the total military credits for those purposes.

As the democratic press has noted, all the previously adopted major French arms programs are being retained and the main directions of military policy are unchanged. And this is in the new conditions, when the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies are adopting and implementing unilateral measures to reduce their armed forces and armaments. When defending a given military program before, it was possible to cite world tension, but now no one believes that bogus argument.

In the new military-political situation in the world and in the light of the new political thinking the attempts to justify the increase in military spending by citing the need to ensure "defense on all fronts," that is, defense against any potential aggressor, look particularly illogical and unconvincing. Even in the past people didn't believe these statements very much because it was no secret that the French defense front, like NATO's, faces east. Such arguments now, however, do not impress anyone at all—either in the East or in the West.

One can hardly overestimate the significance of the fact that the USSR and France, which were there at the beginning of the positive changes in Europe and the healing of the division of Europe, now occupy close positions on realizing the idea of building the common European home. However, France continues to lead the way in the quest for West European political and military integration. Paris considers its contribution here to be decisive. France, as a nuclear power, seeks cooperation with another nuclear power—Britain. It is actively developing its cooperation in the conventional arms sphere with West Germany. Both the former and the latter are taking place within the sphere of bilateral relations and within the framework of the Western European Union [WEU] military-political grouping.

At a session of the WEU Assembly in Paris at the beginning of December, Chevenement advocated the building of a "defensive bulwark" in Western Europe on the grounds that the Soviet Union, by virtue of the size of its population and its vast territory and resources, remains a great and militarily strong power, despite its current difficulties. The minister tried again to justify the French strategy of "nuclear deterrence" and let it be known that for the time being France does not intend to revise its military policy.

Even at the WEU Assembly session itself, this provoked a far from uniform response. For example, E. Baarveld-Schlaman, the representative of the Netherlands, stated bluntly to Chevenement that she was disappointed with his speech. "At a time when Europe is undergoing historic changes and the cold war is becoming a thing of the past," Baarveld-Schlaman said, "I, as a socialist deputy, expected different words from a socialist minister, but instead I heard the same old appeals, the same old justification of the French commitment to nuclear weapons." It is hard to disagree with that verdict.

Legal, Economic Cooperation With FRG Examined

PM3001143990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jan 90 Second Edition pp 1,4

[Report by correspondent Yevgeniy Grigoryev: "Something About Shortages"]

[Text] Frankfurt am Main—A Soviet-West German seminar on questions of law and economics has been held in Frankfurt am Main. It was the first major forum of the new year to discuss topical issues of cooperation between the USSR and the FRG. It was organized by the Heidelberg "Forum", a leading institute for the further training of economic and legal cadres.

Around 150 people paid to attend the seminar in a room in the "Arabella" Hotel. The lists reads like a catalogue of major FRG banks, firms, and lawyers' offices.

One of the reports at the seminar was delivered by Baden-Wuerttemberg Finance Minister G. Palm, a vigorous advocate of the development of cooperation between our countries.

"From the FRG's viewpoint," he said, "perestroyka in the USSR is an historic opportunity to reorientate the Soviet national economy. It also creates conditions for expanding and deepening economic cooperation between East and West." According to the speaker, the "expansion of trade and economic links between the two countries is possible in all spheres in which FRG industry occupies a leading place in the world market." Particularly as the "economic interests of the FRG and the USSR complement one another by and large."

There were only 10 Soviet representatives. They were economists, financial specialists, and skilled workers. The delegation was headed by V.I. Shcherbakov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems. As well as providing essential information on the course of perestroyka and economic reform, the Soviet speakers and participants in the debate presented practical ideas about deepening bilateral cooperation.

Generally speaking, what the West German participants said indicated that they were keen on cooperation. V. Kristians [name as transliterated], member of the Deutsche Bank supervisory board, talked about glasnost in the economy and its significance for partnership. At the same time, he made several fair criticisms of the Soviet side. Our departments, for example, are still behaving in an uncivilized way: Either it takes them a long time to reply, or they do not respond at all to West German partners' inquiries. He also pointed out some objective difficulties that are being encountered in cooperation. But there was always emphasis on the importance and prospects of its development. However, in my view, among the FRG participants in the seminar there was an obvious lack of concrete action and initiative in the form of unconventional steps and quest for new forms of cooperation.

Minister Palm tried to explain the FRG businessmen's reserve. "The Soviet side," he said, "must understand the wait-and-see attitude of certain West German firms, which, despite their keenness and the generally good prospects, are frightened of running into unexpected problems in the shape of an unstable economic situation in the USSR."

Well, let us be realistic. The wait-and-see attitude is very apparent. For some members of the FRG business world the situation is such that they have a lot of trouble with Soviet partners, at the moment they cannot really expect a rapid return on capital investments, and the situation is pretty good on the Western market at the moment. Perhaps the lack of practical ideas from the West German side is due to the fact that the seminar organizers saw it as an educational and informational event, and in that sense it was a success. To some extent it was also of practical significance.

Finally, a detail. The forum organizers must have been disappointed when it was discovered, literally at the last moment, that the main speaker on the Soviet side, USSR Finance Minister V.S. Pavlov, would be unable to come to Frankfurt. This is indeed regrettable. Such "details," alas, are not rare and they hardly contribute to destroying the notion that what we lack is efficiency and obligingness.

Attitude Toward W. Berlin's Status Unchanged

LD2901135390 Hamburg DPA in German 1005 GMT 29 Jan 90

[Text] Berlin (DPA)—The Soviet Union continues to reject the direct election of West Berlin deputies to the Lower House. Direct elections infringe on the status of the city and violate the Four-Power Agreement, says a report by the Moscow news agency NOVOSTI, published in West Berlin. The Berlin Lower House deputies, hitherto appointed by the House of Representatives, are to be elected directly for the first time in the next general election according to a concept of the Berlin Senat.

Concerning reports that the Soviet Union had no objections to direct elections, NOVOSTI notes by quoting circles close to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, that Moscow's fundamental attitude remains negative. Furthermore, the three Western powers are familiar with that position. "It borders on self-deception to believe that the Soviet Union's view can be simply ignored without darkening the political atmosphere in that region." Now, when more and more new practical improvements in East-West relations are becoming discernible, a mutual challenge would be totally wrong. The "acceptable solution" will, according to NOVOSTI, lie "somewhere in the middle."

The Federal Republic, like every sovereign state, can work out, adopt, or change laws. However, only those laws may be extended to West Berlin which leave unaffected the principle that the city does not belong to the Federal Republic. The situation in and around West Berlin is the concern of all four powers, NOVOSTI stressed. The Four-Power Agreement requires that attempts to change the situation unilaterally be desisted.

Belgian Minister Urges Bigger Cuts in NATO

LD3001111990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jan 90 Second Edition p 4

[Dispatch by unnamed own correspondent: "Reducing Confrontation"]

[Text] Brussels, 26 Jan—Belgium is exhibiting growing interest in reducing the level of military confrontation in Europe. This has already been shown in the objections it has raised to the immediate modernization of NATO tactical nuclear weapons and in the start it has made to cutting its military expenditure. The statement by National Defense Minister Guy Coeme is new confirmation of this interest.

After 40 years of a "balance of fear," the minister said, the world is entering an era of transition from confrontation to cooperation. It is essential that the present changes in East Europe and the reduced threat from the Warsaw Pact be taken into account. The structure and scale of armed forces should depend on the existing danger and be reorganized accordingly.

However, as part of NATO, Guy Coeme went on, Belgium is being required to make a 5-percent increase in its "defense contribution." Belgium has already expressed to the NATO leadership its fundamental disagreement with this requirement.

Noting that the military aspect should not be an obstacle to East-West rapprochement, Guy Coeme deemed the cuts in armed forces in Europe proposed by the U.S. President inadequate. Here he proposed that the strength of NATO and Warsaw Pact troops be reduced by 350,000 men on each side. In the prevailing situation, the minister stressed, Belgium intends to consider the future of its 25,000-strong contingent stationed in the FRG. A plan to bring 1,500 servicemen home from there has already been drawn up.

This statement made by the Belgian national defense minister just prior to his trip to the Soviet Union evoked a cool reaction in NATO's Brussels headquarters. It was officially stated that "any important changes in the system of member countries' national collective defense should be the object of consultations and cooperation within the alliance framework."

Norway Drags Feet on Nordic Military Detente

PM3001144990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jan 90 First Edition p 3

[I. Kulkov article: "Warm Currents and Icebergs of Distrust, or How 'Northern Facade' of the Common European Home Should Be"]

[Text] As M.S. Gorbachev said in a speech at the Finlandia Palace last October, let us move toward the desire of the Nordic peoples to transform their countries into a secure wing of the all-European and worldwide system of security. Those words by the Soviet leader expressed, in my view, both the peace-loving aspirations of the North Europeans and the readiness of the USSR to do everything to realize them.

The North Europeans' anxiety over their security is still entirely justified, even though the military-political potential in that region has changed radically in recent years, of course, and it is already senseless to talk of an attack or the occurrence of an armed conflict. Nevertheless, the level of military confrontation here remains high, and NATO continues to stockpile all kinds of weapons in Northern Europe and to assign armed forces to conduct combat operations in precisely this region. Naturally it justifies its actions by citing the need to strengthen the defense of the bloc's northern front.

Quite recently, for example, General J. Akehurst, NATO deputy supreme allied commander in Europe, stated publicly that "if there is a threat from Moscow it will be greatest on NATO's flanks—toward Norway and Turkey, which have common borders with the Soviet Union." Further on he concludes that the North Atlantic alliance acted correctly when it created new multinational forces to repulse a possible attack along the Arctic frontier. Otherwise, the general believes, Norway's armed forces—50,000 men—would be easily overwhelmed by the vast Soviet forces on the Kola Peninsula.

The Norwegian Defense Ministry in turn intends to spend 5 billion kroner on modernizing military installations in the north of the country. And once again the justification for this desire is the aggressive aspirations of the Soviet Union. "The Arctic is regarded as a flank of the West," a top Norwegian officer hinted to journalists of the newspaper NORDLYS, the latter reported. "But bear in mind that it occupies a central place in the USSR's plans." And since that is so, the officer stated, Norway simply must re-equip its coastal fortifications whose batteries are still using weapons left by Hitler's occupation forces. Plans to increase the combat might of the Norwegian submarine fleet have also been adopted. New submarines costing the equivalent of $140 million each will be built under a program running until 2020-2025.

But, the reader will ask, how does all this tally with the generally positive reaction of the Norwegian Government and of the ruling circles of the other NATO countries to the Soviet initiatives in the area of strengthening peace and cooperation in northern Europe? In fact they all expressed support, albeit with reservations, for the policy of turning the Nordic region into a zone of peace and confidence. But the sincerity of people's assurances is now tested more than ever before by their concrete actions. At the moment only the Soviet Union is doing what it says it will.

It would be appropriate here to mention briefly what our country has already done or plans to do in the sphere of reducing the level of military confrontation in northern Europe. Not a single intermediate-or short-range missile due to be destroyed under the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles has been left on active service in regions adjoining northern Europe. Soviet tactical nuclear weapons are now deployed in such a way that they cannot reach the Nordic countries from any point in the USSR.

The Soviet Union has unilaterally begun eliminating certain categories of sea-based nuclear weapons in the Baltic. By the end of this year all six submarines known in the West as "Golf" class, will be removed from the Baltic Fleet's combat strength and destroyed. Their munitions will be destroyed, too. The Nordic countries' public viewed this move as a real contribution to the creation of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe. The USSR is also ready for talks with the nuclear powers and Baltic states on effective guarantees for the non-nuclear status of the Baltic.

Other Soviet initiatives and our country's actual steps to implement them could be mentioned here. But I think that those already listed are enough to prove the sincerity of the Soviet appeals to begin building the "northern facade" of the common European home. But in addition to the purely military and military-political measures it is proposed to bolster this construction with measures of an economic, humanitarian, and environmental character. I should particularly like to mention the environment here. Great damage has already been done to the natural environment of the Arctic, one of the world's "weather factories." In the USSR's opinion, the time has come to consider a general ecological program and on its basis organize cooperation among the Nordic countries in environmental protection.

If the north European countries, primarily the NATO members, were to take a concrete step toward the Soviet initiatives the north European process would gain momentum. It could set a good example for the creation of the common European home, too. Unfortunately, it has to be stated that practical actions on the elaboration of mutually acceptable solutions leading to the strengthening of security and the expansion of cooperation in the north are still influenced by the attitude of those who simply cannot abandon the cold war stereotypes and who still take their lead from NATO, even though NATO circles are also reassessing their values. In any event, certain NATO allies greeted with surprise the decision to increase Norway's military might. "While the Western countries are experiencing a certain euphoria over disarmament questions and the related opportunities for easing the burden of military spending," the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE writes, for instance, "the opposite mood prevails in Norway.... Unlike Norway, many NATO states are either not increasing their military budgets or are even reducing them."

Of course, the warm currents bringing the peoples lasting peace and universal security will ultimately melt the icebergs of distrust which still exist in northern Europe. May this happen as soon as possible.

Swiss Labor Party Official Has Moscow Talks

PM2601120190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jan 90 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report under general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] Talks were held at the CPSU Central Committee International Department 23 January with J. Spielmann, secretary general of the Swiss Labor Party, who is in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee. During the meeting there was a comradely exchange of opinions on current questions of the international situation and on the further development of CPSU ties with Swiss communists.

Support for Convocation of Helsinki-2 Urged

LD2801144990 Moscow TASS in English 1435 GMT 28 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 28 TASS— By TASS news analyst Albert Balebanov:

U.S. Congressman Joseph Biden has supported Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal to hold a summit of the participating countries in the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe this year.

"It may be unwieldy but it's the only forum for Europe," said the chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs in an article published in THE NEW YORK TIMES newspaper.

This statement is actually the first positive response to the Soviet initiative from influential U.S. political circles. Until now, in Washington they preferred to maintain silence, adopting a cautious wait-and-see stance.

In the White House and the U.S State Department they continued to be tightlipped about Helsinki-2 even when French President Francois Mitterrand, West German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and representatives of the Governments of Britain, Italy and other NATO member-countries favoured its convocation.

However, when all of the 12 partners in the European Community spoke out in support of the Soviet initiative a week ago, the United States was forced to break the vow of silence.

One gets the impression that the administration's hesitations regarding Helsinki-2 were sparked chiefly by doubts about the effectiveness of the mechanism of the forums of this scope and apprehensions that the new meeting will be boiled down to discussions on the unification of the two German states.

It is an open secret that the final act of the European Conference has proved its viability and effectiveness. This is illustrated by the path treaded by 33 countries of Europe, the United States and Canada since 1975 in cooperation in the political, economic, military, cultural and humanitarian areas.

It is doubtless that the Helsinki CSCE process can yield still more meaningful results, specifically map out ways to build a common European home. This direction seems to be all-important. New agreements in the disarmament field could be first steps here.

The proposed holding of the Helsinki-2 forum offers a brilliant opportunity to define specific goals in this all-important sphere, to elaborate a joint plan to reduce the burden of military spending and boost confidence in the military field, in part, by embracing new proposals for verification (for instance, the proposal for an "open sky").

Helsinki-2 could provide an impetus to a more intensive trade and economic cooperation between East and West, dispel apprehensions which emerged both in the United States and in East European countries regarding the implications of the creation of a single market within the European Community in 1992, which is frequently regarded as an impregnable protectionist fortress.

Nobody prohibits to discuss at the proposed meeting Germany's re-unification. Although this is not a priority issue, the exchange of views will undoubtedly be useful. The more so that some consensus has already been formed both in the West and in the East concerning the princple of solving this problem, that is along the lines of the CSCE process.

Briefly, Helsinki-2 opens ample opportunities to overcome Europe's division and achieve East-West rapprochement. It would be irrational to shun them.

IZVESTIYA Interviews Finnish Premier

PM2501163790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Report on interview with Finnish Prime Minister Harri Holkeri, in Helsinki by IZVESTIYA special correspondents P. Gutiontov and V. Shmyganovskiy: "Harri Holkeri: Trade Must Not Be Conducted at Level of Declarations. Finland's Prime Minister Ponders Links With Our Country and Role of Power in Changing World"; date not given]

[Text] Helsinki—In the comparatively short time since the present Finnish Government, headed by Harri Holkeri, came to power as a result of the last parliamentary elections in 1987, a vote of no-confidence in the government has been proposed on six (!) occasions and calls have been heard for its resignation.

H. Holkeri himself considers this phenomenon quite normal for a democratic country.

[Holkeri] The opposition's task is to be a constant irritant and give the government no rest. However, in all the cases I mentioned, we were able to win the support of most deputies.... [Holkeri ends]

The premier is familiar with the tactics of parliamentary struggle. The bourgeois National Coalition Party was itself in opposition for decades and was quite unable to get into the country's leadership. It is now cooperating quite successfully with the Social Democrats, sharing the overwhelming majority of ministerial portfolios with them and rejecting all manner of dogma. Here is a quite eloquent fact: At the last "coalition" congress in the city of Pori not a word of criticism was heard against the Social Democrats, the recent "ideological adversaries."

Holkeri, who is 53 years of age, has done a great deal to establish his party and transform it into one of the country's leading political forces. He was the leader of its youth organization, and later general secretary and chairman. Under him the National Coalition Party has stated for the first time that the ideas of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union must be the foundation of Suomi's [Finland's] foreign policy course—whatever parties succeed one another at the state helm. It is no longer important that the party reached this conclusion considerably later than Finland's other political forces—only in 1974. It is this party's representatives that now hold key posts in Finnish-Soviet economic cooperation. Apart from the prime minister, they include Minister of Trade and Industry I. Suominen, incumbent chairman of the National Coalition Party.

What is the party's credo, the essence of its program, of which the Soviet reader—who is quite satisfied by the label "bourgeois"—knows virtually nothing?

Although in its articles aimed at the foreign audience, FINSKA NOTISBYRAN puts the word "conservative"— that is, member of a conservative party—in parentheses after Holkeri's name; he himself believes that this word has a different meaning in Finnish usage.

[Holkeri] To be brief, we express a modern bourgeois philosophy. Reliance on a market economy, limitation of the state's role in economic life, and freedom of choice for everyone. Along with devotion to elements of national culture....

There are now representatives of Finnish business in the party, salaried people—teachers, medics, and engineers—and students. Many mayors of Finnish cities also belong to the National Coalition Party.

The concept of "bourgeois values" has a very broad interpretation, moreover. I suspect that this phrase arouses quite different associations in the USSR in the Russian language from those it arouses in our country, in Finland. It was emphasized at our congress that we are not a class party that upholds the interests of any population groups. We seek the adoption of fair and optimum decisions in the interests of all society. [Holkeri ends]

Last year H. Holkeri became cochairman of the Standing Intergovernmental Finnish-Soviet Commission on Economic Cooperation. Receiving Soviet journalists visiting Helsinki at the invitation of Finland's Foreign Ministry, he spoke first of his comparatively new duties.

[Correspondents] Mr Prime Minister, there was initially a sense of some confusion in your first interviews for the Finnish press in connection with the perestroyka of our foreign economic sphere. "People in Finland," you told a HELSINGIN SANOMAT correspondent, "still cannot tell who makes the decisions in the USSR."

[Holkeri] The situation is now changing for the better. I have just become throughly acquainted for the first time with my colleague S.A. Sitaryan, chairman of the commission on the Soviet side. The acquaintance was very agreeable. Mr Sitaryan has a good knowledge of the economy, including the market economy. I particularly sensed this when we got down to details in our conversations. We spoke the same language, albeit via an interpreter. I am delighted by this because Finland traditionally makes economic ties with the USSR a high priority. It is very important for the cochairmen to be like-minded people.

Incidentally, as I have already said in an interview, when the current cabinet of ministers emerged, it had many opponents who predicted that the new government would "come a cropper" on Eastern trade (that is how people in our country describe trade with the USSR). Fortunately, this did not happen, we succeeded in maintaining high volumes of deliveries. A quest is under way for a solution to existing problems—the imbalance in Finland's favor and Soviet suppliers' lack of interest in a number of cases, which was also mentioned in a recent IZVESTIYA article.

[Correspondents] Many specialists, not only in the USSR but also in Finland, believe that faster progress must be made. UUSI SUOMI wrote that Finns' high standard of living attained over the last decade was founded on "Eastern trade." Now, in the newspaper's opinion, other Western countries are beginning to make use of the Finns' experience. In this connection the following question is arising in an acute manner: Unless Finland's leadership takes special steps, its advantageous position in the Soviet market will be lost.

[Holkeri] Reform in the USSR has indeed made it necessary for us to resolve quite new tasks. Many ties are now being implemented at the level of firms and enterprises themselves rather than at government level. Essentially there is a shift toward generally accepted world practice.

[Correspondents] Does this mean that the role of the authorities is being reduced to a minimum in conditions of decentralization?

[Holkeri] No, governments must adopt decisions connected with improving the system of payments and settlements and creating a legal basis and help simplify the formalities for direct contacts between customers and vendors in both countries. Lastly, state bodies still have a job of paramount importance—environmental conservation. Take the free economic zones by the Soviet-Finnish border; we are awaiting decisions regarding their organization with interest. The authorities must also promote cadre training. Finland could, for instance, train Soviet managers more effectively.

In our conversations with Sitaryan, we also broached the question of the conversion of Soviet defense industry. Our firms displayed interest in this straightaway and sensed very alluring prospects. Many companies already have concrete proposals, and here too it is up to the authorities.

I have done a good deal of thinking about the "special" measures for which the press is calling, and under current conditions I attach paramount importance to the deepening of our knowledge about one another. In order to retain their privileged position in the Soviet market, Finns must, in my view, devote more attention to the spiritual side of our relations, to studying and getting to know their partners. For instance, I constantly reproach myself for my poor knowledge of Russian.

I am convinced that our very good political relations are the base on which economic ties can develop successfully. But these ties must not continue to be conducted solely on the level of declarations and statements. Goods that are above all of interest to the consumer himself are what is needed. It is he, rather than officials, who must decide whether or not to buy in conditions of reform.

[Correspondents] It is obviously important to define one's position: What should we aim to do ourselves and what should we "leave" to competitors from Western countries?

[Holkeri] This must be a crucial factor under the new conditions! Good relations do not in themselves ensure beneficial contracts for us almost automatically. Whereas previously there was one client—the Ministry of Foreign Trade—now we must find a potential customer among hundreds, maybe thousands, of Soviet enterprises. Let us assume that we do indeed know the Soviet market better than, say, the West Germans. But their firms will get their own way all the same—just by virtue of the fact that there are... more of them.

We Finns are sometimes excessively proud and haughty. We think that we know everything in this world and can do everything. That is far from the truth! So we must in the future offer our services mainly in those areas where our national industry is superior to our competitors. Finland is not competitive in the export of oranges or cheap sewn goods. But on the other hand we can supply state-of-the-art technology for logging, metalworking, and producing a number of chemical products, medicines, and particularly fashionable outerwear produced by world-class designers.

[Correspondents] Can it be said that, as a result of the decentralization of Soviet foreign trade, the quiet life is coming to an end for many Finnish firms?

[Holkeri] It is coming to that. But all normal trade is based on this. That is why I do not tire of repeating at meetings with businessmen the need for better knowledge of your country, including studying languages. When we want to sell our goods, we must speak the client's language. It is simpler to buy: There is tremendous choice in the world.

[Correspondents] Allow me to ask you a question that is undoubtedly of interest for our country's economy. Recently, as the saying goes, "without undue fuss," Finland adopted a decision enabling foreigners to acquire full ownership of Finnish enterprises. What is the purpose of the innovation and what rules and restrictions exist here?

[Holkeri] First, it is not that simple to obtain a 100-percent share. The main rule is as follows: A foreigner can obtain a 20-percent and then 40-percent controlling block of shares without particular bother. A special license is needed for full ownership.

What guided us here? A similar process is taking place in many countries. Finnish business is itself buying hundreds of enterprises, notably in Sweden, the FRG, and the United States. But there were restrictions within the country that went back quite a long time. We drew the following conclusion: Instead of keeping money in various countries' banks in return for high interest, it is better to attract direct foreign investments and pay dividends on this "real" money.

But we have one absolute restriction: We do not want and will not sell Finland's land, fields, and woods (it is not, of course, a question of allocating land for building a new plant). I once said the following at a meeting with FRG businessmen: There is so much "unused" money in the world and Finland is so relatively small that if this were permitted, any mad billionaire could buy almost all our country—as his "holiday home." Of course, that is a hyperbole but the sense of it is, I believe, clear.

[Correspondents] Our legislators are also attracted by another novelty—this time from Finnish political life—debates about vesting the prime minister with the right to dissolve parliament....

[Holkeri] The country's president alone has hitherto possessed that right. In the new law it will be made conditional upon a preliminary representation from the head of government. But in the course of heated debates we forgot one essential detail: The president is by no means obliged to dissolve the parliament, even if the prime minister does have a definite opinion on this score.

On the other hand, without his representation the head of state cannot decide to take this extreme step. Our president, Mauno Koivisto, considers the dissolution of parliament such a responsible matter that he refuses to submit a potential decision to one person's judgment. Incidentally, the president voluntarily agreed to regularly give a public report on his state of health to ensure that matters would not be reduced to a crisis of power owing to his possible illness.

[Correspondents] At the beginning of our conversation you spoke about frequent attempts to proclaim a vote of no-confidence in your government. Public opinion polls also attest to a reduction in its popularity of late. Do you consider that the opposition was wrong on all points?

[Holkeri] Naturally, any cabinet of ministers may have mistakes or shortcomings and come do some things better and some worse. But if you take a realistic unbiased look at things, in my view, the incumbent government has not made particular blunders. What is more, time will tell whether a particular "bad" decision may turn out to be a very good decision ultimately.

[Correspondents] Finnish journalists would hardly agree with that....

[Holkeri] I myself was editor in chief of a newspaper and I would say that the first rule for a journalist in our country is that he can never be satisfied with the government! I know that many reporters working on domestic policy envy their international policy colleagues: That is where it's all happening, where the bold splash headlines are! But, in their opinion, nothing special happens in Finland itself....

[Correspondents] As Soviet journalists, it only remains for us to envy the absence in Finland of many of the news items which have unfortunately become all too much a part of life in the Soviet Union. The absence of such sensations in Suomi indicates stability and prosperity.

[Holkeri] Be that as it may, many people regret that the government refuses to join the ranks of variety entertainers and supply facts for "spicy" articles. Our credo remains the same: daily, painstaking—not always noticeable—persistent work.

No one can reproach the Finnish Government for the fact that this work does not take place in view of the whole people.

Delegation Leaves for Council of Europe Meeting

LD2701094790 Moscow TASS in English 0841 GMT 27 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 27 TASS—A delegation from the USSR Supreme Soviet left Moscow for France today to attend the winter session of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary assembly.

The delegation is headed by Nikolay Neiland, secretary of the Soviet parliament Committee for International Affairs and head of the Supreme Soviet group for relations with the parliamentary assembly.

Ukrainians Meet Bavarian Prime Minister

LD3001111490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2020 GMT 29 Jan 90

[Excerpts] Munich 29 Jan (TASS)—TASS special correspondents Lev Volnukhin, Aleksey Grigoryev, and Mikhail Stepovik report: The visiting Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic government delegation led by V.A. Masol, chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, had a meeting today with Max Streibl, the Bavarian prime minister.

In his welcome speech for the Ukrainian visitors, he noted in particular, that the Bavarians are following the progress of perestroyka in the Soviet Union closely and with great empathy. [passage omitted] V.A. Masol said in his speech of reply that the visit by his delegation was taking place at a very dynamic time. A new approach, founded on recognition of the primacy of pan-human values, was coming to replace the stereotypes of confrontation and isolation.

There have been events in the history of our countries and peoples that cannot be forgotten, he went on. They must be remembered to ensure that never again will the tragic lessons of the past be repeated. We must strive to meet one another half way, and together build a peaceful future.

The Soviet Ukraine head of government stressed the need to expand the progressive new forms of collaboration, and to create joint enterprises in various economic spheres.

After their talks V.A. Masol and M. Streibl signed a joint statement on the main avenues for partnership and cooperation between the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Bavaria. Priority is to be given to such spheres as the economy and technology, agriculture and forestry, nature and environmental protection, tourism, science and research, health care and town planning.

The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, as one of the republics of the Soviet Union, and Bavaria, as an intergral part of the FRG, regard their interaction as partners as a concrete contribution to the joint search for ways that will lead to the creation of a Europe of peace and cooperation, the document stresses.

Ukraine's Kryuchkov Heads Delegation to Italy

PM3001110390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
29 Jan 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Delegation's Departure"]

[Text] In accordance with the plan for party exchanges between the CPSU and the Italian Communist Party, a CPSU delegation headed by G.K. Kryuchkov, first secretary of Odessa Ukrainian Communist Party Oblast Committee, departed Moscow for Milan 28 January.

Political & Social

Gorbachev Says Resignation Rumors 'Groundless'

LD3101134290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1315 GMT 31 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 31 Jan (TASS)—Mikhail Gorbachev has denied the allegations of CNN's Moscow correspondent to the effect that the Soviet leader is planning to resign from the post of general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, but to stay in the post of chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Today, before the start of talks with Fernando Collor de Mello, president-elect of the Federal Republic of Brazil, who has come to the Soviet Union as the guest of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Mikhail Gorbachev stated the following to a Brazilian journalist who asked whether the rumors corresponded to reality:

"There are many rumors and suggestions going around. They are all groundless. Probably it is to someone's advantage to perpetrate such things. Next week we shall have a very important Central Committee plenum. We shall be discussing documents for the upcoming congress. But it has now become the fashion in the international press that as soon as we approach the next Central Committee plenum a whole network of fabrications rises up around it. Those of you working in Moscow are well aware of this. This proves that we are another country, another society—everything is discussed—openly discussed, especially at such a turning point, a very critical and crucial stage of perestroyka. We need to make known all assessments and points of view because it is very important for paving the road ahead."

Reportedly Appeared 'Irritated'

AU3101103690 Paris AFP in English 1008 GMT 31 Jan 90

[By Francis Curta]

[Excerpts] Moscow, Jan 31 (AFP)—Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev dismissed rumours Wednesday that he was about to quit as Communist Party chief to concentrate on his job as president.

"I'm certainly not intending to do so," he told journalists covering a welcoming ceremony for Brazilian president-elect Fernando Collor de Mello. "These suggestions are groundless. No one said this and I certainly didn't declare it," he added.

Reporters said he appeared irritated when quizzed about the rumours that he might announce his resignation as secretary general at a two-day plenary meeting of the Communist Party's Central Committee scheduled for February 5 and 6.

"In a few days, there will be a very important plenum at which national questions will be discussed and decisions on serious matters taken," he said.

The Kremlin leader said he had spent "a few days in the south" to prepare his speech to the plenum. He was at a private dacha in Gagra, on the Black Sea, informed sources said. He left for the south following a meeting of the ruling politburo on January 22 which was called to discuss his plans for reform.

Fellow politburo members asked him to redraft some of the proposals to be put to the plenum, a sign there had been disagreement in the ruling body. The politburo also appeared to have postponed the plenum by a week, as Lithuanian sources said it was originally scheduled for January 29.

An unconfirmed report by the U.S. Cable News Network had suggested Tuesday that Mr. Gorbachev was about to resign as party leader. Citing a "well-informed and usually reliable Communist Party source", CNN said he would try to hand over his post to his closest political ally, Alexander Yakovlev, "while he (Gorbachev) follows public pressure to remove the party from its monopoly control of political power". [passage omitted] However, observers here did not rule out Mr. Gorbachev resigning as secretary general, but probably not before the party congress which is currently scheduled for October.

The French newspaper, LE MONDE, published extracts Tuesday from what it said was a memorandum addressed to Mr. Gorbachev by close aides who recommended that he ditch conservatives within the party rather than try to hold a balance between reformers and the old- guard. The aides also called for a true sharing of power in the Soviet Union, "a path which all socialist countries have had to follow, except for Romania where the party was simply swept away," the paper reported. [passage omitted]

Perestroyka, Power Discussed at PRAVDA

PM3101123390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Jan 90 Second Edition pp 1-2

[O. Losoto and G. Ovcharenko account of roundtable discussion at PRAVDA offices: "Perestroyka and Power. Discussion at PRAVDA"—date unspecified, first two paragraphs are editorial introduction, last five paragraphs are editorial conclusion]

[Text] The editorial office mailbag is full of alarm about the future of perestroyka. "Is it proceeding at all—and if so, in what direction?" A. Gulko of Dnepropetrovsk asks. "There are no real positive changes in the economy, and democratization often turns into anarchy. The country and the economy are in turmoil through strikes and unprecedented disruptions in the work of transport and trade, the blood of innocent people is being shed in many regions. Is this what people expected from perestroyka? But the most painful aspect is the fact that, in this critical situation, the central organs of power are at times displaying demoralizing indecisiveness. Maybe the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet does not have sufficient powers? Then let us raise this question at the

Congress of People's deputies and resolve it! We cannot delay: Perestroyka is in danger..."

There have been many letters of this sort. Their writers no longer ask or advise, they demand: It is time, they say, to use power. Hence the subject of the discussion at PRAVDA—the powers of central authority under the conditions of perestroyka. Taking part in the discussion were Candidate of Historical Sciences Yevgeniy Arshakovich Ambartsumov, Doctor of Juridical Sciences Vladimir Yevgenyevich Guliyev, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Vladimir Afanasyevich Zots, and Doctor of Juridical Sciences Mikhail Anatolyevich Krutogolov.

Step Toward Democracy

Correspondents: Many readers, observing the processes currently taking place in the economy, social development, and interethnic relations, are writing bitterly to the editorial office stating: We wanted democracy, but we've got anarchy. And they ask: Just what has happened?

Ye. Ambartsumov: I wouldn't claim so categorically that perestroyka has only produced new problems. I'd put it differently: It has laid bare those negative phenomena which we deliberately hid behind the screen of deformed socialism. There is no doubt that with the formation of a new constitutional power structure and with the appearance of a demanding Congress and a no longer sham Supreme Soviet a real step has been taken toward democratization. Admittedly, the new institutions have become more cumbersome. But the Congress, in which more than 2,000 deputies participate, has witnessed the public emergence of effective parliamentarians; it has become an arena for revealing new and genuine political leaders—not imaginary leaders, as was the case in the past.

Correspondents: All that is so. The changes in the political climate are indisputable. But people expected that with them would come fundamental changes in the country's socioeconomic situation. This has not happened. Moreover, there have been additional new problems: unprecedented disruption in transportation and trade, interethnic conflicts, and strikes. But the authorities, in the opinion of many readers, have kept silent.

M. Krutogolov: At meetings in various auditoriums I'm asked even more sharply: Do we have power at all? As a rule, I reply using the old phrase "More haste, less speed." But in general the question of the power of the authorities in a period of perestroyka —a revolutionary period—is a very complex question.

Ye. Ambartsumov: I agree. I think that the people are right to be dissatisfied with the slow pace of change, the holdups in everyday life, and the indecisiveness of the authorities in implementing their own plans. But, for all the current shortcomings, people do not realize what a huge distance we have come since perestroyka started. After all, for instance, in the past, too, we had a Supreme Soviet based on the Stalin and, later, the Brezhnev constitutions, but it had no real influence on the country's life. We essentially lived under a totalitarian regime, not in a democratic rule-of-law state. But our current difficulties stem precisely from the fact that political change is not being accompanied by progress in the economy, where we have essentially remained at our previous, totalitarian stage.

Correspondents: Obviously, we ought to at least briefly explain the difference between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes.

V. Zots: In my view, a totalitarian regime is typified by a situation in which all the activity of society and each person is absolutely regulated. And power at all levels is shaped in secret—as a rule by one person or a few people from the ruling elite. Under an authoritarian regime, power—although concentrated in a single person or an elite—permits a certain division and polarization of powers. When they clash, the conflict is stopped by an "iron hand" that makes no distinction between who is right and who is to blame. Or rather, it acts merely to maintain its own authoritarian power. All civilized countries have been through these phases of social development.

Ye. Ambartsumov: I'd like to clarify that. Totalitarianism regulates and floodlights all spheres of people's lives, even their thinking—as was the case under Stalin. And the economy too, of course. But authoritarian leaders are concerned about their power and give economic forces freedom of action. Where is that freedom in our country? Admittedly, under Khrushchev we underwent a certain liberation of private life from the orders of the state, but this did not apply to the economy, because it partially became a black economy. But on the whole the system remained the same as before—an administrative-edict system. Although the system no longer works in practice, the state—or rather, its apparatus—continues to suppress the shoots of a civic society. As a result, anarchic elements are growing in both the economy and political life. It is regrettable that in the transitional period, when particular cohesion, responsibility, and rapid and resolute reactions are required from the central authorities, they are growing weaker and do not look effective.

Our parliament will clearly need time to become firmly established. Currently its sessions are often reminiscent of a rally; our parliamentarians are not always able to respond rapidly, decisively, and, above all, in a balanced way to complex and conflicting current events and therefore do not always support [podpirayut] the state's top official.

Also, the fact is that our supreme organ of power is based on combining the not entirely harmonious principles of the Soviet system—conceived of as direct democracy—and traditional parliamentarianism. This affects the efficacy of the Congress and the Supreme Soviet.

Incidentally, the two-level model of parliament—Supreme Soviet sessions and the Congress of USSR

People's Deputies—itself has a negative influence on parliament's effectiveness. After all, it is hard to reach agreement at the Congress, when more than 2,000 people participate in the debates and everyone invariably wants to speak. Currently the Congress often repeats work already done by a USSR Supreme Soviet session.

Moreover, we still lack a clear separation between the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. They often interfere in each other's activity. This particularly applies to our fourth power—party power. Each of us, I think, can cite plenty of examples when for some reason a decision is made for the USSR Supreme Soviet or the USSR Council of Ministers by the CPSU Central Committee or the Politburo. This, of course, violates the principle of the separation of powers proclaimed in the Constitution.

Do We Need A Fourth Power?

Correspondents: A great deal is currently being said about the party's role in society, and our readers are not avoiding the subject either, of course. For instance M. Bakriyev of Groznyy believes: "...all our trouble stems from the fact that the party is losing its influence and Soviet power—both centrally and locally—does not yet control the situation in the country."

V. Zots: Well, we need to recognize that the party's general state today is not ideal. Its committees—from the Central Committee to primary committees—have found themselves in a kind of public goldfish bowl under the sometimes highly penetrating glare of unsympathetic antisocialist spotlights. And let us say bluntly that in their light even the positive results of these committees' efforts look distorted. As for their shortcomings—these are presented to the public gaze as out-and-out criminal actions.

All this strengthens still further the already painful transition from a rigid command system to political methods of leadership, from ideological monopolism to diversity of opinions. And yet these spotlights have done us a service: We have clearly seen the death throes of those structures which have outlived their usefulness, we have been able to see the cracks in our social organism through which initiative disappears, and we have seen a system—grown fat and lazy under ideologically comfortable conditions—which lacks the energy, or rather the will, not only to take the offensive but even to defend itself. When we had to move from words to action, we clearly saw the fiasco wrought by once-thriving party workers and leaders at the highest level who had developed from party, All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League, and trade union hangers-on. Their "deep dark secret" was, it turns out, their inability to do anything.

We were also able to realize something which we were very reluctant to admit: The social awareness inflamed by perestroyka was exceptionally deformed. Isn't that why its energy was primarily a destructive force rushing through the open gates of national egoism into the Torricellian vacuum of age-old grievance and unsatisfied ambition?

You can hear people say: OK, let people criticize others, including the party—we have agreed that there are no no-go areas for criticism. And if we've gone too far, it's nothing to worry about, just a shortcoming of democratization. I think that there are insufficient grounds for optimism on this question. We have seen people continually trying to "corner" the party and put it in a position where it has to justify itself. And the critics of the party are often people who are by no means irreproachable both politically and morally. I'm talking about attempts in the guise of **plurality of opinions** to justify **plurality of action** aimed not at renewing but at shaking and discrediting socialism.

But let's not forget something else too: It was the party which found the courage to critically analyze the situation in society and advance the ideas of perestroyka, democratization, and glasnost.

Correspondents: Don't you think we're moving away from our subject?

M. Krutogolov: Not at all. We're talking about power and its impact on the fate of perestroyka. In a rule-of-law state—and this is not denied by the party itself—there is a separation of powers between the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. We too are campaigning for this, demanding clearer differentiation in this sphere. But for some reason we forget or, rather, we sheepishly keep quiet about the fact that we also have a fourth power—the power of the party, its CPSU Central Committee, and the Politburo. And this is probably the main power, standing above the others. That is the reality, and I as a citizen and a Communist am by no means opposed to this fourth power, particularly in today's crisis situation. But that is why I believe that we must talk frankly about the party's power and its structures. And we must admit that, having initiated the renewal of society, the party itself is lagging behind the democratic processes in society.

V. Zots: That's no big deal: The party has already stated that publicly and openly.

M. Krutogolov: I agree. But let's look at the current composition of the CPSU Central Committee, whose plenums resolve the most important issues. In my view, it has been lagging behind perestroyka even in terms of its membership. And here's one new fact: In the past few weeks three secretaries of major oblast party organizations have been relieved of their posts by the will of Communists. But they will all take part in drawing up the resolutions for the forthcoming CPSU Central Committee plenum. It would be undemocratic to strip them of that right. But if we had the institution of direct representation and an oblast committee first secretary represented his oblast party organization on the Central Committee, then from the time he lost the confidence of his oblast's Communists he would no longer be able to represent their opinions on the Central Committee either. I think that in this case there would be a natural renewal of the party leadership, which would make it not only more prestigious but stronger and more progressive, too.

Ye. Ambartsumov: There are no two ways about it: The party and the actual mechanism for forming its structures must change—discussions on that topic are under way. But I would like to defend even the present party and even its apparatus—which is largely inefficient and demoralized—because at the present time it is an integrated structure which, as it were, unites the state and, at the same time, is susceptible (albeit reluctantly) to democratic influence. Although, of course, this structure needs decisive and rapid renewal, which, we must hope, will take place during the preparations for and as a result of the party congress. Arguments are currently raging about Article 6 of the Constitution. I agree: Its formulation is undemocratic and it has already outlived its usefulness. But, in my view, it is simply foolish to wage a political struggle around this issue when we are literally being torn apart by other, more immediate problems.

V. Guliyev: I support this view. To abolish Article 6 right now would mean to virtually deprive the Politburo of power. The only real power that is still obeyed by executive organs. Even though I would like to emphasize: The fourth power will perforce be necessary until such time as the other powers, including the legislature, acquire real strength.

What Can the President Do?

Correspondents: Some of our readers, in particular I. Denisov from Moscow, K. Velichko from Stavropol, and A. Kulnev from Baku, have pointed out that the Congresses of People's Deputies have not justified their hopes and are in fact more like rallies than an institution of supreme power. They ask us to clarify the powers of chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet today, whether they are adequate, and how justified journalists are in describing M.S. Gorbachev as the country's president?

Ye. Ambartsumov: I think that the work of the supreme body of power is adversely affected by the fact that the Constitution does not clearly define the powers and position of the head of state. This may be the source of the indecisiveness of which people are today accusing the supreme body of power.

V. Guliyev: I disagree. Look how tersely but vaguely, and therefore extremely broadly, the Constitution defines the powers of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In effect USSR sovereignty both within the country and abroad is represented not by a system of representative bodies, but by him. He exercises overall leadership over the preparation of questions to be considered by the Congress and the Supreme Soviet. That is, he effectively molds draft laws. But what lies behind the small phrase which says that the laws and resolutions adopted by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet have been signed by the chairman of the Supreme Soviet. What if he were not to sign them? Would the law enter into force? No, it would not! Thus, I believe that there is no need to blame the USSR Supreme Soviet chairman's lack of power...

M. Krutogolov: I think that Vladimir Yevgenyevich is contradicting himself. In my view, the terseness of the Constitution's definition of the powers of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet does not indicate his unlimited power but rather the fact that we have simply not developed the institution of head of state. The point is that the man who chairs a parliamentary sitting cannot be considered head of state or president. Consequently we have some sort of hybrid: a chairman of a parliament who exercises certain functions of head of state. Clarity is needed on this point.

The following question was raised here: What would happen if Gorbachev were not to sign a draft law? To be honest, this is a rhetorical question. But even if this happens, there are two answers. First: The Congress would agree with the chairman and would vote again on the question—incidentally, that has happened but the law does not make provision for this. Second: The Congress would elect a new chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Now let us see how this situation would be resolved in France. It is very simple. There the president empowered to demand repeat discussion of a question within 15 days and he cannot be denied that—the law does not allow it. In the United States the president has the right to impose a veto. We have nothing of the sort. That is why there are no guarantees that the Congress of more than 2,000 people may not in the heat of emotion adopt an ill-conceived decision that would become law straightaway.

Ye. Ambartsumov: We probably need to get away from practice and tackle a little bit of theory. The question of a strong power in a democratic society is not as simple as many people, including our new parliamentarians, believe. We spent a long time living under a totalitarian regime. But respect for true democracy does not involve great leaps from one regime to another. A phased approach is what is needed here. In my view, we should now have a stage of authoritarianism propped up by a strong democratically elected parliament. It is at this specific stage that we must perfect the specific institution of head of state.

V. Zots: Possibly. But it must not be forgotten that even presidential rule does not merely involve power for the president. It also involves a strong authority at local level on which the president depends. This authority still does not exist in the localities; as yet local self-management is a matter of declarations rather than a reality.

Second. I agree that the institution of head of state is necessary. The chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet has virtually no legislative protection. There are no guarantees that the Congress, swayed by left-wing or right-wing forces, will not demand his replacement. Theoretically it is also possible that a CPSU Central

Committee plenum could recall its candidate representing the party and we would be deprived of a head of state. Of course, these concrete conditions affect the concrete actions and deeds carried out by the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

M. Krutogolov: That is indeed the case. But why is the French president independent and why does he have virtually unlimited freedom of action? Because he is elected by direct universal suffrage. He knows that the people are behind him and that it is extremely hard to replace him. This is also why you get free decisions and resolute actions.

Ye. Ambartsumov: When constitutional amendments were being formulated, I, like many of my colleagues, proposed the institution of presidential rule. But this proposal did not get through. However, I am also convinced now that an unconditional orientation toward democratism at all stages of social development may produce a weak central power. There are stages, particularly phases of revolution and perestroyka, when democracy must act as a support for power. I believe that this is precisely the stage which we are experiencing.

The country is in a critical situation. You only have to look at current events in the Transcaucasus. Take the following specific example: The Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic has announced that it is leaving the USSR. This, you will agree, is an anticonstitutional act because an autonomous republic does not have the right to secede. But what about the center? It is keeping quiet; it cannot bring itself to use its power. The chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet could have the decisive say and make a one-man decision, as the situation in the Transcaucasus requires. Perhaps he does not have the authority to do this? That is why the question that we are discussing today—the question of the powers of the head of state in the present situation—is a most important question concerning the future of perestroyka.

V. Guliyev: I believe that the indecisiveness which, in many people's opinion, the central authorities are displaying today resides not in lack of power but in lack of a clear political perspective.

V. Zots: I believe that you are somewhat mistaken, Vladimir Yevgenyevich, because policy cannot be elaborated for years in advance. Then it simply becomes dogma. Have we made mistakes and miscalculations in the perestroyka years? Yes, we have. The party makes no secret of this. Moreover, it is learning lessons from and rectifying its mistakes. Incidentally, this also is one of the signs of its strength and ability to assess the situation correctly. Now, I would point out, great work is under way to elaborate the party's platform, which is to be discussed at the impending CPSU Central Committee plenum. Thus we have a firm political line, but firmness in implementing it is lacking. Possibly because, as we have already said, the actual central power is still weak and the head of state lacks the powers that the presidents of other developed countries have.

I also want to broach a question which emerged from the discussion and which is, in my view, extremely important. I am referring to the level of citizens' legal culture and legal conscience. If these are high then it is easier for the central authorities to implement decisions. The following principle operates in any civilized country: The law is the law. Unfortunately, violation of the law has become the norm in our country. I see this as another reason for the present crisis situation in the country. Any authority is powerless if it is not confident of citizens' obedience of the law. That is why I believe that the stress today must also be laid on legal education for people. We must also clarify and obey the principle of a rule-of-law state: The state is responsible to the citizens and the citizens in turn are responsible to the state. If this principle were operating in our country now, we would have avoided many of our troubles.

A great deal also depends on every person's overall level of culture and supreme integrity. Recently Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Miroslav Popovich stressed in PRAVDA that an individual cannot possess supreme moral reliability without knowing the origins of our integrity.

In Place of a Conclusion

Correspondents: Well, our conversation is drawing to a close. What would you like to say in summing up its results?

Ye. Ambartsumov: I personally am an advocate of presidential rule being defined in the USSR Constitution. Furthermore: If there is anything we lack, it is resolution in implementing considered decisions which have been adopted.

V. Guliyev: The improvement I would introduce would be to free the head of state from constant, daily leadership of the work of the top representative organs. This is even physically incompatible with the performance of other functions. As for constitutionally defined powers, I believe that their range has been outlined sufficiently broadly, but they must be stated more specifically. The job to be done by the top man [pervoye litso] must have a constitutional foundation, gaps in the law must be eliminated, and the question of, for example, his power of "veto" must be resolved. I would be cautious and, in the event of instituting the position of one-man head of state, I would make provision for some monitoring mechanism which would enable the people, or parliament, or some other institution (maybe a constitutional court?) to terminate a president's powers ahead of time should this become necessary. Subject to this reservation, I am not against instituting the position of one-man head of state.

M. Krutogolov: I am nonetheless a supporter of a decisive—more consistent, more clear cut—separation of powers. Each branch of power must have its own powers which do not intertwine with but supplement the others. In what sense? There must be a system of balances; strong presidential power must be balanced by a strong parliament. Both these branches of power could be placed under rigid monitoring by the people, but it is necessary for each to know its powers and, especially, to bear in mind its duties. For example, if the legislators or the president fail to perform their duties, this would immediately give rise to the question: Why are you so slow, why are you not deciding, why are you inactive where you should be displaying initiative? At times inaction becomes a political blunder, at times inaction is simply criminal. Briefly speaking, what they have done must be a factor in assessing people, but it is absolutely necessary to introduce as a factor in the appraisal what they should have done but failed to do for various reasons. The question then would be: Why did they fail to do it? Various factors might be at work here. It happens very often in our country, I think, that inaction by a representative of the state, someone holding a high office of state, is aided or abetted by the fact that he has simultaneously to act in his other capacity as party leader. I am not against the existence of party power—but only if it has the same powers as all others. If a prosecutor fails to cope there are procedures for taking him to task; if the executive fails to cope the legislature throws it out. If parliament produces a bad law it is held responsible. The party must have rights—but it must also without fail have duties and must be held responsible for them. This is my stance.

V. Zots: I agree with those who say that there must be strong presidential power, but under strong monitoring by the people. This legislative mechanism must be effective. The system must not allow any anomalies like the ones our people and state experienced when leaders were changed. There is a need for a precise mechanism not only for voting them in [izbiraniye] but also, if need be, for voting them out [pereizbiraniye].

As for the party, since this question was raised, it must be a democratic political party and not merely an organization of spear-carriers. Many people say nowadays that the party is lagging behind the perestroyka processes. But it is not just a matter of external signs. We are lagging in qualitative renewal. In terms of cultural-creative potential and intellectual standards. But I am confident that the party will find its position in the renewed society.

From the editorial office. Perestroyka and power is a large and complex topic and all its aspects cannot be considered in a single, albeit extremely lengthy, discussion.

We believe that a reformist leader does indeed need additional power for radical actions. But how can he obtain it? What options can there be here? What is the procedure in other countries? It is not for nothing that the press is discussing the possibilities of a presidentail system, taking into consideration, of course, our traditions, specific features, and existing institutions of power. What should the central power be like in the era of perestroyka with its developing processes of self-mangement, sovereign republics, and economic autonomy for the regions?

These questions must be answered in the very near future. They have been raised by current practice and must not impede the course of perestroyka.

We are not closing this discussion about the powers of the central authorities in conditions of revolutionary perestroyka. What is more we invite all our readers to take part in it. We await your letters....

Drozdov Article on Leadership in USSR

PM3101112790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 31 Jan 90 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Drozdov under rubric "Last Day of the Month": "January Is Hard Going"]

[Text] In other times it would have been a pleasure to unhurriedly open the final volume of Dal's dictionary to muse on the interpretations of "January..." Now even every day has its own political sign. It seems to me that January 1990 is under the sign of instability, anxiety, and fear. The internal political situation has confronted society with a very grave problem—what will happen to the Soviet Union, to our motherland, which each "language existing within it" today understands in its own way?

This concern is by no means one of the new year. We have crawled over with it from 1989, as with a yoke around our neck.

The last months of last year fundamentally changed the situation in East Europe. And this, as you understand, is not simply a geographical concept but a sphere of the USSR's vitally important interests. What is happening there is known in the language of politics as the collapse of the unified, ossified system on the European Continent as we pictured it hitherto. The regeneration of political power in East European states as classical social democracy is changing not only the nature of relations among the members of the socialist community but also the situation in Europe and throughout the world. Our allies are concertedly and decisively taking their leave of Stalinism and returning to panhuman values, to national political and religious traditions. Stalin alone is not being dethroned—people's own idols are too.

I have just attended the last, 11th Congress of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR]. Recently still the leading party, it has been cast to the periphery of political life in Poland. Having lost to "Solidarity" on all counts, Polish communists are trying to return to the field. With losses, of course. The PZPR no longer exists; it has disintegrated into fragments. It was impossible not to feel our responsibility for what is happening both in Poland and throughout East Europe. But, unfortunately, the problems of our confreres (may they not take offense) bear no comparison with our own.

Their parties are disintegrating, but national unity and statehood are being preserved. We, on the other hand, who proclaimed the renewal of socialism, have for the first time really felt the threat of the Soviet Union's disintegration. Despondency of spirit is accompanied by the exacerbation of the country's economic position (are figures needed here?).

Huge loans will hardly come to our aid. It would be all the more naive to put our trust in CEMA—our colleagues will switch to tougher language not only in politics... The West is hardly sincerely concerned at the prospect of the USSR's potential of being weakened. The only thing that alarms it is the existence of nuclear weapons in the "waning empire" (no good will come of it). Thus, at best, they will not disturb us.

In these notes I am speaking as "A man of Moscow." As someone for whom the strengthening of the Russian state and the development [stanovleniye] of the USSR means a very great deal. But to speak of the national revival of Russia alone is to understand nothing in Russia. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze emphasized recently that the teetering of the USSR could destabilize the international situation. The nationalists of all republics would do well to take that to heart.

It is another matter that we must not today picture our country as some gift from God or from Lenin. It is necessary to restore the balance of national interests among all the components of the USSR. Prior to 1985 this was ensured by an ideology consisting not of convictions alone but also of delusions. We had only to think seriously about panhuman values and tackle perestroyka for the seemingly unshakable ideas about socialism, about political power in the USSR, and about the federation to wither and be rendered colorless. We were mistaken with regard to the new historic community—the Soviet people. The strength of the "fraternal bonds" faltered beneath the truth about the 1939 pact.

Can we reproach the republics which are declaring their right to secede from the USSR? No. The Constitution of the Soviet Union grants this right. It is a guarantee of their sure, equal participation in the federation. Provided that a republic's policy is not run by corrupt political clans working for the system with all its defects and multiplying its flaws. The federation's history has been supplemented in recent years by instances of the total forgetting of national interests in favor of the center and in the interests of preserving a personal sinecure at local level. For 70 years even the center itself worked thoroughly to weaken the federation.

The result is a mighty explosion of nationalism in the federation's most painful border sectors: the Transcaucasus and the Baltic region. Who is to be reproached? The reforms of perestroyka? This is so easy. It is as simple as seeking in the union the roots of a Jewish-masonic conspiracy (and for many people—particularly the participants in the January rallies in Moscow—this is one and the same thing). But what is happening to the federation was predictable. It was precisely the idea of political and socioeconomic reforms that unleashed the forces which had been slumbering snugly beneath pathological traditions in ideology and politics. However, the crisis in a number of republics and the popular indignation were directed through local political structures toward the center and, through it, toward Soviet power and the CPSU. Neither the Armenian pogroms in Baku nor the situation on Azerbaijan's border with Armenia can detract from the understanding that the People's Front (even though it is not the whole people) tried to take power in Azerbaijan. It is easy to imagine how that might have ended if you remember also the attempt to destroy the USSR's state border with Iran. The decision to send in the troops was undoubtedly correct, although belated. But, forgive me, the leadership of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic had time to make an independent choice... The responsibility once again lay with Moscow. A convenient occasion for the appearance before the people of political "pensioners" like Aliyev, the Azerbaijani Communists' former leader. In Azerbaijan's permanent mission in Moscow he condemned the sending of troops into Baku. The same old clan games....

In the context of the Transcaucasian crisis and the situation in the Baltic region, the issue is a serious one: Power. The prospect of this power being retained by the ruling party. But if in Lenkoran the party comrades voluntarily relinquished power and sat things out in a teahouse, if in Baku the Communist Party leadership is proving incapable of controlling the situation, if in Chernigov all the party and soviet "big shots" are in a state of siege, and if in Lithuania the Communist Party is consciously splitting up, what does this mean? (Leaders have also fallen in Volgograd, Tyumen, and Chernigov...). It probably means that forces of alternative power are appearing in the political vacuum thereby created.

This is a fact born of the turbulent end to 1989 and confirmed by January 1990. If we, as a party, really want to retain our position in this country, we must start thinking seriously about our political image and about a political platform appropriate to the moment (think of the Polish experience in this respect).

It is no less important to try to include the new people's movements in the ambit of state and political life and give them equal rights with the ruling party. Radical political reform can and must become the basis for uniting and reviving our federation. It must be its spiritual content and its religion, reflecting the entire spectrum of views and opinions held by our diverse, multinational Soviet society. Those who say that our people are a lost cause, a demoralized bunch, are lying. Our society is alive and learning to get what it wants. Let me remind you of the reaction to reservists being called up in connection with the events in Baku. Were the authorities not dealing with society in Stavropol, Krasnodar, and Moscow? Society can no longer live by bread alone because the taste of freedom is stronger than the aftertaste of food.

Gorbachev was told this bluntly in Lithuania. His meetings in Vilnius showed that internal party reform is an urgent matter. The CPSU and the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League are no longer a monolith: either vertically or horizontally. We must admit this and go on to build a new party and a new youth league. To be locked in a cycle based on mythical unity is a dangerous game, if only because the responsibility for everything boomerangs against those at the very top. And we cannot, do not have the right to risk Gorbachev simply because he was the one who inherited such a grave ideological and cadre legacy. Today he is the only person who can be the center of gravity and the mediator between the multitude of political and social forces in the country. Ultimately, he is our president. The president first and foremost.

I think that the time has come in the Soviet Union for all influential participants in the political process to sit down at a "roundtable." Especially as the Congresses of USSR People's Deputies in their present form do not always lead us in the direction of compromise. Just as the various political conferences, regardless of whom they bring together—collective farm workers, workers, or engineering and technical personnel—do not represent the voice of the people. Irrational political means are needed for such an extraordinary country as ours. Otherwise something else will always be found to fill the power vacuum.

These are the thoughts that come to mind in January, and January is only the first month of a difficult year.

Note on Conservatives Drafted by Gorbachev Aides

PM3101112490 Paris LE MONDE in French 31 Jan 90 pp 1,2

[Bernard Guetta dispatch on "political note" drafted by "Gorbachev's close aides": "Gorbachev Advisers Urge Him To Break With Conservatives"]

[Text] Moscow—In less than 1 week's time, Mr Gorbachev will have burned his boats and will only have a few months in which to regain or completely lose control of the situation. He will have in his mind a long political note drawn up by his closest aides, of which LE MONDE publishes extensive extracts today, when he launches an offensive in the Central Committee on Monday 5 February, from which the USSR will, in any event, emerge transformed.

If Mr Gorbachev wins, and if he succeeds in imposing a presidential regime and making the party into a "different party" open to dialogue with rival organizations, he will perhaps prevent his country from sinking into chaos. If he fails, there will be no political or state institution in the USSR capable of channeling the violence of the aspiration for change, of moderating nationalist confrontations, and of proposing any other course than revolutionary explosion.

The striking thing about this note, although it was drafted before the Caucasus sank into violence, is how close the chasm of widespread violence seems to be in the Kremlin's eyes. The problem, in the eyes of Mr Gorbachev's aides, is that the conservatives in the apparatus have not only succeeded in curbing the introduction of reforms but are also now managing to establish a popular base by exploiting social discontent, Russian nationalism, racism, and egalitarianism with which the whole of Soviet society is imbued.

After condemning "the exceptional potential for conservatism in (Soviet—LE MONDE editor's note) society, which is contaminated by egalitarianist thinking, by the aggressive rejection of any demonstration of individualism, independence, personal initiative, and the success linked to it," the text analyzed by our correspondent explains that it is necessary "to use all available means to stimulate the sections of the population which are not afraid of living off their work," and to this end "to transform these individuals into a mass group, in other words into a social group." It continues:

"The union between the intelligentsia and the party and state leadership is truly a unique and precious conquest. However, we are on the point of seeing it broken, and consequently of starting to give in to the anti-intellectual blackmail of the conservatives who highlight the "proletarian masses...." Aside from the fact that losing the intelligentsia's support would mean that the party and perestroyka would lose an ally, virtually their most devoted ally, there is another danger in this.

"As the 20th Century draws to a close, it is time to rid ourselves of the myth of the working class, because it ultimately means the continuation of this same 'dictatorship of the proletariat' in a different form. Finally, we are closer to the 21st century than to the 19th century when this kind of reasoning was historically justified.

"Would it not be worth thinking about the present and future forms of the social structures of contemporary post-industrial and computer-based societies? Is it not also worth thinking about the reasons why, as everybody knows, it is primarily the middle categories of workers who form the extremely powerful and conservative trade union movements in the West, from which the majority of the left-wing forces in Western Europe are recruited?

"This does not mean that, in our specific situation, the party leadership should dissociate itself in any way from the working class. That would not be justified and would not be understood or accepted either by our society or by the mass of party members. It is enough not to dissociate ourselves from the intelligentsia, not to conceal the fact that we regard its backing as a support, and hence to accept it in party ranks (provided it is prepared to join) and, instead of playing the card of "proletarian populism," to emphasize the need to consolidate the union between the intelligentsia...and the working class. Otherwise, this union (for which there is an objective basis) will be formed elsewhere, and even in opposition to the party bodies.

"This all...leads to the need to publicly explain the situation to the party and to the whole of society and to dissociate ourselves, inside and outside the party, from those forces which are now no longer merely hampering perestroyka but are also openly and actively opposing Mr Gorbachev's political line.

"Continuing to refuse to dissociate ourselves politically (from these forces—LE MONDE editor's note) not only serves antiperestroyka factions.... It has even more serious consequences because weariness, apathy and, increasingly often, aggression toward the party are increasing throughout society. By so doing we are, with our own hands and disregarding the lessons of Eastern Europe and China, aggravating the real conflict which exists between society and the party. And, in view of the country's size, its multinational composition, and specific Russian characteristics, this conflict may take forms beside which Tiananmen Square and Romania would pale in significance.

"Centrism" Does Not Pay

"Although it is generally acceptable for society, which needs a stable center, the tactics of maintaining a course midway between right and left, the conservatives and the radicals, is clearly not profitable as regards work within the party. Yes, society needs a consolidated center. But, in a period of revolutionary restructuring, it needs a vanguard which will push it forward. However, to be effective, this vanguard, in other words the party, must be sufficiently homogeneous, at least as regards its positions of principle.

Ultimately, any party is a group of people sharing the same ideas. The situation in recent months reveals an entirely different picture, and society is fully aware of that.

Alliance Between Apparatus and "Fascist-type Elements"

"The refusal, which has gained strength in recent months, to describe the conservative forces as the main obstacle to the realization of the party's leadership role in a society undergoing radical change has clearly lost all justification, if it ever had any. The conservatives have taken advantage of the idea of consolidation at any cost, even at the cost of perestroyka, and they have shown little concern about the fact that this cost might be a head-on clash between the party and society the outcome of which would be the same for progressives and conservatives.

"Faced with the prospect of losing its privileges and its power, the apparatus, which is afraid, is not hesitating to form alliances with nationalist and chauvinist forces, abandoning all principles. It is beginning to use imperialist and autocratic ideas, becoming associated with fascist-type elements in the hope of prolonging its existence in that way. The result is that a paradoxical situation has been created within the party.... Behind the facade...of unity, the consistent advocates of an intensive development of the restructuring processes are coexisting with the most conservative forces in a way which is already no longer peaceful....

Perestroyka has achieved the essential thing. It has weaned society, put it on its feet, and pushed it forward. This society, which now feels it is an independent living being, is no longer prepared to make do with a pacifier and lullabies. It is demanding the right to determine its future—in other words power.

"The first stage in the transition from the state party to a civilian society was welcomed with hope by society and strengthened the party's position when it took the form (of the first session—LE MONDE editor's note) of the Congress (of People's Deputies—LE MONDE editor's note) and of the Supreme Soviet. The fact that this process tailed off, which was noticeable during the second (session of this—LE MONDE editor's note) congress, at which all the decisions adopted corresponded to those drawn up in advance by party bodies, raised doubts about the leadership's sincerity.... On this basis, serious antagonism could light the powder keg between the party and a society which is now more demanding...and attentive to the experience of our neighbors in Eastern Europe.

"For the time being, we can hope that society is prepared to share power with the party, provided the agreement reached is honest and frank. This agreement may take different forms. (It may range?—LE MONDE editor's note) from an intensification of the Supreme Soviet's work and the transfer of real power to local self-management organs to the organization of roundtables—a path which all the socialist countries have been forced to follow, aside from Romania where the party has purely and simply been swept away.

An Agreement Between the Party and Society

"However, the conclusion of such an agreement, which would see the gradual transfer of power from the state party to civilian society while ensuring that the party keeps a role as a privileged political force, is only possible if society has no doubt about the party which confronts it—that of Gorbachev who started perestroyka or the less and less anonymous party of the all-powerful apparatus with which it is scarcely likely to want to link its future.

"This raises the question of a party different from the present party, which certainly does not prevent the majority of its members from remaining within it. The way of building it may lie in preparations for the 28th congress and the election of its delegates. The starting point for this is the forthcoming Central Committee plenum which will take place in public (it would be best if it were shown on television) and will give the leadership the opportunity...to address not only the Central Committee members but also the whole CPSU and the whole of society, presenting a platform for speeding up perestroyka and launching an appeal to be trusted with the mandate of fundamentally restructuring the party."

Medvedev Urges Popular Control Over Party

LD3101143790 Moscow TASS in English 1421 GMT 31 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 31 TASS—The Soviet Communist Party is moving away from its role as a nucleus for the command-administrative system, when it enjoyed total control over nearly everything, and directed all spheres of life, Politburo ideology chief Vadim Medvedev said in an interview with the latest issue of the DIALOGUE magazine.

Charting directions for party renewal, Medvedev called for the separation of party and state functions, state bodies and public organisations.

The party should change its relationship with public organisations (Komsomol and trade unions), opening a dialogue with them and moving away from heavy-handedness and pressure tactics to persuasion, discussion and personal example, Medvedev said.

The party should become more democratic and ensure the accountability of higher bodies before the rank-and-file and the right of the minority to air their views, he said.

Finally, the party should submit itself to the people's control through elections, Medvedev said.

"The former pattern of an ideologically monolithic society unequivocally reacting to command impulses from the centre has been cast aside for good."

Today we need new methods of ideological work serving the people and relying on dialogue, he said.

Under glasnost, not a single decision in economic and social development can be taken without due regard for public opinion. It is not enough to make the right decision. One must be confident that it will win public support. To achieve this, all pros and cons should be presented to the people in order to convince them, according to Medvedev.

There is a need for deeper understanding of the role of elections in the life of the party. Today, elections are a test for the authority of the running Communist and the party, its influence over the masses. They will decide whether the party will get the vote of confidence, he said.

Science is playing an increasing role in preparing party politics, Medvedev said, calling for radical changes in scientific development and the mechanism for cooperation between science and policy.

Free Estonia Association Registered

LD3001114390 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1800 GMT 29 Jan 90

[Summary] Today [29 January] in Tallinn a session of the Estonian Government took place. It was decided to carry out a survey of the population about regulating milk and meat prices.

After the session information was provided to journalists, with Prime Minister Indrek Toome also present. It became known that the new "Free Estonia" association has been officially registered. Indrek Toome, leader of the association said: "("I would add, in order to substantiate the birth of this democratic association) that I have also recently felt concern over the situation which has developed within the Estonian political landscape, where several movements or (?calling themselves) parties [word indistinct] again for some reason want to fight for a monopoly of the truth, like in the old times, and not for the truth. That is very sad." He added: "Because it is freedom and democracy which are the aims. I was asked yesterday if it was not possible for us to think up some kind of a very big, noble, and new aim for our democratic association. I said, dear people, there is nothing bigger and more noble in our Estonian society than the aim to be a free people and free society in a democratically built and organized country."

Effort Made To Improve Estonia Radio Reception

LD3001160690

[Editorial Report] Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian at 1200 GMT on 25 January carries a recorded talk by (Rein Ruudi), chief engineer of Estonian Radio and television transmitting center, who says that radio reception in central Estonia is very poor. According to him, the construction of another powerful radio and television transmitter at Koeru is now in its second year, and four VHF transmitters will also be installed at the Koeru relay station. When the Koeru station becomes operational, hopefully by the end of 1991 then of course this reception gap in central Estonia will disappear.

Ruudi goes on to say that there are problems with medium wave reception only after dark, and adds that "there are certain difficulties, yes, with Vikerraadio now over there in central Estonia and in western Estonia." He discusses improvements in Vikerraadio, saying that "in the course of this year we will install two 1-kw transmitters, one at Haapsalu and other at Kardla, with the Haapsalu transmitter scheduled to be carrying out test broadcasts around April." He adds that this should put radio listening in western Estonia and on Hiiumaa more or less in good order.

Lithuanian Political Situation Viewed

90UN0698A Moscow GUDOK in Russian
18 Jan 90 p 1

[Report on interview with Secretary of Vilnius City CPSU Committee A. Chistyakov by GUDOK correspondent Ye. Malyuta; date, place not given]

[Text] [Malyuta] The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania adopted documents which, I believe, represent the Polish way of renewing society. What do you have to say about this, Anatoliy Ivanovich?

[Chistyakov] I was not a congress delegate. However, the day before, in my speech at the plenum of the party Central Committee, I said that the program documents have been prepared hastily. They are not specific; they do not reflect a set of measures for the socio-economic development of Lithuania. To be sure, they contained many unconventional things. However, for this very reason they should have been referred to a CPSU Central Committee plenum for consideration as a package of proposals. After all, it has already been announced that the obsolete statute and program of our party are no longer in line with reality. Participating in such work together with all the communists of our country would be considerably more constructive, and would represent genuine help with renewing the life of the entire Soviet society and party.

[Malyuta] What is your view of the creation of a Communist Party of Lithuania independent of the CPSU?

[Chistyakov] This will lead to nothing but a split and, consequently, harm. For our party organization in the capital, such independence poses the danger of a confrontation between communists. Despite the situation in the city being quiet on the surface, and enterprises operating in a stable manner, we cannot but feel that there is a tempest raging inside, that processes are under way which are fraught with serious consequences if they erupt. In that sense, the appeals by the CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the general secretary not to force the events were timely. However, neither the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee nor the Lithuanian Communist Party Congress heeded them, and the threat of delineation in party organizations and labor collectives has emerged.

Under the circumstances, the position of the party city committee was unequivocal until recently—not to allow ourselves to be led by hot-headed groups. We summoned up the courage to maintain this centrist position for which we were subjected to harsh criticism. Under the conditions of Vilnius in which only one-half of the population is Lithuanian it would be unwise and dangerous to lean to any side. We were aware that there are forces in the city which are capable of preventing a split. Alas, it has occurred, and I do not see anything good about it.

[Malyuta] The Lithuanian Communist Party leaders have stated on many occasions that the Party was the first to set an example of renewal. What is your attitude toward this?

[Chistyakov] I would distinguish two aspects of the separation from the CPSU. First, most of our difficulties and conflicts on interethnic grounds are due to the deteriorating economic situation, and this cannot be ignored. Second, in the not so distant past, but nonetheless in the past, excessive centralization and, in some cases, dictatorial practices existed in both the economic and party organs. A pyramid was at work, democratic centralism was made absolute, and, of course, this caused justified dissatisfaction in the field. However, a year to a year and a half ago everything began to change. As I see it, the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee was given a completely free hand which even caused complaints from some communists. The Lithuanian Communist Party resolved all issues, including those of cadres, independently. In the course of it, lots of mistakes were made, but at the 20th Congress discussing them was not considered topical.

The inactive Bureau of the Central Committee and its leaders hid behind the triumph of the national renaissance. At this significant time, the party city committee and the city party organizations also allowed blunders to occur. In a word, regular organizational work was left to its own devices.

[Malyuta] How is the appearance of the leaders of the Sajudis in the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau to be explained?

[Chistyakov] The arrival of some of its leaders. I believe that this was the logical completion of a scenario developed no less than a year ago according to which a union of the Communist Party of Lithuania and the Sajudis was planned. The fact that active leaders of the Sajudis have become members of the Central Committee and even of its Bureau gives us reason to think that their work will be influenced by this most powerful social movement in the republic. The program document, the charter, or in other words, the Lithuanian Communist Party Statute, are primarily the result of work of activists adhering to the Sajudis.

[Malyuta] The communists I have happened to talk to interpret the symbiosis of the Central Committee and the Sajudis as a threat aimed at eroding the operation of the party and even its liquidation.

[Chistyakov] Anything can be expected. The life of Lithuanian society has now been politicized to such a degree that I do not rule out the possibility of this development.

[Malyuta] This begs the following question: What are the reasons for this powerful influence by the Sajudis on the public life of the republic?

[Chistyakov] The Sajudis is neither a party nor an organization. This is an entire movement, a wave, if you will. I believe that it is popular precisely because it has been conceived in the depths of Lithuanian consciousness. As far as I know, the thrust and intellectual basis of the movement were set forth through the efforts of scientists from the Academy of Sciences and the creative arts intelligentsia. This is not a homogenous movement at present. We may speak very harshly about a particular Sajudis leader by virtue of our convictions and view of the world, but on the whole the Lithuanian movement for perestroyka has made a considerable positive contribution to the moral purification of our society. This makes the current distortions in it which have led to the naked striving for the complete freedom of the republic reinforced by nothing all the more disappointing. This is on the conscience of the Sajudis leaders.

[Malyuta] In Vilnius, many people believe that the Sajudis adheres to a nationalist orientation because its functionaries call the Lithuanian people the predominant force. Is it so?

[Chistyakov] This is a painful issue; let us not discuss it. At the same time, you cannot overlook the fact that at present the term "nationalism" is interpreted variously here. I would only like to refer to the unquestionable: As communists and non-party members have noticed, the program documents of the Sajudis mention on several occasions "the people of Lithuania and other peoples." So, this "and other peoples" offends the non-Lithuanians a lot. The people of Lithuania—this I understand. That is, we, the Lithuanians, Russians, Ukrainians, Poles, and others—we all want to achieve certain common goals.

The policy of primacy of the majority is pursued in the legislative activities of the Supreme Soviet of the republic. It is clear which majority I mean here. This cannot but cause serious concern among the people. Let us recall, say, the Law on the State Language; we interpret it as giving in directly to the interests of the majority. What about taking the interests of the minority into account?

[Malyuta] I have happened to hear from railway workers that given the current political situation in Lithuania they work at half their capacity.

[Chistyakov] Indeed, we got carried away by politics and meetings. This is why the workers are rightfully outraged: Who is going to work and feed the people? The politization of life in our society, the high pitch of passions and emotions which are inflamed artificially and skillfully in many cases, as well as the split in the party, do not promote the effective work of production collectives and demoralize the people. You may gather 300,000, a million or more people at a meeting during business hours; however, the republic will not have more goods due to this.

[Malyuta] What do you see in the future?

[Chistyakov] The Lithuanian communists have backed themselves into a corner and have additionally complicated the situation in the country and in the party. One thing is clear—we will not change the situation without good will and mutual understanding. At a meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and the creative arts intellectuals of the republic, I came out in favor of suspending the effect of the documents adopted at the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress. We should be patient and wait for the CPSU Central Committee Plenum which will submit its program documents for a discussion by the communists.

I believe that understanding will come about, and at that most significant moment of perestroyka the communists of the republic will bring themselves to consolidate their forces.

[Malyuta] Thank you for the interview.

Gerasimov Discusses Lithuania, Perestroyka

90US0413A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 3, 20 Jan 90 p 12

[Article by Gennadiy Gerasimov: "World Values Perestroyka"]

[Text] A couple days ago, in a conversation with the management of a leading foreign television company, I could not stop wondering how little they know about Lithuania despite venturing to discuss this acute topic. Perhaps, the viewers know just as little.

A visit to Lithuania by M.S. Gorbachev and a bold decision to show everything to everyone have taken our viewers into the thick of the argument from which they can draw their own conclusions.

About 200 foreign correspondents hastily traveled to Lithuania. They had to master dialectics when they switched from simple descriptions to analysis.

On the one hand, they were mindful of the fact that many countries still have not recognized Lithuania joining or being incorporated into the Soviet Union. In that case, Lithuanian separatism appears as the justification of their unchanged position and an invitation to fanfare.

However, there also is another aspect which is due to the current topicality of the issue rather than its history. From this other point of view, Lithuanian separatism appears as a threat to perestroyka because by its poor example it invites the action of centrifugal forces.

Despite the term "separatism" not being to the liking of many people in Lithuania itself and words about self-determination or restoring the lost independence being preferred over it, in the West it is used commonly, including its use by Henry Kissinger, who weighs his words, in his discourse on the "raging separatist sentiment."

This term in itself brings about a value judgment. The separatists are not liked. They exist, or existed at one point, in many countries: Canada, Ethiopia, Spain, India, England, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Cyprus. The attitude toward this universal phenomenon is universally watchful.

The headline of an article by Robert Schaeffer in the newspaper THE NEW YORK TIMES says: "Baltic Separatists Would Do Well To Think Twice." The author believes that "separatism threatens to undermine a future democracy in the Soviet Union just as the Civil War in the United States threatened democracy... The Baltic ethnic groups believe that the policy of separatism will allow them to ensure democracy. However, ultimately the aspiration to self-determination may develop at the expense of democracy and lead to an isolated deadend, escaping from it will be difficult."

However, this logical argument is not perceived by those who are at a purely emotional level of striving for freedom.

The argument about endangering perestroyka remains. Having thanked M.S. Gorbachev for initiating perestroyka, many Lithuanians are planning to go further on their own. However, the West is concerned about the prospects for destabilizing the status quo and the threat of uncontrollable shocks if "a conglomerate of economically unsound and politically ill-matched states" emerges on the periphery of a contracting Soviet Union.

As a result, we are registering an exceptionally restrained attitude toward the events on the part of the officials and even the mass media of Western countries with a view to not harming perestroyka. A speech by the pope which the newspaper MESSAGERO viewed as an open "expression of support for M.S. Gorbachev" is particularly significant in this regard. The headlines in other Italian newspapers were: "Wojtyla Comes Out Against Fierce Nationalism;" "Wojtyla: It Is Time To Gather Stones, To Build a Common European Home."

I will recall that Lithuania is considered to be a Catholic country in which the pope is the highest authority.

We may also note a statement by the press attache of the UN secretary general F. Giuliani [name as published] "on the discontinuation of contacts between the United Nations and nationalist groups in the Baltic republics."

As far as the administration of President G. Bush is concerned, its official position is not to take any position which would benefit either side. The world values perestroyka.

Gorbachev's Visit to Lithuania Viewed

90UN0698C Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 14 Jan 90 p 1

[Statements by Lithuanian workers on Gorbachev's visit to Lithuania: "There Is Food for Thought"]

[Text] All of us attentively followed on TV and radio the trip of M.S. Gorbachev to Lithuania, and read newspaper reports devoted to this event. Indeed, there is more than enough food for thought. Following are the impressions of the meeting with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev which workers of the imeni 50th Anniversary of the USSR Vilnius Fuel Equipment Plant shared with our own correspondent R. Motskus.

L. Adamovich, metal worker:

Without doubt, rank-and-file workers do not get to meet the head of state and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee very often. On this score, I have had very good luck; I've had the honor to have a frank conversation with him about our state and party affairs and about daily life. I am still indelibly impressed by this meeting.

When M.S. Gorbachev came up to me and greeted me I did not know what to do. However, constraint and inner tension began to go away after his very first words. Despite our conversation being short, he managed to ask me about many things: How many years I have been working at the enterprise, what my category is, which operations I perform and how many of them? When the conversation turned to interethnic relations I said that in 20 years of working here I have noticed no discord or differences on such grounds. Lithuanians, Russians, and Poles work here together with me. However, at present some kind of mistrust is being felt.

Mikhail Sergeyevich asked me: "Is it heating up?" I answered: "It is hot indeed," but he calmed me and answered that everything will work out.

There is another thing which I cannot fail to mention. Previously, when I watched on TV various trips by M.S. Gorbachev and his meetings I did not necessarily approve of the presence of Raisa Maksimovna at these meetings. Now that I have seen her next to him I understand that she sincerely feels for him and his affairs, and helps him with her presence there.

E. Raybis, brigade leader of tool setters:

To tell you the truth, I do not quite agree with the speech by General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev. What is so bad about the Communist Party of Lithuania resolving the political and economic issues in its republic independently?

If we were to refer to the relations between the Communist Party of Lithuania and the CPSU, they should proceed on an equal footing. I believe that instead of the CPSU Central Committee, say, a Council of Secretaries of communist parties of the republics should be formed so that they could coordinate their actions together and solve strategic problems.

Christian Democratic Party Restored in Lithuania

LD3001114990 Moscow TASS in English 1125 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Kaunas January 30 ELTA-TASS—The Christian Democratic Party has been restored in Lithuania after a 50-year break. Egidiyus Klumbys, a medic from Kaunas and USSR people's deputy, was elected chairman of the board of the party's council at yesterday's conference.

The Christian Democratic Party was created in Lithuania in 1905. Its members took an active part in the creation of the independent Lithuanian Republic (1918-1940), the formation of the first Lithuanian government, the creation of management structures and the army and in the implementation of the land reform. After 1926 the party was in opposition to the authorities. Its activities were discontinued in 1940.

"About 30 local branches of the party have been created already in the republic. Their total membership is more than 1,500", Klumbys told journalists.

Lithuanian Communist Party Plenum Held

90UN0708A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 19 Jan 90 p 1

[Report by R. Motskus: "Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] Vilnius—The Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Second Plenum held on 17 January discussed the results of the visit to the republic of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The resolution adopted in this connection observes that this trip served mutual understanding between the CPSU and the Lithuanian Communist Party. It also expressed confidence that it would exert an active influence on ensuring that the endeavors of Lithuania's communists become more comprehensible to members of the CPSU Central Committee and all communists and on the adoption of decisions acceptable to both parties.

The Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee declares to the upcoming CPSU Central Committee plenum, the resolution goes on to say, that the resolutions on the independence of the party passed by the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress mean a cardinal, natural, and democratic restructuring of the party predetermined by the new realities of the life of Lithuania. The Lithuanian Communist Party intends abiding firmly by the principles of equal cooperation with the CPSU expressed in the congress' documents. It is proposed that the Lithuanian Communist Party Program and Statute be viewed as a model of restructuring in the CPSU which should be examined at the 28th Party Congress.

The plenum discussed the Lithuanian Communist Party's program of priority action at the current stage and practical measures pertaining to the rearrangement of the party organizations and the apparatus. In place of the positions of senior organizers and instructors, new positions—Central Committee representatives and permanent and temporary consultants—are being introduced. The former departments are being replaced by commissions under the auspices of the secretaries, and the commissions of appeal and financial commissions will function in a new manner. Up to 30 percent of party dues will now be left with the primary organizations. The status in the party of persons who, while not members of the party, render it practical assistance, and material assistance also, is provided for.

Republic Legislation Problems Viewed

PM2501141790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 3

[I. Zhagel article under rubric "Fact and Comment": "Do No Harm!"]

[Text] The renewal of our federation and the further division of power between union and republican organs is, naturally, a long and painful progress. Therefore, the recent USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution which instructs the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidiums in particular to adopt, in accordance with the set procedure, measures to bring the republics' legislative acts in line with the USSR Constitution and USSR laws is hardly to be viewed as an exceptional event.

Doctors have a good principle: Do no harm! It would be a good thing if people who make laws also adopted it. After all, the national economic organism is no less complex and sensitive to outside influences than say, the human organism.

I must say straight away that no one intends to cast doubt on the competence of the parliamentarians in the Baltic republics—they are doing a great and important job. Nonetheless, it is annoying when steps are taken there which serve to destabilize the market.

The Law "On the State Budget of the Estonian SSR for 1990" makes provision for markups on retail prices for alcohol and tobacco goods. The purpose of this decision is seemingly noble: The additional revenue of the republic budget is to be used to increase the wages of people working in the sociocultural sphere and to augment pensions, monthly allowances, and grants to students, postgraduates, and pupils of secondary specialized educational establishments.

However, let us recall that recently this question was examined at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet which was also attended by representatives of the Baltic republics. At that time a proposal to this effect was rejected. Now a similar idea is put forward, but this time by the republic's lawmakers. And that despite the fact that its implementation in the conditions of one republic creates ideal conditions for abuse, for mass purchases of tobacco and alcohol in neighboring oblasts and their subsequent resale in Estonia. It is obvious that we are not talking about tourists here but speculators.

Adjacent regions will also suffer. In order to protect themselves from the onslaught, they are already spending money and effort on the organization of coupon systems and are introducing trade on the basis of visiting cards and passports. This now also applies to many other goods, as reciprocal distrust is mounting. Especially as the Law on the State Budget of the Estonian SSR instructs the republic government to submit "proposals to establish order in retail prices for food" by 1 February 1990. We are well aware what will follow.

And there is one more noteworthy detail in this whole story of increasing prices. The point is that tobacco goods are manufactured almost exclusively in Estonia from imported raw materials. The suppliers, naturally, may raise the question of higher prices for their output too, after all they may also need to increase pensions and student grants. From here it is only a small step to mutual recriminations and claims and counter-claims of which we have had our fill in the past. They will say: We supply raw materials cheaply, and they sell goods at exorbitant prices. It will no longer be a quarrel between neighboring rayons, but republic will take offense against republic.

Unfortunately, other examples of ill-considered legislative acts also exist. For instance, the decision adopted by the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet on the payment of full pensions to working pensioners. Especially since it is planned to make these payments from the State Social Insurance funds, which are largely based on subsidies from the union budget. In other words, Lithuanian pensioners would be enjoying a privileged position.

Naturally, the desire of the members of the Latvian and Estonian Supreme Soviets to let the inhabitants of their republics taste the fruits of regional economic accountability as soon as possible is quite understandable. After all, it was with these ideas that they sought the voters' support. However, the road to prosperity does not lead through isolation, through pitting the interests of republics against each other, but rather through the further development of the All-Union market and strict observance of economic laws. No one stands to gain from the destruction even of the sort of market which we have had in the past. Therefore, in embarking on reforms, let us repeat to ourselves again and again: "Do no harm!"

Belorussian Supreme Soviet Proceedings Reported

PM3001164790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Own correspondent N. Matukovskiy report: "Belorussian SSR: Language Law Ratified"]

[Text] Minsk—The 14th session of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet, 11th convocation, opened with a sharp discussion about the agenda. Certain deputies demanded that the agenda be supplemented with the question of fulfilling the program to eliminate the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station [AES] accident. On the eve of the session 200 representatives of the strike-bound enterprises of Narovlya arrived from Gomel Oblast's Narovlyanskiy Rayon. In talks with republic government leaders and members of the government commission the Narovlya people demanded an answer as to when the government will start resettling people from the radiation-polluted urban settlement.

By a majority vote the Supreme Soviet decided not to include the question of the elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl AES accident on the agenda, and to limit itself to listening to information on these problems

Discussion then began on the draft law on languages in the Belorussian SSR, and a report was delivered by N.N. Mazay, deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers. The draft law was published long before the session and has been extensively discussed by the mass media. That is why the session ratified the new law without resorting to a long discussion.

The law stipulates guarantees to ensure that the Belorussian language's status as state language does not affect the constitutional rights of citizens of other nationalities. Citizens of the Belorussian SSR, irrespective of their ethnic background, enjoy equal rights and have equal obligations to the state.

Production Begins on Pocket Radiation Counters

PM3001163190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jan 90 p 1

[TASS correspondents' reports: "Ten Thousand Radiation Counters"]

[Text] Production of radiation counters has started at the Belorussian association named for Lenin. The instrument resembles a microcalculator with a digital display. It measures radiation dosages and density, and also the degree of contamination with radionuclides of food products and the surfaces of various objects. This year some 10,000 pocket radiation counters will be marketed.

Ukraine Starts Breaking Up Collective Farms

LD3001151890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] The breakup of collective farms into smaller units has begun in the Ukraine. This is the result of a search for the most effective production structures. Farms that were huge in area and in number of population centers were set up in the days of the system of administration by injunction, without taking into account people's opinions, established traditions, or scientific substantiation. This resulted in small villages falling into decline, while young people started leaving for the towns. The inhabitants of such villages have resolutely demanded the return of their production and economic independence.

Army Daily Notes 'Rukh' Human Chain Event

PM2501154590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jan 90 First Edition p 3

[Telephone report by own correspondent Colonel A. Polyakov: "Kiev: 'Rukh' Sunday Action"]

[Text] Kiev, 22 Jan—On Sunday 21 January a human chain formed along Kiev's streets and squares. At noon the people joined hands.

Thus began the action organized by "Rukh," the Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka, which was to symbolize the unity of the Ukraine's peoples and its territory and the consolidation of progressive forces for democratic achievements. It was timed to be as close as possible to 22 January, which people here are being urged to celebrate as the day of "zluki" or, in other words, the 22 January 1919 unification of the Ukrainian People's Republic led by the Directory [central body of authority in the Ukraine] and the West Ukrainian People's Republic set up on the territory of Eastern Galicia, Bukovina, and the Western Ukraine after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Some maintain that it is 1919 rather than 1939, when the West Ukrainian lands were reunified with the Soviet Ukraine as part of the USSR, that should be considered the year when the Ukrainian people's historical desire for unity was fulfilled.

The "Rukh" leadership had estimated that the human chain would stretch for 650 km: through Zhitomir, Rovno, and Ternopol to Lvov. And although this clearly did not happen—the chain was formed only within Kiev itself—hundreds of people traveled outside the city boundary in cars and buses to stand in groups waving yellow and blue flags along the Zhitomir highway.

At 1600 hours a sanctioned rally opened by one of the "Rukh" leaders, D. Pavlychko, was held in Bogdan Khmelnitskiy Square, by the Cathedral of St Sophia. The rally was addressed by writers O. Gonchar and Yu. Mushketin, as well as by delegates from Lvov, Kharkov, and Donetsk.

In their speeches people spoke of the need to strengthen unity and fraternity between Ukrainians and Jews, Russians and Poles, and other peoples living in the Ukraine. But there were also biting remarks about "the death of an empire," on whose ruins an independent Ukrainian power must supposedly be built. So some interpret unity in their own way.

Hardly had the rally begun, when the slogan "Occupiers Out!" appeared on the roof of a neighboring building. True, the leaders of the rally called the people who had hung out the slogan provocateurs, and it was soon removed. On the other hand, a vast banner bearing the slogan "Through Soviets Without Apparatchiks to an Independent Ukraine" raised high above the square was perfectly visible from a long way off.

Like the rest of the country, the Ukraine has a considerable number of problems, which must be resolved by strengthening friendship between peoples, working very hard, and increasing political activeness. The people who took part in the unity action and attended the rally believe that "Rukh" will help to mobilize all forces to overcome difficulties on the basis of healthy, patriotic, internationalist principles. How I hope they will not be disappointed.

Ouster of Chernovtsy Obkom Chief Explained

90UN0641A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 2, 10 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by Sergey Kiselev: "What Is Behind Wording?"]

[Text] **As we have already reported, a plenum of the Chernovtsy party obkom [oblast committee] relieved USSR People's Deputy N.N. Nivalov from his duties as a bureau member and as the obkom first secretary. While discussing organization problems the plenum pointed out that Nivalov contributed to some serious mistakes in the activities of the obkom bureau and also violated the party's ethical norms all of which did considerable damage to the prestige of the oblast party organization.**

"This wording serves as a summary of N.N. Nivalov's work for the last year," said N.F. Strela, head of the Department for party organizational and cadre work of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee. "All this time we kept commenting on the authoritarian style in the work of the former Chernovtsy obkom first secretary. We kept pointing out that the bureau lost its ability for self-criticism and stopped paying attention to public opinion. Eventually the bureau and Nivalov himself lost their prestige as they ended up in the wake of the complex and multi-faceted phenomena of public and political life in our oblast. We should remember here the mass chemical-induced ailment of the Chernovtsy children. At that particular time our party leaders failed to gain the public trust, and to feel the people's concerns and their pain. We should mention also the story of the "Chervona Ruta" festival in which case the obkom bureau should have defined their position. And there were many other things.

"Trips on guest invitations to various foreign countries, to Yugoslavia in particular, proved to be the last straw in the cup of public patience. The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee was ordered to analyze the situation and, according to the results of this analysis, many people hurried to utilize the simplified procedure of visa application. Many of these people wanted to gain new impressions in a foreign trip and some aimed to gain certain profits in the travel. However, both categories handed in their visa application papers in the regulated way and manner. But we were greatly amazed to find out how many officials from our oblast party and soviet bodies, from the militia and procuracy, and from the industry administration rushed to Yugoslavia ahead of everyone else, bypassing the legalities and the principles of social justice. The son of our former first secretary, by the way, was among those people too."

The Politburo of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee did a fundamental appraisal of the above-mentioned violations. Not a single one of them will go unpunished. The Politburo severely reprimanded Nivalov and decided that he could no longer serve as the first secretary of the obkom.

Moldavian First Secretary Luchinskiy Interviewed

90UN0740A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 4, 24 Jan 90 p 1

[Report on interview with P.K. Luchinskiy, first secretary of Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Moldavia correspondent G. Malarchuk: "Creating Is More Difficult!"; place, date not given]

[Text] Meetings with workers and inhabitants of Kishinev, talks with students and journalists, speeches at party forums, tours of the republic and areas outside—these and many other things that brook no delay have been heaped on P.K. Luchinskiy, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee.

A particularly dramatic background has been created by the revolutionary events in neighboring fraternal Romania, with which Moldavians have much in common—historical roots, culture, language, family ties. However, the good-neighbor relations have not been duly developed during the last 20 years. In addition, they were artificially held back not only by the Romanian side but also by the former leadership of the republic.

"Prior to Shevardnadze's visit to Romania, we expressed our wish for the establishment of direct and comprehensive relations between the Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and the neighbor country," P.K. Luchinskiy said. "We proposed, specifically, a considerable simplification of the procedure for crossing the state border. The opening of consular establishments in the cities of Kishinev and Iasi would, in our view, contribute to this. A set of measures in the sphere of the economy, science, education, culture, and information was proposed also. In a word, we are endeavoring to ensure that our relations become more multifaceted."

[Malarchuk] And how do you assess the situation in the republic today as a whole and what is your forecast for the future?

[Luchinskiy] The situation in the republic is, to be blunt, tense. People have simply fallen out. And what is surprising is that they all want roughly the same thing, but have in certain circumstances, in my opinion, failed to understand one another or have failed to resolve questions in good time and have not given thought to the consequences of their steps. The procedure and method of settling conflicts have led to exacerbation. Generally, all questions—political, socioeconomic, environmental—need to be discussed by all the people, and we need to move forward together. I am sure that we will ultimately find the right path.

[Malarchuk] A serious conflict arose between the former party leadership and the artistic intelligentsia. What do you intend doing to settle it?

[Luchinskiy] I believe that this is just about the most serious thing that has happened with us in social life. As long as we treat the intelligentsia as in past decades, considering it some stratum which cannot be trusted, we will find ourselves in a most complex situation. Some of my colleagues say even today that "we need to bring in the intelligentsia," "we need to consider its opinion," as if it were a question of temporary measures. But in fact without the participation of the intelligentsia we will be unable to control the restructuring processes or achieve success.

I stress: Any organization with influence on people must be aware of its high responsibility for its words and deeds. Destroying unity and sowing the seeds of dissension and distrust among people is easy. Creating is more difficult. But without creation there is no future. The way out of the current situation is not a "taming" of the spontaneity of the pluralism of opinions, calls for which are sometimes heard. The sorry experience of hasty administrative rule, when a desire to curb the flood of mass meetings and demonstrations led to the opposite results, is well known. The more fruitful and sole correct path is transition from confrontation to broad cooperation.

Volgograd Obkom First Secretary Resigns

90UN0764A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 25 Jan 90 Second Edition p 2

[Article by SOVYETSKAYA ROSSIYA special correspondents V. Cherkasov and B. Drobotov: "Logic of Renewal"]

[Text] The custodians of stagnation are pining for the times when everything was ordinary in party life and nothing unexpected happened. If something did happen, then those who were supposed to know knew about it in good time in all of its details. With perestroyka, times have changed. Positives are being replaced by negatives. Now at any worker meeting, and especially at a pre-election meeting, a party worker has to be prepared for the most diverse kinds of questions and, at times, he himself comes under fire.

Could the members of the bureau of the Volgograd obkom [oblast party committee] have heard at a pre-election meeting a year back something like these words of M.V. Kuznetsov: "I am an old communist and do not want to accept for myself or for the party the guilt of a party apparatus that has broken off from the party and the people. I do not want to!"

The plenum of the Volgogradskiy obkom of the CPSU took place yesterday in an atmosphere of these kinds of passions. This is the only question that it discussed: Can the present composition of the bureau lead the oblast party organization? The situation at times turned dramatic. The position of the participants in the plenum was complicated by the fact that a rally was being held at the same time on the street around the Political Education House, where they were meeting. Speakers at the rally were quite clear: The bureau of the obkom has to resign.

What happened in Volgograd?

The situation that developed before the plenum of the obkom, and later also at the plenary meeting itself, was far from clear. A broad spectrum of opinions was reflected in sharp discussions at the aforementioned public meetings and at the Komsomol [All- Union Leninist Communist Youth League] oblast reports-and-elections conference held the day before the plenum, as well as in letters and telegrams that have arrived and continue to arrive at the obkom and the editorial office of the oblast newspaper VOLGOGRADSKAYA PRAVDA.

I will quote only two typical letters as an example of the polarization of public attitudes. The first letter: "We know Comrade Kalashnikov as an active participant of perestroyka and a supporter of progressive forms of organization of agricultural production. We ask the members of the CPSU obkom to take our opinion into account. On instructions of the collective of the leased tractor-field brigade of kolkhoz [collective farm] 'Put Ilyicha,' brigade leader Mazin." The second letter: "We, the workers and office employees of the association 'Barrikady,' came to the conclusion that the first secretary of the obkom judges our life on the basis of paper reports, which are far from reality. We personally understand that our country is undergoing a crisis and that, to achieve a favorable outcome, society needs leaders who would honestly assess the situation and would be in concert with the people not in words but in deeds. 202 signatures."

This same kind of wide scattering of opinions is typical of each work collective and each party organization. In the lobby of the plenum and in certain speeches from the rostrum we had occasion to hear that the stormy reaction of the public of the city and the oblast is stirred up by some kind of "evil forces." Others said that such a turn of events was unexpected and that the situation in the oblast and in party organizations did not, they say, justify what happened.

But if we digress from polarized emotions, both of an extremist and a conciliatory nature, and return, for example, to two-three years ago and mention some kind of subjects from the intraparty life of the oblast, what is happening today is seen in a somewhat different light. Truth demands objectivity.

The election of V.I. Kalashnikov as first secretary of the Volgograd obkom after almost 20 years of "governing" by his predecessor, who clearly embodied the worst features of a worker of the command-administrative era, was received in the oblast with sincere confidence and hopes. The first steps of the renewed obkom bureau staff at the reports-and-elections party conference that was held shortly after began to justify these hopes to some degree.

Practical deeds—this was remarked by all participants of the plenum—were noticeable: Modernization of obsolete technology in industry and, as a consequence, for the time being, of course, not as significant, but nonetheless, progress in raising the quality of products; orientation on the primary development of cattle-breeding on the basis of a growth in irrigated areas—"an irrigation area on each farm!"—and guaranteed self-provision of forage, which supplemented products on the farms.

In this respect, quite convincing evidence and statistical analyses were cited at the plenum. But, later, and especially in the last two years, slips started to occur in one or another vitally important sphere. The poor organization in the work of industry, a slowing down in the rates of growth of agricultural production, interruptions in plans for introducing housing, and a worsening in the supply of vegetables in the city—this could not help but have an effect on the mood of the people.

During these years also, the meetings of the obkom bureau began to resemble departmental planning meetings more and more. The methods of political management, which the first secretary passionately propagated at first, did not, in fact, become his fundamental principles, and they were more and more frequently being replaced by the same command and oppressive methods that he criticized in words. Ministerial approaches—V. Kalashnikov came to party work from the position of minister of land reclamation and water transport of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]—began to develop more and more obviously and more sharply and harshly. They also made an imprint on the style of management of the bureau and the work of the party apparatus. As if incidentally and unintentionally—we will put it this way—they started at various levels to be sly with statistics. For example, they cite the annual growth figures of the irrigated areas that are supposed to show the accelerated tempos of land improvement, and they are silent about the ruined, saline, and swampy lands, and about the quality of these rapidly built tracts. But the one who sounds the alarm, who does not accept such "shock work", and speaks against the creation of an ecologically unsound construction project like "Volga-Don-2," is declared to be "an enemy of land reclamation and perestroyka."

The anxiety among people, among party workers also, began to bring out the personal qualities and character of V.I. Kalashnikov. In the beginning, having at his disposal people of trust and a desire to put social justice into practice, the first secretary more and more noticeably proclaimed democracy, modesty, and frankness—but in practice he demonstrated autocracy and intolerance to those who thought differently, even among members of the bureau. All it took was for one of them to display independence in the assessment of the situation with land reclamation, and he was transferred from the obkom to other work "at his own request."

There was reason to recall at the plenum: The first "seismic jolts" could be heard not just at informal meetings—but much earlier. At one of the obkom meetings, back in December 1987, I.P. Shabunin, an obkom member and director of the computer information center of the oblast agricultural industry (now he is the chairman of the state cooperative oblast agroindustrial association), spoke with a frank and principled criticism of the style and methods of leadership of the bureau and, specifically, that of the first secretary of the obkom.

At the past oblast report party conference, the concern over the situation in the "party house" of the oblast could be heard very clearly from the rostrum in the speech by A.M. Anipkin, first secretary of the Volgograd gorkom [city party committee]. The gist: In three report years there was no case when draft resolutions prepared by the apparatus were subjected to radical additional work at an obkom plenum.... Practically no decisions were made at meetings of the obkom bureau that differed from the opinions of First Secretary V.I. Kalashnikov. Errors in the selection of personnel are made known.

Should this not have alarmed like thinkers? It did not alarm them.... Is this not the reason why the "informals" proved to be more dynamic and now dictate their conditions to the obkom staff?

There was one more warning alarm of the same A.M. Anipkin on the pages of the oblast newspaper VOLGOGRADSKAYA PRAVDA. At his initiative, a discussion was conducted concerning party fellowship and democratization in the party. This is what A.M. Anipkin said after this discussion in September of last year, and the quote deserves attention: "I have no sense of satisfaction with the discussion: The secretaries of large party committees, members of the obkom and the gorkom, and members of the bureau remained silent. This reflected the level of the condition of democratization inside the oblast party organization...."

Did the members of the bureau and V.I. Kalashnikov pay any attention to these conclusions? To this concern? They did. But in a rather unique way: The gorkom for every kind of reason began more and more frequently to come under the critical aim of the obkom first secretary, and the attitude of V.I. Kalashnikov toward the first secretary of the gorkom changed sharply.

...As a rule, the common talk of the people is merciless: At the mention of the name of Kalashnikov, it is difficult to distinguish the good from the bad. And even in good motives one sees the ruses and intrigues of the "apparatus." Given empty store counters, it is not difficult to find a scapegoat—it always turns out to be the first person in the oblast. At a Saturday meeting on the banks of the Volga, practically all of the speakers sharply criticized V. Kalashnikov for poorly supplying the residents with vegetables. In the kray, where the Volgo-Aktyubinsk flood lands stretched out, a really abnormal situation developed.

But one of the speakers, a worker, trying to assess the activity of the obkom objectively, took the megaphone: "We knew that vegetables will perish in the field. The obkom and the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] decided to send city residents to assist the rural workers. Which of you picked at least one tomato? No one." The worker was not allowed to finish. And how could he dare, when everyone was "against" and he was "for."

There was another breakdown of forces at the obkom plenum. More than anything, it would be called almost traditional. People here rarely divided according to the principle of either/or. For the majority of those present were silent, and the others waited to see what would "win out." Perhaps this is where V.I. Kalashnikov's greatest shortcoming as a political leader of the oblast lies.

Is it not this that brings about the dull defense to which many of our party committees resort—alas, not only in Volgograd? But the action of the obkom is more reminiscent of a quick reaction team, which rushes to the crisis area but never gets there.

"Our oblast party committee and the obkom bureau, of which I was also a member, did not do everything that was necessary for normal progress of the democratic processes," said A. Anipkin, first secretary of the Volgograd gorkom of the CPSU.

A. Anipkin's point of view was supported by certain other secretaries of the raykom [rayon party committee]. In particular, Ye. Sorokin, first secretary of the Ilovlinskiy raykom of the CPSU, who spoke at the plenum, said:

"The day before, our raykom had a meeting of party-administrative active members. The communists justly believe that not only V. Kalashnikov is to blame for this crisis situation in which our oblast party organization now finds itself, but all members of the bureau."

He proposed to members of the bureau, whose competence among the participants of the plenum was not in doubt, to head the preparation of an extraordinary oblast party conference.

The meeting of the plenum was expanded. Everyone present could say a word from the rostrum. In our opinion, G. Boyko, a communist and pensioner, had quite a businesslike idea:

"It is a pity that perestroyka in the party has not yet become a matter for the basic party organizations. Therefore, poorly informed people frequently speak at meetings where efforts are being made to resolve fundamental issues in the life of the party. Why are the voices of communist leaders rarely heard at these heavily attended meetings?"

The difficult and agonizing conversation went on for many hours.

The plenum approved the statement of V.I. Kalashnikov concerning his discharge from duty as first secretary of the Volgograd obkom of the CPSU in connection with his retirement on pension.

The question of confidence in the bureau of the oblast committee of the CPSU was examined. As a result of a secret vote, out of 17 members and candidate members of the obkom, the bureau received 11 votes.

The duty of the first secretary of the party obkom was temporarily assigned to V.G. Ronyshin, secretary of the obkom.

The plenum examined the question concerning the possibility of setting earlier dates for the conduct of report-and-election conferences. The plenum proposed setting up commissions in all rayons for the broad study of public opinion and of the proposals of party organizations.

V.N. Krikhunov, deputy head of the Department of Party Construction and Personnel Work of the CPSU Central Committee, took part in the work of the plenum.

Background to Resignation

PM3101131790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 31 Jan 90 p 1

[M. Verzhba report: "Volgograd: One Resignation, Two Resignations"]

[Text] These days the local newspapers in Volgograd Oblast are far more popular than the central ones. Every issue contains reports on rallies and plenums and comments on the decisions of the sixth party oblast committee [obkom] plenum, which was held a few days ago and accepted the resignation of CPSU Obkom First Secretary V. Kalashnikov. What happened next?

On 27 January the newspapers published the Obkom Bureau's appeal to the communists and all working people of the oblast. It stated that the plenum "took a step to renew party life."

Rallies, party and economic aktiv meetings, and party committee plenums were held in the rayons. The communists of Tsentralnyy Rayon expressed lack of confidence in the entire obkom, and similar decisions were adopted in Novonikolayevskiy, Alekseyevskiy, Nekhayevskiy, and other rayons of the oblast.

The bureau had been in session since the morning. For several hours. In the evening the Central Television broadcasts were interrupted and CPSU Obkom Secretary V. Katunin acquainted the people of Volgograd Oblast with a new bureau decision. Mindful of the demands of the people of Volgograd Oblast, the entire bureau would resign at a plenum. The question of convening an extraordinary party conference in February would also be examined there. It was proposed to apply to the CPSU Central Committee for permission to hold elections not in accordance with the statutes but by direct delegation from primary organizations, and to form the obkom in accordance with the same principle.

On Sunday thousands of residents went to the central embankment for another rally. The demands were the same—the resignation of the entire obkom and punishment for the party and soviet leaders who shamelessly used their official position and who each obtained several chic apartments for their families.

On 29 January a Volgograd CPSU City Committee plenum expressed lack of confidence in the obkom. Everyone was waiting for the next day.

And then, 30 January, an extraordinary CPSU Obkom plenum met once again 6 days after the resignation of the "top person."

The Obkom Bureau resigned en masse. The resignation was accepted.

After several hours of hard debate an interim bureau was elected and entrusted with preparing the upcoming electoral conference. It was decided to hold it not in February but in March. The bureau includes two secretaries of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League Obkom—V. Yermakov and USSR People's Deputy A. Kiselev.

Moscow Election Campaign News Conference Held

PM1501113990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by A. Davydov under rubric "Election Campaign Under Way": "Keen Struggle Lies Ahead"]

[Text] Moscow—A news conference devoted to the end of the campaign to nominate candidate deputies for the republican and local soviets has been held at the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee [gorispolkom]. Yu. Vinogradov, secretary of the Moscow Gorispolkom, described the features of the election campaign and familiarized journalists with the preliminary results. What is of note?

As is well known, the nomination of candidates began back in November, but for a long time voters' activeness left room for improvement. As a result approximately 36 percent of candidates were nominated in the 5 last days before the campaign ended.

The forthcoming elections will take place in the capital on a broad alternative basis. In every okrug several candidates will complete for the deputy's seat. Thus, according to the results of the nomination for the

Moscow City Soviet, in every okrug an average of seven people are running for each place.

The number of candidates nominated on the basis of voters' place of residence is considerably inferior in number to the results of the nomination from labor collectives and public organizations. The proportions are 4.68 and 44.75 percent respectively for the local soviets and 7.01 and 96.7 percent respectively for the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet. All this merely confirms the fears previously voiced, the news conference noted, that the unusually high quotas set by the RSFSR laws on elections of people's deputies for participants in voters' meetings at their place of residence have failed to justify themselves and are essentially of a discriminatory nature.

Statistics state that the voters' activeness has increased by comparison with the previous election campaign. Whereas in Spring 1989 nominations on the basis of place of residence were made at 22 meetings, this time about 500 meetings were held.

The overwhelming majority of candidates (82.3 percent to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and 66.04 percent to the local soviets) are CPSU members, including 27 first secretaries of the capital's party rayon committees nominated as candidate Moscow City Soviet deputies. Workers are poorly represented, few All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League members were nominated, and the percentage of women is extremely limited.

To all appearances the election campaign promises a keen struggle. This time the lists of candidates already registered contain many representatives of informal public organizations like the All-Union association of voters, the Russian People's Front, and the Moscow voters' association, for instance.

Unfortunately—and this was also mentioned at the news conference—the imperfection of the recently adopted RSFSR laws on elections of people's deputies is already making itself felt. For instance, under the law the candidates and their agents receive quite broad rights and opportunities for sound election agitation. But the funds which the executive committees really have for this purpose are extremely limited.

Right now the candidates are being registered. The registration is proceeding unusually slowly. For instance, of the 3,793 candidate deputies for the Moscow City Soviet so far only 120 have been registered. This can obviously partly be explained by the fact that the volumes of work of the electoral commissions have increased substantially compared with the previous elections. After all, a total of over 18,000 candidate people's deputies have been nominated in the capital this time. It will be possible to draw final conclusions somewhat later, when registration is completed and the lists of candidates are published.

Party Secretary Melnikov Discusses Statutes

PM1901093990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jan 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by I. Melnikov, secretary of party committee of Moscow State University Named for M.V. Lomonosov, carried as part of 2-page feature entitled "Discussion Leaflet No 3": "Let Primary Organizations' Voice Be Heard"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] It has already been repeatedly said that the party's leading role is realized in the actual labor and struggle of every Communist rather than by declaration. Therefore, when the CPSU Statutes begin with the words "The CPSU is the militant, experienced vanguard of the Soviet people..." and later says that the party is "...the leading and directing force of Soviet society," you want to say to yourself: "Let nonparty people say these things, but we Communists will not flatter ourselves in our own Statutes." Given this, I think that we should closely examine every sentence of the new Statutes to ensure that the party's intentions and objectives are kept separate from assessments of its actions. We can and must openly declare our objectives, but let the people assess them. The people's well-being is the party's aim. But well-being in the broad sense, not just materially. Leadership is not the aim of the party, but is—it is my deep conviction—the necessary means to that end, a means available to the party only if it enjoys the people's trust. It is in this context that the thesis on the party's leading role can be enshrined in the Statutes.

Wherever discussion of the Statutes starts, it cannot avoid serious consideration of the principle of democratic centralism. It is being proposed by some in discussion that this leading principle of party organizational building be abandoned to be replaced by a range of norms, including such principles as the voluntary execution of party decisions, voluntary participation in party measures, freedom for factions and all other formations within the party, and so forth. Here the principle of democracy is put forward as the basic organizational principle of party activity, but different people understand the meaning of the actual principle differently. It seems to me that all these proposals bear the stamp of a passionate desire to prevent any recrudescence of the antidemocratic distortions that have occurred in our party's history. It is possible that the proponents of these proposals are highlighting the real pluralism of opinions and actions which does exist in one form or another in the party, hoping that the resultant effect of the various forces within the party will ultimately produce the correct choice and unity of action on the basic questions.

However, I think that the proponents of these proposals are unwittingly mistaken. Abandonment of the principle of democratic centralism will weaken the party and fairly quickly lead to its losing the ability to formulate a stance and exhibit a united will. At the same time this principle does need a new interpretaion. The obligation to execute decisions should not preclude the possibility for every Communist to criticize those decisions at whichever level they were made. The election of leading organs at every level cannot be ensured on the basis of the current system but needs a system of direct, contested elections. The right of the minority to defend its own position must also be considered—history teaches us that the majority is not always right and that there is a need while carrying out the decision of the majority to keep the ideas of the minority under general consideration. It is essential to grant primary organizations the right to recall their representatives in the leadership organ of the party at any level. In general, the new interpretation of the principle of democratic centralism should ensure the leading role of democracy and the auxiliary role of centralism. [passage omitted].

Moscow Party Club Views on Democracy

90UN0707A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 3, 20-26 Jan 90 pp 6-7

[Article by V. Lysenko, member of Moscow Party Club and candidate of philosophical sciences: "En Route to Renewed Party"; first paragraph is ARGUMENTY I FAKTY introduction]

[Text] Problems of the restructuring of the CPSU.... They are today at the center of attention of our entire community. "We need a new, radically renewed party," M.S. Gorbachev said at a meeting of Lithuanian party activists on 13 January. The development of this process is being heatedly discussed in the party organizations. The opinions of the communists who are members of the Moscow Party Club are described by one of its leaders, V. Lysenko, candidate of philosophical sciences.

The Moscow Party Club is an informal, amateur association of communists concerned with the crisis situation of the party and advocating radical democratic reform of the CPSU. Currently, over 120 communists of Moscow and Moscow Oblast are members of the club. Engineering-technical professionals and many workers, higher educational institution teachers, and servicemen are preponderant among the club's membership. Program, political, rules, sociology, and organizational sections, an election preparation section and sections for the study of social democratic and communist experience function in the club.

We base our work on the CPSU Rules and the club's provisional regulations. A club platform for the 28th CPSU Congress, an economic program for a way out of the crisis, new draft party rules, instructions governing direct elections to the party congress, and other documents have been prepared by its members. The club maintains contacts with more than 100 cities in the country, and similar party clubs have already been formed in many of them.

The club's theoretical and political positions are expounded in its platform. We proceed from the fact that not only our society but also the party itself are in profound crisis. This crisis did not arise yesterday, its roots go back to post-October history, when the Bolshevik Party, having become the governing party, at first did away with political pluralism in the country, and it was then also eliminated in the party itself. As a result, the party merged in the thirties with the state, having monopolized power, property and ideology and having become the nucleus of the administrative-command, totalitarian system.

It would seem to us that this antidemocratic party model is at odds with the requirements of the renewal of our society. Under the conditions of the ever increasing lag of democratization in the party behind the democratization in society the CPSU is becoming an impediment to the restructuring process. Recent public opinion polls testify to the alarming trend of the decline in the party's authority and influence in the masses, as reported in the press.

In this connection, the Moscow Party Club believes, what is necessary during the current stage is not an improvement and upgrading of party structures and relations but a fundamental reform of the party presupposing a transition from the old model to a modern democratic model of a parliamentary-type party operating under the conditions of a multiparty system. There should be a fundamental change also in the party's position in society: From a commanding structure which directs each and every thing, the CPSU should become a purely political party (as a public organization and mass democratic movement) which bases its right to leadership exclusively on its own authority and acquires it solely at general parliamentary elections.

Our concept of the reform of the CPSU incorporates the following system of transformations.

In the political sphere: The transfer of all command powers from the party to the soviets within the framework of the concept of the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial authority. Revocation of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution and the enactment of a law on public organizations which would guarantee freedom of the creation of political organizations (parties included) and their equality.

In the ideological sphere: A reform of ideology which presupposes a renunciation of the dogmatic interpretation of Marxism and transition to a concept of democratic socialism based on the priority of interests common to all mankind, diversity of forms of ownership and a market economy, and the principles of democracy, humanism, pluralism, social justice, nonviolence, and solidarity.

In the organizational sphere: Substitution for the principle of democratic centralism of general democratic principles: electiveness, glasnost, the recall of party leaders who have failed to justify the trust shown in them and subordination of the minority to the majority, given a guarantee of minority rights (up to and including the freedom to create platforms and groups); intra-party pluralism (the possibility of the creation of horizontal structures, that is, the unification of communists by specific, functional, territorial, and other interests); and extensive autonomy for the party organizations (up to and including transition to the federative principle of the party structure in accordance with the structure of our state). We propose also the introduction of direct elections, based on choice and in accordance with programs, of party secretaries and delegates to all party forums, including the upcoming 28th CPSU Congress. The party club supports the replacement of the party-schedule system with elections and other democratic mechanisms, with the total elimination of privileges for the elective active party members and the apparatus.

We see as the way to the reform of the party a broad democratic movement from below of the communists themselves and the creation of various horizontal structures (party clubs, interregional associations of communists, party organization secretary councils, and so forth).

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY note] At the request of the editorial office V. Shostakovskiy, dean of the Moscow Higher Party School, comments on V. Lysenko's article.

First of all about the mere fact of the existence and activity of the Moscow Party Club and other informal associations of communists. I know that the attitude toward them is ambivalent and frequently extremely negative. The following opinions may be heard: The work of such associations is impeding consolidation in the party; it is leading to the serious political situation of a scattering of forces and unnecessary confrontation, and there arises at times even the question: Who sanctioned this?

Negativeness in respect to the informal structures is organically interwoven in a phenomenon of a more general nature—nonacceptance and guardedness among some professional party officials and the communist rank and file also in respect to debate in the party and a panic fear of the emergence of groups, platforms and, even more, factions within the CPSU. The argument is one and the same: What is needed is work, everything else is a talking shop that distracts us from serious business. But is this the case? After all, at a particular stage of the formation and development of our party debate was legitimately regarded as a method of party work capable of revealing the entire potential of ideas in the party, protecting it against serious mistakes, and ensuring the more balanced and in-depth study of its strategy and tactics. And the fact that silence and like-mindedness (more precisely, single-mindedness) subsequently became firmly established in the party and that any dissidence was persecuted and an attempt to enter into debate without approval from above was tantamount to suicide—all this contributed to a large extent to the sclerotic ossification and destruction of the normal processes of activity in our political organization.

I believe that the revival of debate in the party in the time of perestroyka, as a result of the assertiveness of informal structures included, is a phenomenon of fundamental, positive significance and an important lever of the renewal of the CPSU and the its revival as a vital, creative political organism. Horizontal structures in the party are essentially being engendered, ramifying and strengthening with the emergence of informal associations in the CPSU. And this is, in my opinion, a necessary component of its democratic rearrangement.

There arises, however, the question: Is this important, would it not be better to concentrate on optimizing the traditional structures?

An answer is possible only on the basis of a sober and honest evaluation of the state of the CPSU itself. Merely an ascertainment of the crisis state of the party and the lag of the processes of its renewal behind the democratic transformations in society is insufficient here.

I believe that it is necessary to look and see whether the current condition of the CPSU corresponds to the ideas concerning an alliance of fellow thinkers, as asserted in "The Communist Manifesto" and the practice of the League of Communists and Russian social democracy and its Bolshevik wing.

Without going into an analysis of the causes, I would like to emphasize that, in my opinion, a profound break occurred in the party in the twenties with the strictly Marxist-Leninist tradition of the vision of its internal condition and its attitude toward the state and society. The party switched to a rigid hierarchical model, in whose realization little remained of the original ideology of the organization itself. As a political organization of the new type, the party began to lose sight of its functions. Such fundamental values as the communists' equality, freedom of discussion and criticism, and the electiveness, accountability, and replaceability of leaders were in fact destroyed as the years went by. The power of the minority, the power not even of elective structures but of leading groups, became firmly established in intra-party relations. The communist rank and file was assigned, essentially, the role of silent executor of another's wishes. All this lives on today also to a considerable extent. This is why, in my opinion, the strategic path of renewal of the CPSU is the establishment of the power of the party masses. It is toward this that the set of democratic mechanisms and procedures and the provisions of the new CPSU Rules should be directed.

But however good the rules may be, the decisive role in the transformations of the party should be performed by the creative energy of the party masses and their assertiveness and intellectual potential.

I see also in this connection the most important mission of horizontal structures both as a kind of balance of the "vertical" and, and this is the main thing, a source of new ideas, creative initiatives, and constructive opposition, which for this reason or the other do not acquire the opportunity to manifest themselves in the traditional structures.

In this connection I believe that the work of the informal associations of communists would be very useful in the phase of preparation of the 28th CPSU Congress for revelation of the sum total of views in the party. It is also, incidentally, useful for a search for productive ways of realizing its decisions.

What has been said above by no means signifies that I agree with all the propositions of the platform of the Moscow Party Club, which contains, incidentally, many commonly acknowledged propositions which have been expressed repeatedly by the current party leaders. For instance, I do not share the view of the party as a traditional political organization of power, that is, a parliamentary-type party. Proceeding from political realities, I believe that the CPSU could, restructuring itself democratically, develop as a party of the vanguard type and be the political leader of all strata of the working people supporting the building in our country of humanely democratic, self-managing socialism. This by no means rules out political pluralism.

But as a political vanguard, a renewed CPSU could and, I am sure, will perform an exceptional role in the process of the further structuring and suffusion with rich content of the activity of the civil society and its interaction with state structures. It is essential for this to establish in the CPSU the power of the party masses, complete glasnost, openness for constructive dialogue and criticism, and the high independence of the party organizations and to afford extensive scope for the communists' initiative and political creativity. In a word, it is necessary to implement profound democratic transformations of both the system of intra-party relations and the sum total of the relations of party and state, party and society.

Chernigov Party Corruption Reported

PM3001161490 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 4 28 Jan 90 p 5

[Sergey Tsygankov dispatch: "Last Straw. After Meetings in Chernigov"]

[Text] Chernigov—To remind the reader about what happened in Chernigov, Ukraine, early this January: at 6 p.m. on January 6 the Volga automobile belonging to the Regional Executive Committee crashed into a Zhiguli automobile at a street crossing. The drunk driver of the Volga tried to get away together with his "master" Valeriy Zayka, a department head at the Regional Executive Committee. But a trolleybus making a turn blocked the Volga's path. Traffic stopped. Passersby, including a lot of young people, started crowding around the Volga. The driver and his passenger from the nomenklatura behaved so audaciously that the crowd decided to examine the car. In the trunk they found smoked sausage, tongues and other delicacies. The people's reaction, considering they don't see ordinary meat in Chernigov every day, was unexpected. The Volga was first "beaten up", then "confiscated", and brought to the square—in front of the Regional CPSU Committee. The first spontaneous meeting of several hundred people was held there. And three days later over 20,000 Chernigov residents turned out for a protest demonstration.

That was how a seemingly banal traffic accident led to a flare-up of emotions. But it wasn't accidental anger. Communists had intended to start a dialogue with the city fathers a long time ago. But the city fathers kept silent, not paying any special attention to the increasing stream of criticism, addressed to them.

The first sign of people's mistrust was Leonid Palazhchenko's loss in the elections of the people's deputies of the USSR. He was First Secretary of the Regional Party Committee.

In July 1989, the Communists from the instrument-making shop of the Chernigov Radio Equipment Plant Association, the biggest enterprise in the region, decided to send an open letter to the Regional Party Committee.

"The pretext was, that the Communists saw that their leaders in word spoke for social justice, but in real life stamped it out getting further and further away from 'ordinary' people who had the same Party cards and 'professed' the same Programme and Rules. Some of the Communists at the plant declared that they didn't want to stay in the same Party with the bigots," said Mikhail Kalashnik, a fitter. "We couldn't be reconciled with the fact that a three- storey mansion was being built in the city for families of the apparat, on the initiative of the First Secretary of the Regional Party Committee. 20,000 other families are on the waiting list. We protested against the building of a lush hotel for the Regional Party Committee on the bank of the Desna. We wrote against the inexpediency of dividing the city into districts, which leads to a swelling of the Party-administrative apparat, and demanded setting up workers' control groups, a report on how the Regional Party Committee spends party money, and the transfer of a part of administrative buildings to childcare centers."

The editor of the regional Desnyanskaya Pravda did not publish the letter, and was scared to answer even orally to its authors. But, trying to oblige the Regional Party Committee, he decided to publish a wordy article by Stanislav Repyakh, the executive secretary of the regional writers organization, with the following words about the letter: "Expropriation? Why, we'd already had that! We've already burned the estate of composer Levka Revutskiy in Irzhavets, Ichnyanskiy district, and we've already destroyed, in the same place, the church which Taras Shevchenko used to come to look at. And already the blood was spilled of Dmitriy Revutskiy, a talented scientist, because, as the leftists-revolutionaries had thought, this blood was blue."

And the very thoughtful conclusion of the article: "I'd like to declare only one thing—the spirit of Sharikov from Bulgakov's short novel 'Heart of the Dog' has not died as yet—let's divide everything."

Leonid Palazhchenko, speaking at a meeting in the Regional Party Committee, did answer in his concluding word the criticisms and the questions of the plant's Communists: The answer didn't satisfy them and they sent all the materials to Pravda and to the CPSU Central Committee. Pravda didn't answer. The CPSU Central Committee sent the materials to Kiev, and an executive organizer from the Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee was sent to Chernigov.

"Not to figure out what's going on here, but to calm us, to persuade us not to make trouble outside our home," Mikhail Kalashnik says.

It was a repeat of things that had happened more than once. The case was heard and nothing was done. The same Mikhail Kalashnik, member of the bureau of the Desnyanskiy District Committee of Chernigov, says that since the 19th Party Conference, the District's Communists failed to get a reply to over 2,000 proposals they had sent to various superior Party organs.

Many Communists in Chernigov say that this sort of irresponsibility may be explained by the system of present-day elections of free Party leaders. They are elected in a narrow circle, for example, not by an entire Party Conference, but by a plenary meeting of a district committee, city or regional committee. Essentially, they are subject only to the Party apparat. The people in Chernigov think that this system needs to be changed, and very soon. It is also necessary to change the status of the Party paper, turning it from an organ of the Regional Party Committee into a rostrum for the entire Party organization. And its editor should be approved by the Party Conference.

The Chernigov Regional Party Committee held a plenary meeting on January 13. It relieved Leonid Palazhchenko of his duties as First Secretary and expelled Mikhail Grishko, chairman of the Regional Executive Committee, from the bureau of the Regional Party Committee. Ivan Muzychenko, editor of DESNYANSKAYA PRAVDA, has also retired. Valeriy Zayka was dismissed from his job and expelled from the Party even before that.

As they say, "conclusions" have been made, but it looks like Party leaders haven't understood their own guilt, and what they have "overlooked". Some of them are even now trying to explain all that happened by looking for intrigues among "extremists from among the informals", as if forgetting that the first who tried to influence the "bad situation" in the city, according to the Regional Party Committee, were "ordinary" Communists.

In primary Party organizations there is talk about the half-measures adopted by the Regional Party Committee. A Regional party Conference could have adopted a cardinal decision.

The Chernigov story, of course, has its own specific features, the same as its "heroes" do. But these "heroes" acted, unfortunately, in conditions typical for all of the Party. They used opportunities—existing to this day—enabling leaders to disengage from the people. When there is a lack of feedback, it is possible to ignore the opinion of ordinary people and continue not to report to them about the fulfilment of adopted decisions.

The participants in the forthcoming Plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee ought to think about all this!

Demonstrations Against Officials

LD1401232290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 14 Jan 90

[From "Seven Days" program; video report by L. Ilchenko from Chernigov]

[Text] Passions have raged for the whole of the past week in Chernigov. [Video shows large crowd shouting and waving banners in a large square] And the reason for this wave of fury, indignation, just, and far from always legal, demands and attacks of those taking part in the meetings, was, this Volga here and its former passengers. [video shows shot of Volga car which looks as if it has either been in a car crash or smashed up] On Christmas eve, the chief of the organizational department of the oblast executive committee, (Zayko) didn't manage to return from a trip. Clearly ignoring the rules of road traffic, the car of the exalted [sanovnyy] official bumped into a little Zhiguli vehicle travelling in front of it.

As it turned out, both the driver and the passenger of the Volga were inebriated. Passers-by who had rushed to the spot of the accident saw deficit food items in the trunk which had opened—several kilograms of meat, sausage and spirits. [video shows militiaman being interviewed]

[Begin recording of Militiaman] As a result of all the actions of the crowd which had gathered you can see what was subsequently done to the car. They turned the car over and they dragged it no less than a few kilometers. [end recording]

[Ilchenko] Soon, both the car and the crowd of passers-by in the street were in the square at the oblast committee of the party, demanding the immediate investigation of the case. The next day, those who were guilty in the accident were fired from their work and the chief of the organizational department of the oblast executive committee was expelled from the party. The incident, it seemed, had run its course, but the passions in the city didn't die down, and unsanctioned meetings took place in various places. Many people spoke sincerely about what pained them—about the slow advance of restructuring, and they are calling for its acceleration.

Last Wednesday, seeking to eliminate the conflict, the local authorities sanctioned a city-wide meeting in the stadium. [video shows hosts of a large meeting being addressed by megaphones] As a counterbalance to this, some political groupings organized an alternative meeting outside the oblast committee. [Video shows group of people; a woman is interviewed and then a man]

[Begin recording] [Woman] I have always been in favor of...[changes thought] that the party should, after all, be in the leadership of our state, but a party which does not compromise itself.

[Man] Right here in Chernigov, the bureau of the Chernigov party organization has to an extent lost touch with the communists themselves, from the party organization of our oblast itself, and has thus discredited itself even before the communists. [end recording]

[Ilchenko] The first secretary of the Chernigov oblast committee and the chairman of the oblast executive committee have resigned. A plenum of the oblast committee of the party met their request.

[Announcer] Tyumen [reference to preceding news report] and Chernigov. I don't know if everyone will agree with me, but I personally view the events in these cities as a normal and natural process in the renewal and cleasning of the party.

Leningrad Party Chief Explains Election Pullout

PM3001161790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by own correspondent Vladimir Nevelskiy under rubric "Direct Link": "What Prompted B. Gidaspov's Decision?"]

[Text] The local press has published a letter from USSR People's Deputy B.V. Gidaspov, first secretary of Leningrad City and Oblast CPSU Committees. Expressing sincere gratitude to the collectives of "Vereteno," "Meridian," and "Progress" Enterprises and to the microrayon residents who nominated him as candidate deputy to the Leningrad City Soviet, B.V. Gidaspov declared that he declines to stand for election to the Leningrad City Soviet. What prompted this decision? Is this not attributable to a fear of not being elected? This was Boris Veniaminovich Gidaspov's reply to these questions:

"The Law on Elections prescribes that no citizen of Soviet society can be a member of more than two soviets simultaneously. I would have certainly agreed prior to 1986. It was possible to work on two and even three soviets because, in essence, a deputy's role primarily boiled down to attending sessions. This did not demand any great expenditure of time or energy.

"But my work on the Supreme Soviet, and especially in my capacity as chairman of the Congress Credentials Commission, is already something quite different. It must also be remembered that I was quite recently appointed first secretary of the Leningrad Oblast and City party committees and member of the Russian Bureau. All this constitutes a considerable workload. But there are still only 24 hours a day.

"As regards my participation in the life of the soviet and the city, my status as USSR people's deputy and secretary of the oblast and city party committees gives me an opportunity to participate in the elaboration of decisions. Whether with a consultative or casting vote—this does not change anything in principle. Furthermore, I think that as many new people as possible should be on the soviet. I have been a city soviet deputy for 12 years now. It is necessary to change its composition and bring in 'fresh' people who would find it interesting (and who would have the ability) to work with total dedication.

"These are the main motivations which I followed."

Leningrad Introduces Rationing by I.D. Card

LD2201140390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0430 GMT 22 Jan 90

[Text] [Announcer Irina Chirkova] The Baltics, and now Leningrad—which will be next on the dismal list of the country's regions or cities in which visitors cannot buy a cartoon of milk, a loaf of bread or Validol in the pharmacy. This report by our correspondent Matvey Frolov is, as you might guess, devoted not to resentment of the visitors. As a native Leningrader, he is, of course, concerned with the first concrete results of this latest development in his city. Over to you:

[Frolov] For more than 10 days now, our shopping has been bound up with passports. Whether you want to buy some meat or sausage, a towel or stockings, or much else you have to produce your passport with its stamp showing you are domiciled locally, in Leningrad. True, this is only for the time being. Soon we are to be issued with I.D. cards bearing a photograph. Apparently this is a serious long-term move. So, what in the opinion of the leaders of the Executive Committee, has the initial experience shown? That is what I asked Vladimir Yakovlevich Khodryev, chairman of the Executive Committee of Leningrad City Soviet of People's Deputies.

[Begin Khodryev recording] In the first place, I can say that the reaction has been mixed: We have been criticized. But I believe that if we did not introduce I.D. cards, we would be criticized for doing nothing. So it is perfectly natural. On the whole, though, we have received support; the situation has stabilized. But overall, the past days have not yet seen any great advances or changes. And therefore our task lies elsewhere now—to fill our shop with the resources and reserves that we have. I can tell you that everything is now being dealt with on the spot. Moreover, there is none of the strict regulation. You cannot cover everything in instructions or directives. Each person must think for himself: If someone comes in, can he really not be sold anything? And therefore, everything is sorted out directly in the shop. We have a commission that convenes in the morning and the evening to examine this matter. There is a special telephone link which Leningraders can use to contact the Trading Directorate. The Main Trading Directorate has a special ad hoc working group which is now studying all that is being done.

It is another matter that in some shops the comrade directors are exceeding their powers. For instance, passports are sometimes demanded before bread is sold. But why? After all, we sell bread to children [who do not have passports]. We are tackling the problem of visitors and invalids.

We are linked with one another. And if somewhere someone does something not quite right, then that generates a chain reaction in other regions, too. For that reason, there has been a strongly negative reaction to this from the people of Pskov and Novgorod. I know that the government of the of the republic is to take steps to deal with Pskov and Novgorod, so if the situation in the surrounding area is stabilized, and if the Baltic republics meet their obligations—although unfortunately they are not doing so: Latvia has refused 100 percent; Lithuania is still giving something—and if we have the resources...if we have all this, then perhaps we will manage to limit things to I.D. cards. The way I see it, while accusations are levelled at us and, of course, it is not terribly wonderful for Leningrad that we have introduced I.D. cards, nevertheless I believe that it has struck home to suppliers that, if this is happening in Leningrad, then they must fulfill their undertakings. I know of many regions that have been telephoning us and telling us not to worry—that they will deliver everything. [end recording]

[Chirkova] While paying tribute to the suppliers' sense of responsibility toward the Leningraders, I would like, esteemed listeners, to share with you some doubts on one aspect of Matvey Frolov's report. Khodyrev, the chairman of the Leningrad City Executive Committee, stated that the directors of shops had been given powers to settle whatever problems arose on their own. But I would like to know how far this independence of action extends, and what machinery has been devised to combat abuse of this independence. For we are all well aware of the extent to which this abuse merges organically into the overall distribution system, and even with the sale of goods on presentation of a passport or I.D. cards.

Vorotnikov Chairs RSFSR Supreme Soviet

PM3001132990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 25 Jan 90 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "At RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium"]

[Text] A session of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium 24 January examined the question of the course of the preparations for the elections of people's deputies to the RSFSR and RSFSR autonomous republics and local soviets of peoples' deputies.

It was pointed out that the election campaign in the Russian Federation is taking place in a businesslike and democratic atmosphere, in conditions of supreme interest among the voters in renewing organs of state power in the RSFSR and electing highly prestigious and worthy people's deputies capable of taking an enterprising part in implementing the aims of perestroyka.

Some 8,254 people—or approximately eight candidates for one mandate—were nominated as candidate RSFSR people's deputies, 8,449 people were nominated as candidate people's deputies in autonomous republics—approximately three candidates for one mandate—and 1,208,000 people were nominated as local soviet people's deputies—an average of 15 candidates for 10 mandates.

In the course of the nominations most activeness was displayed by labor collectives at enterprises, establishments, and organizations, which nominated approximately 75 percent of the candidate people's deputies to all soviets of all echelons. Some 3.2 percent of RSFSR candidate people's deputies were nominated at meetings of voters at their places of residence, while this figure was 7.3 percent and 18.2 percent respectively for the autonomous republics and local soviets. Approximately one-fifth of RSFSR and autonomous republic people's deputies were named by public organizations. Public organizations' representation among candidate people's deputies to local soviets totals 6 percent. In comparison with the current body of deputies in the republic's soviets the representation of creative and scientific workers and economic leaders rose among the candidate people's deputies, while the numbers of working class, peasantry, women, and young people fell.

Since candidate people's deputies registered, electoral okrugs have been mounting the varied work of holding meetings between candidates and voters at election meetings, providing candidates with the requisite reference and informational materials, making use of the mass media, considering voters' instructions, and creating equal conditions for candidates to wage the election struggle.

At the same time the discussion showed that, alongside the high activeness within the republic as a whole, in the course of the election campaign not all labor collectives and soviet and economic organs are yet ensuring the successful resolution of the economic and sociopolitical tasks facing them or taking a direct part in the preparations for the elections.

In the resolution it adopted the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium defined the tasks for RSFSR soviets of people's deputies and their executive and managerial organs in the closing stages of the election campaign

Having examined the proposals put by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Commission for Science and Technology and in view of the opinions of the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium and the broad public, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium adopted a decree on setting up an RSFSR Academy of Sciences and instructed the RSFSR Council of Ministers to take practical steps to shape and safeguard the activity of the RSFSR Academy of Sciences.

The RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium ratified a plan of basic organizational measures to prepare for the First Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies and the first session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

The RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium session examined other questions of state life in the republic.

V.I. Vorotnikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, led the sitting.

RSFSR Election Campaign Becomes 'More Acute'

LD2901092790 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 29 Jan 90

[Text] The election campaign in the Russian Federation, where about eight candidates are competing for each mandate to the parliament of the republic, is becoming more and more acute. In Irkutsk, the candidates who are for speeding up democratic reforms have united into an interregional group and are campaigning against the conservative forces from a common platform. In some of the cities, including Leningrad, certain prominent party leaders didn't risk taking part in the election campaign and removed their names from the list of candidates. Nevertheless, among the more than 8,000 candidates representing different public organizations, labor staffs, and voters' clubs, 85 percent are communist. Elections in the Russian Federation are to be held in early march.

Candidate Registration Concluded

90UN0767A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Jan 90 Second Edition p 3

[Report by T. Karyakina: "Registration Completed: A Thumbnail Sketch"]

[Text] On 22 January the registration of candidates for the posts of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] people's deputies and for the local soviets was completed. The closer we get to election day, 4 March, the hotter each of the new stages of the election struggle becomes. The candidate debates have started and there is competition between the programs of the contenders for seats in the highest organ of power.

Today, of course, it is very difficult to say what Russia's new parliament will be like. But obviously the main features of the corps of candidates registered can one way or another form a general portrait of the deputies. I think that the party majority of candidates—they include 85 percent communists—will also be preserved after the election results are known. The minority of kolkhoz [collective farm] farmers and workers and women and young people will change little in the future parliament.

Unfortunately, we must cite this statistic: The total number of candidates includes only 8.5 percent workers, 3.2 percent kolkhoz farmers, and 1.5 percent Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] members. The reasons for these proportions remain to be analyzed. It is only to be hoped that the deputy mandates will be taken by worthy people.

To judge from the letters to the newspaper these days, this current choice of contenders to participate in the election struggle has been extraordinarily exacting. Sometimes fierce competition has developed not only in a particular okrug but even within a single collective. This is how it was, for example, at a conference in the USSR Ministry of Transport Construction to nominate deputies. V. Volkov, who recently received his mandate as candidate for the Sokolnicheskiy territorial okrug No 49 in Moscow, had to last through a meeting that went on, with intermissions, for three days.

We were interested in knowing the degree of sympathy gained from voters for the program of a contender who was in such a serious competition. "Russia," V. Volkov believes, "should have its own voice in the choir of the union republics. It is necessary to draw up on a priority basis and adopt draft legislation to switch Russia to economic independence. The historical role and political position of the RSFSR require that the republic be in the vanguard of perestroyka. Russia's relations with the other union republics should be built on the basis of equality, justice, and equivalent exchange within the framework of the union market."

The fewer the women in the dense ranks of the candidates the greater the interest evoked by those who do not fear the competition and are not worried about their own tranquillity. For what? One native of Yakutsk, a doctor of geographical sciences from the USSR Academy of Sciences Siberian Branch Institute of Permafrost Studies, M. Gavrilova, wants to enter the Russian parliament in order to strengthen her own professionalism. No, she has never studied parliamentary activity. But by becoming a full-fledged member of the highest organ of power she will oppose, for example, the adoption of laws that may exert a baneful effect on the ecology of the national minorities of Russia. However, not only Russia: Mariya Kuzminichna is engaged in a study of the Arctic climate on all the world's continents, and she is the bearer of a Gold Medal of the polar explorer Litka, and may be doing good service to people all over the planet.

These are just a few thumbnail sketches of the possibilities—there are no guarantees—a portrait of the corps of deputies.

Wider Role for RSFSR Foreign Ministry Urged

90UN0695A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Viewpoint by Professor V. Lukin, doctor of historical sciences: "Soviet Foreign Policy: Russian Aspect"]

[Text] It is common knowledge that, in accordance with the union treaty and the USSR Constitution, our country's foreign policy is a common, All-Union policy. This is, of course, an essential condition for ensuring that our partners in the world understand us, respect us and reckon with us.

The unity and wholeness of the USSR's foreign policy course by no means signify, however, that everything is as it should be with us when it comes to the ascertainment and realization of specific republic interests in the foreign policy sphere. I believe that the ailments of "foreign policy insufficiency" engendering dissatisfaction and confused irritation characterize in varying degree all 15 union republics.

The concerns and problems of my republic—Russia—are naturally closest to me.

Let us ask ourselves: Are there many Russians who know what the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Foreign Ministry does? To say that a handful knows would be a considerable exaggeration. In our age of superhigh technology a patient in the murky region between life and death may often frequently be maintained in this condition in practice once he has been hooked up to artificial life-support systems. Is not our republic Foreign Ministry such a half-alive person who is not "unhooked from the system" merely because it would be inconvenient to bury him?

Yet our patient is by no means a hopeless case. I am sure that the coming elections to the highest Russian legislative authority will lead to a sharp acceleration of the process of conversion of the Russian Foreign Ministry, and of many most important institutions of the RSFSR also, from decorative semideceased persons into actual organs of republic administration.

What should the Russian Foreign Ministry be doing—not in words but in deeds? It is called upon primarily to ascertain and formulate specific republic foreign policy interests and requirements.

Each Soviet republic has such interests. They are born of the specific features of geographic location, history, culture, size of territory, combination of natural resources, and level and focus of S&T development. We have people in whom the mere mention of republic specifics, in a foreign policy interpretation particularly, evokes a shudder of ritual indignation. Yet acute problems and discord arise not on account of the recognition and attempts to incorporate these specific features in actual political processes but precisely the reverse—on account of the perpetuation in respect to them of the ostrich position—the tacit denial of actual problems.

So Russian specific interests and requirements within the framework of the All-Union foreign policy process.... This means, in my view, primarily the particular political interest in Europe and the particular economic interest in adjacent countries of the Asia-Pacific region.

There have been dramatic changes of colossal importance in Europe in recent months and even weeks. A common European political space is taking shape before our very eyes. The end of the era of the continent's division into two ideologically hostile poles is leading to a solution of many of the old problems. At the same time, as is the case in the world, new problems are arising or old problems are being spotlighted anew. We shall cite just one—the German problem. Russia and Germany: Is this not a field for most serious reflection—historical, current political, futurological? After all, it is sufficient to recall that Kaliningrad Oblast is a part of the RSFSR to imagine how many serious arguments the Russian Foreign Ministry has for reflection and a honing of positions in a European direction.

The Russian Foreign Ministry could display initiative in discussions with the foreign policy departments of other Western republics of our country on questions connected with membership in a common European home in such a way that we harm neither ourselves nor others.

Historically Russia underwent modernization by "carving out a window onto Europe". Now the area of East Asia and the Pacific is becoming the world center of S&T progress. There is increasingly less doubt that it is in this vast area stretching to the east and southeast of our borders that the main actions of the military, political, and economic performance of the 21st century will unfold.

Our Russian Far East is a backward, underpopulated area. Its opportunity for a spurt ahead is not a window but a wide-open door to the Asia-Pacific region. This is possible, but particular economic and political conditions are needed for this. The energy and enterprise of Russian foreign policy and foreign economic departments are needed. Recently a "new industrial country" of the region—Malaysia—was visited by high-level delegations from Uzbekistan and Estonia. They held businesslike and fruitful discussions there and laid the foundations for specific projects. But where was the Russian team? Where were Comrades Vlasov and Vinogradov? Perhaps they think that overseas merchants will place their goods directly on our stove, where we are still dozing in reveries about a bright future? We need a republic concept of the development of the Far East closely linked with the development of long-term relations with the Asia-Pacific countries.

Let us specify once again to avoid ambiguity—the particular interests and requirements of Russia in the sphere of foreign policy should be effectively coordinated at the union level. But let us say clearly: The process of coordination has not as yet been properly worked out. It is good that the RSFSR foreign minister is a member of the USSR Foreign Ministry Board. I believe that all his colleagues from the other union republics should be members also. Unfortunately, his "seat" is to a considerable extent of a for-the-record and ritual nature. Yet a mechanism of intra-union concordance and coordination on foreign policy matters should be created. Specifically, any important foreign policy action, particularly one affecting Russia, should be prepared in close cooperation with the RSFSR Foreign Ministry and the Russian Supreme Soviet Foreign Affairs Commission. This applies to all questions of the union's relations with countries adjacent to the RSFSR (including, naturally, territorial questions), foreign economic relations, cultural and scientific contacts, and humanitarian issues. A Russian representative at a level in keeping with the significance of this problem or the other should unfailingly be a member of the union delegation and coordinate the changes in position arising in the course of the negotiations with the Russian Government and Parliament. Such a procedure could, possibly, complicate somewhat, and sometimes slow down, the progress of some negotiations, but their results would, on the other hand, be more easily and better understood and accepted by those who by right feel themselves to be most involved in a given foreign policy problem. Of course, the same procedure should operate in relations between the USSR Foreign Ministry and the foreign ministries of all the other union republics on issues in which one or several of them have an obvious special interest.

A big and unsolved problem is republic representation abroad. It is possible and necessary—mostly at the consular level—to find the extent and form thereof which combines the executive unity of the basic set of problems of the union foreign policy process and at the same time fits the reflection of specific features of the interests of the RSFSR.

I believe that a Russian representative—again not decorative but working in entirely specific fields—should be a member of the Soviet delegation at UN General Assembly sessions.

That the RSFSR has such an odd, "half-strangled" foreign policy department is the fault not only of this department, of course, and its particular inertness. It is a part of the broader process of the unstructured nature of Russian state structures. It is now, it would seem, becoming universally acknowledged that this anomaly needs to be removed. The best method of dispelling the myths spread by not very enlightened or by very embittered people about the devilish machinations since the times of Adam and Eve of foreigners, Jew-Masons, and Russophobes against our country is restoring to Russia all the rights and prerogatives of a Soviet republic as a worthy and sovereign member of the union federation. The foreign policy aspect should be an important component of this process. I believe that the new, "post-March" composition of the Russian Parliament could and should take up this matter in earnest. And this parliament itself could make a considerable contribution to this important business. I am sure that a strong and influential RSFSR Supreme Soviet international affairs commission could, first, establish supervision of the activity of the RSFSR Foreign Ministry and help the Ministry finally acquire its own character; second, investigate the constant disputes between Russian departments and local authorities about who is impeding whom in the development of business relations with neighboring countries; third, draw up a businesslike and practical program of interparliamentary exchange, taking as the reference point chiefly the countries and regions of particular Russian interest.

These are just a few thoughts, which could be summed up as follows: Russia's voice in the foreign policy course of our union can and should be heard more loudly and distinctly. Not to the detriment of anyone but to the benefit of each and everyone together.

Russian Voters Club Demonstrates in Moscow

LD2801211290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 28 Jan 90

[From "Seven Days" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer Aleksandr Tikhomirov] Yesterday there was another meeting in Moscow.

[B. Kostenko] Peoples of Russia, Unite the fatherland through your revival! A meeting was held at Ostankino with this slogan. It was organized by the Club of Russian Voters for RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputies. The main themes of this meeting were the recreation of the Russian communist Party, undoubtedly within the framework of the CPSU; the strengthening of Russia's economic might; and the restoration of the Russian village.

More than 30 candidates for RSFSR People's deputy spoke. They represented the OFT—the United Front of Working People [Obyedinennyy Front Trudyashchikhsya]; the United Council of Russia [Obyedinennyy Sovet Rossii], which is an association; the Committee to Save the Volga; and religious organizations. Many of the problems around which passions were heated at this mass meeting had not been solved for years. As a rule, eyes remained closed to them in shame. The fall in Russia's birthrate, high infant mortality, the low standard of living in Russian non-chernozem areas, the destruction of society's moral foundation, and Russophobia. It is hardly worth paying heed to certain speakers who chose excessively harsh expressions. Things were clearly boiling over.

[D.A. Barabashov, cochairman of the Russia Club, candidate for RSFSR People's deputy] The destiny and problems of the people of Russia, and its revival, concerns everyone today. We feel that if Russia is strong, then the Union, too, will be strong, and this is one of the main ideas of this meeting.

There are many slogans and theses being advanced here, but perhaps I shall dwell on one which is painful today; it is searing our hearts. There are a great many refugees from Azerbaijan. They are being accommodated in various regions of the country, many of them in and around Moscow. Yet either there is a lack of information or else it is true that not everything is being done as it ought to be, but we see that they are being accommodated in barracks. In the Moscow area we now have a great many health resorts and boarding houses which are standing empty and which could be lived in. In the first place I would cite the boarding houses of the party's central Committee such as Barvikha, Uspenskaya, Klyazma, and a number of others. I think that I have a right to cite these boarding houses first of all because I myself am a functionary of the party Central Committee. I am an instructor of the party Central Committee. I think that it is necessary to start from here.

[video shows Kostenko standing among crowd near Ostankino television tower; speakers on a stage in front of a banner with the letters "OFT" and hammer and sickle; banners among the crowd saying "Russia's work—for mothers and children", "Down with the mercenary leaders of the interregional group," "We demand immediate and complete equality of rights for the RSFSR!", "People's front of Armenia and People's Front of Azerbaijan! Russia calls on you—Stop!"]

Yeltsin Airs Plans for Deputies Elections

90UN0739A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 4, 24 Jan 90 p 2

[Interview with B.N. Yeltsin by Yuriy Bogomolov: "I Believe I Will Be Supported"]

[Text] [Bogomolov] Boris Nikolayevich, you have been nominated for RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputy in dozens of electoral okrugs. What have you decided?

[Yeltsin] I have been nominated in Moscow, Leningrad, in the Urals, in Siberia. Availing myself of the right accorded me by law to be a deputy of two soviets, I have decided to join the fray for the mandate of people's deputy of Russia. I will run in Sverdlovsk.

[Bogomolov] In the USSR Supreme Soviet you head the Construction and Architecture Committee. Considering our obstructions in this sphere, you have a lot to do. What induces you to struggle for a seat in the highest organ of power in the RSFSR as well?

[Yeltsin] At almost all the meetings which nominated me as a candidate for deputy the voters gave me the political instruction not to give up the struggle for the position of chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, that is, not to do as I did at the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies. At one such meeting I gave my word that I would not.

Second, the composition of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies is such that the supporters of more emphatic democratic transformations remain and will in the future remain in the minority. I hope that there will be a different alignment of forces at the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies, fifty-fifty, perhaps. In this case it might be possible if Russia adopts more democratic, radical solutions to push the center toward such also.

[Bogomolov] If you are elected people's deputy of Russia, do you intend to keep your present position in the USSR Supreme Soviet?

[Yeltsin] It will all depend on whether I am elected to some office in the Russian Supreme Soviet or not. Combining two offices would, of course, be impossible.

[Bogomolov] Which questions, in your view, should be tackled in Russia primarily?

[Yeltsin] It is very important to resolve the nationality issue. The autonomous formations should be accorded full independence. The small peoples should be given autonomy also.

More attention should be paid to the Russian population. This is not chauvinism, but a necessary condition for national revival. Russians are now scattered throughout the country and in many republics constitute a high percentage of the population. It is very important here that they know that Russia is creating jobs and residence conditions and is always ready to receive Russians.

And, of course, Russia must be an independent republic in order that it not be automatically associated with the central union authorities. A revival of spiritual and cultural traditions, an appropriate breakdown into economic zones and the financially autonomous independence of these zones and, as I have said, autonomous formations are essential. I believe that the Russian Federation should join the United Nations and have its own Communist Party and, possibly, all other parties also. It is necessary to constitutionally recognize the possibility of any political, social and political, and public organization participating with equal status in the life of the country and struggling for its authority, relying on its own platform.

[Bogomolov] Boris Nikolayevich, it is several years now since you ceased to be first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom [City Party Committee]. Is the present Yeltsin different from the Yeltsin of that time?

[Yeltsin] We are all reorganizing ourselves, of course. In this very complex, contradictory situation becoming, I would say, wiser, little by little. Some more than others. The situation itself is forcing us to both think and act differently today. I would not say that Yeltsin has become someone else, but there has undoubtedly been a change, a change leftward, what is more. I am today disposed toward more radical change than at that time.

[Bogomolov] How do you rate your chances of victory at the elections? Are you confident?

[Yeltsin] I believe I will be supported in the okrug which I have chosen. But, of course, I will have to work well in the course of the election campaign.

Yeltsin Interviewed by SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH

Part One

90UN0742A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 3 Jan 90 p 3

[First of two-part interview with Boris Yeltsin by SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH correspondent Aleksandr Olbik, submitted on 25 November 1989: "42 Questions for Boris Yeltsin"]

[Text] Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov was still alive at the time. The spirit and moral ideals of the Great Dissident still dominated the spirit and morality of perestroyka. He inspired the despairing and brought back those who had gone astray. He was involved in everything and therefore it was easy to love him and easy to hate him. He seemed to be a mortal, like the rest of us, and only his death—as is always the case with the great—underscored his immense personality and its truly astronomic scale. It is as though it were said about him: After all, the good is not life itself, but a worthy life.

...The conversation with Boris Yeltsin began at his headquarters, in room 606 of the Moskva Hotel. Then (because of technical reasons) it was necessary to change location and most of the interview was conducted in the southwestern part of the capital—in one of the new rayons.

It was a freezing day and the sun was low. The recently restored temple of Michael the Archangel sparkled in its blinding rays. Its golden cupolas would burn over Moscow for a long time before evening would dim their gold. Possibly this sparkling, mirage-like vision along with the spacious, frost-covered streets of the capital in some way put us in a retrospective mood. I recalled: **B.N. Yeltsin came to be hated for his just undertakings. He was forced to abandon positions that would have been to the greatest advantage of the people. S. Andriyants, Svetlogorsk, Gomel Oblast." And also: "Yeltsin cannot be forgiven by those who hate him for his boldness and directness, for his appeals to deprive the elite of their privileges, and his refusal to accept Kremlin ways. V. Melnikov, Krasnoyarsk." "The people love B.N. Yeltsin for the fact that he does not grovel before the higher-ups and tells the truth... PRAVDA has undermined its reputation so much that it is not likely to regain it soon. F. Rybakov, Daugavpils." (From SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH mail.)**

From time to time access to the mass media is closed to him, supposedly because of his "great transgressions": He is supposed to have said the wrong thing somewhere, expressed his thoughts in the wrong form, violated party ethics or regulations, and in general conducted himself inappropriately... That was the case after the aforementioned October (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, that was the case during the pre-election campaign, and that was and is the case since his trip to the United States. SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH gives him as much room as it can on its pages, as it did in August 1988 when it printed its first interview with B. Yeltsin, thus breaking through the artificially created zone of silence surrounding his name. On 20 October of this year [as published] SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH published his "Declaration" which "solid" Moscow publications had refused to print. We are doing the same thing now for it would be unconstitutional and immoral to deprive a USSR people's deputy of the "newspaper" forum...

[Olbik] Boris Nikolayevich, your victory in the spring elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet in some ways remind one of the triumph of one Roman military leader who had a brilliant victory...

[Yeltsin] I do not know whom you have in mind but I am sure that your hero fought out in the open and his legions stood face to face with a real enemy. He knew who his enemy was and how many there were. I have had the petty intrigues of the apparatus against me, and with all my optimistic predictions I could not count on anything like a triumph—on a victory and then some. True, the Western mass media, taking advantage of the services of public opinion survey firms, predicted that approximately 70 percent of the voters would vote for me. In general they were not too far wrong—I won 89 percent.

[Olbik] As in a school composition, the elections in your "history" were a kind of opening paragraph...

[Yeltsin] An opening paragraph with a detective story twist. When the election began I received many offers to be nominated as a candidate. You understand that to rush into something like that without thinking, without having a particular tactic, would be unforgivably irresponsible. After all, I knew that the Moscow "white collars" were ready to fall in battle in order to prevent me from getting through the pre-election sieve. It reached a point of outright unfair finagling: In one region of Moscow a deputy session was created at which it was directly announced: Do not vote for Yeltsin! Naturally, in such a disturbed atmosphere I had to think about reliable rear forces. I was convinced that I would be covered by the Ural mountains, particularly Sverdlovsk and the city of my youth, Berezniki. I based my election on them. But I was aware that if my "well-wishers" found out about this they would definitely latch on to me and could impede my nomination.

And here is where this "opening paragraph" begins. When I found out what time the precinct meeting was to be held in Berezniki I went to the post office and sent a telegram there—I said excuse me but it is impossible for me to come there. Like a fox, I covered my tracks. Then I waited until the last plane had left for Perm and set out for the airport—I flew to Leningrad. When we landed in the city of Peter I rushed to the military airport and literally hurled myself into an AN-26 transport plane and "in the embrace" of a cruise missile, flew to Perm. I showed up at the meeting itself by 10 o'clock. When I entered the Palace of Culture in Berezniki... But I cannot tell you what happened there. It was incredible! But I had to work fast: I had a couple of hours to meet with the youth, the labor collectives, and the intelligentsia. Nobody stood in my way: The oblast leaders did not manage to get there from Perm and in Berezniki itself they were in a state of confusion—for there were no instructions from above. In a word, I had staked out my territory and all I had to do was sign the application and register.

[Olbik] After that plane ride you still did not register in Berezniki but in national territorial precinct No 1. The largest in the USSR. You were taking a risk...

[Yeltsin] At one of the plenums of the Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev said to me that the people from Moscow did not recognize me. And I decided to find out whether they did or not. As Kant put it, the only qualification to be a citizen is the ability to vote. And I believed very much in the qualifications of the citizens of Moscow. True, one question remained unclear and therefore caused a certain amount of uneasiness. At the last moment I found out that the voters in precinct No 1 also include all Soviet citizens living abroad at the time. Of course I could not immediately fly to 29 countries of the world in order to speak personally with my dear compatriots. But what is curious is that later it was explained in the Ministry of Internal Affairs that the percentage of votes cast for me abroad was the same as the percentage I received in the metropolis—almost 90 percent. (Boris Nikolayevich says, not without a certain amount of pride, that he has 2,250 deputy mandates—the mandate for No 1.—A.O.)

MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, 16 April 1989: "Yeltsin passed with an overwhelming majority not as a 'leader for the people' but as a 'leader for the leaders.' Unanimity in voting for Yeltsin is the people's response to the apparatus for its arrogant absolute power."

[Olbik] The victory in the elections "transferred" you from the category of a minister out of favor to the category of the people's choice. Was there no political mortification of Yeltsin?

[Yeltsin] By that time they had tried to pin so many different labels on me... And they did brand me but they would not let me tell the people the truth. And the elections were supposed to prove whom the people were dealing with—with a political corpse, as the apparatus tried to represent me, or as a political activist recognized by the people. And it was not the custom here for anyone to return from political nonexistence. It was necessary to break this "custom"...

[Olbik] The expression the "Yeltsin phenomenon" appeared in the mass media. How do you feel about definitions like this? From your viewpoint is there something phenomenal about your destiny?

[Yeltsin] I do not think that this phenomenon can be interpreted in such a simple way...

[Olbik] But still you call it a phenomenon.

[Yeltsin] No, I am speaking about what I have already said earlier: How difficult, almost impossible it is to emerge from political nonexistence. This is probably what "my phenomenon" consists of. But I would not call it the "Yeltsin phenomenon" but the **"phenomenon of the system"** which has used all possible means to apply pressure to the minds of the masses and the masses have made their independent choice in spite of the pressure. The system is deaf to signals, impenetrable, and herein, of course, lies its weakness. The "phenomenon of the system" is also that, having at hand a gigantic apparatus for applying pressure, a monopoly on the mass media, and "colossal" support from recruits from the working class (like the venerable V. Tikhomirov), it still turned out to be powerless to subdue the will of the masses. Powerless and therefore it lost out in the "competition" with many progressive deputies. And the main thing is that it did not understand why it lost.

I do not wish to assign myself the role of some kind of reformer but still I note that during my term as first secretary of the Moscow party city committee glasnost in Moscow has become the most appreciable sign of democratization. Pointed articles have appeared concerning previously prohibited subjects—for example, drug addiction, prostitution, the fat-cat nomenklatura, the trampling on social justice, and so forth. Possibly you recall the article that created the greatest stir, "Carriages at the Door." The people liked this one but it made the apparatus extremely nervous—they wanted very much for me not to make my way back into political life. And they insisted that I observe their rules of the game: Once they have "killed" you, you are dead. A corpse poses no danger to anyone.

Therefore the "Yeltsin phenomenon" is explained not only by logic (he who is beaten is protected) but also by a combination of many factors affecting people's consciousness and psychology. And this combination worked to my advantage.

[Olbik] But fortune almost turned us from the path when the voting took place in parliament. I have in mind the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

[Yeltsin] The Moscow group of deputies prepared a whole package of documents for the congress: amendments to the Constitution, concerning the electoral system, concerning ownership, and so forth. Had it been "to the liking" of the deputies we would be working on them now. But the fact is that all the proposals from the Moscow group were rejected without cause. The psychological atmosphere of the congress was wrong. Had we proposed at that time the most brilliant plan in the world it still would not have passed. Such was the thinking of the aggressively indifferent majority. For up to this point there has been no regulation of the congress and no law on the status of the deputy. In essence we in the parliament are children of illegality and nobody can take us seriously. The second congress is approaching (the conversation took place in November—A.O.) and our legislation is still in the cradle.

One of the principles of the Moscow deputy group was to have a number of variants in the selection and approval of cadres for the congress. That is, the chairman of the chambers, committees, and commissions. Therefore when this question was discussed at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee I explained my position and asked: With which article should the Central Committee plenum advise the higher power organ on how to conduct itself? The principle of alternatives has been thoroughly eliminated. This is why when the next candidacy was being named I raised my hand—against, against, against... Then they asked me to my face: Are you, Comrade Yeltsin, going to carry out the decisions of the plenum? You are a member of the Central Committee, a communist, and as such you can... I lowered my head and remained silent. I was trying to think of what to say. And again a voice applying pressure: Will you carry out the decisions of the plenum or not? But I answered the question with a question: Don't you understand how far ahead our society has moved and that the party regulations and Constitution are hopelessly outdated? So how am I to answer you—in terms of the condition of the society or in terms of the documents you have adopted? They said to me: the documents. And then instead of the word "will" I said "must." I did not consider it necessary to break off relations with the Central Committee at that time.

Briefly, the Moscow group decided to go to the elections to the Supreme Soviet with alternative candidates. There were 11 of us but after one brilliant speech by Deputy Kazannik I suggested including him on the lists. As you know, a blow was dealt to me, which, of course, was not unexpected. What was unexpected was something else—Kazannik's speech and withdrawal. I was against his proposal but here is what he said to me: "Tell me, Boris Nikolayevich, what will I tell my constituents? For they know that the six million people of Moscow are behind you. If I remain, they will kill me." This was an act of the highest nobility. And two of our famous jurists—Gorbachev and Lukyanov—not knowing how to resolve this antinomy, turned to other jurists for help...

[Olbik] Was that vote a test for you?

[Yeltsin] I was disturbed, of course, but as far as its being a blow goes... it was not.

[Olbik] Your withdrawal of your nomination for the post of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet could be regarded as reverence for M. Gorbachev...

[Yeltsin] I had a very clear feeling for the situation that prevailed in the hall. The alignment of forces was clearly not in my favor.

[Olbik] And if these had been direct general elections?

[Yeltsin] That is interesting... Most likely in terms of votes we would not have been very far away from one another.

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY of 1-7 July 1989: "B.N. Yeltsin is most frequently named as an alternative—46 percent of those who do not support M.S. Gorbachev, then comes N.I. Ryzhkov—19 percent, and then A.M. Obolenskiy—4 percent.

[Olbik] You are the chairman of the committee for construction and architecture but... I personally have the impression that this position was especially reserved for you by Gorbachev himself...

[Yeltsin] I think that, too, and I shall explain why. In the first place it was stipulated at the outset that the committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet should be formed not according to the branch principle but according to problems. In the second place, all the executive organs for control of capital construction in the country have been eliminated. The USSR Gosstroy [State Construction Committee] was also left without a chief and it had no executive functions left. That is there was a simple calculation to "drown" Yeltsin and his committee in a heap of papers and requests, to harrow them with complaints, and so forth. For the committee has neither staff nor funds; it is naked as a newborn child. True, it has power, but legislative power and not executive, not administrative. And now people have come to us from all over the country, as though we were not a committee of the Supreme Soviet but some kind of staff supply office. They say: Give us cement, allot us a gantry crane... It would seem that this is what the higher-ups were counting on. In the terrifying whirlwind of current affairs, with one problem after another, when will Yeltsin have any time for politics. But that is all right, we shall work a little harder, but there is no question about politics—my immediate task is as a people's parliamentarian.

I asked Comrade Gorbachev not to appoint me chairman of this committee, that is, not to recommend me. But on the spur of the moment he brought this issue up for discussion by the Supreme Soviet. What was left for me to do? And I decided to "shake" up the deputies, to beat out of them the willingness to vote for me. I went up to the podium and criticized the Congress and in general gave it a negative evaluation. I thought that if I made the deputies mad... but they voted for me anyway. But with this maneuver I made one thing clear for myself: The democratic potential was very low.

[Olbik] In my opinion, everything did not go smoothly for you at the First Congress.

[Yeltsin] The first failure—the program of the Moscow group did not go through. They had immediately prepared a bed of Procrustes for it: Since it was a group, it naturally had group goals, and since it was Muscovite—it was elite. In a word, the ambitions of the "hard-head" conservatives came into play.

[Olbik] One is struck by one "pattern": When a session or a congress is conducted by Mikhail Gorbachev your "presence" on the television screen is extremely rare. And one does not see you at the podium very often either.

[Yeltsin] I do not know about the television directors—perhaps they have been given instructions. I spoke twice at the Congress and I consider that quite sufficient. One cannot run to the podium on every occasion. My main work takes place in the meetings of the Presidium, of which I am a member. Nobody else from the Interregional Deputy Group is on it and this means that I have to look out for our interests all by myself. There are very heated skirmishes: For example, at the last meeting of the Presidium on 10 November I spoke 12 times.

[Olbik] About what?

[Yeltsin] About the most diverse issues. It reached a point where Comrade Gorbachev tried to hush me up: You, Comrade Yeltsin, calm down... I had to respond: No, you, Comrade Gorbachev, calm down. Or do you get to do whatever you want to?

[Olbik] May I print that?

[Yeltsin] If you wish: What happened, happened. When I began to defend the Baltic republics with respect to their constitutional committees and their independence in general when it comes to applying their own laws, I was immediately silenced: Are you, Yeltsin, in favor of a federation or a confederation? And I responded: Please do not try to push me into a corner. Today we speak about neither a federation nor a confederation; today we are speaking about the republic's independence. For ultimately there must be real sovereignty and not just on paper. Real! My proposal about constitutional supervision was ultimately adopted.

[Olbik] Is the Interregional Deputy Group (MDG) the Moscow group reconstructed?

[Yeltsin] Being susceptible to their predilections, when the deputies heard the words "Moscow group" they immediately bristled up and rejected any suggestion we made. We understood that something had to change, and on the basis of the Moscow group we created the Interregional Deputy Group. I shall not discuss its organizational structure since a good deal has been written about that. But the form of management consisting of five co-chairman, it seems to me, has not justified itself. As soon as things come around to organizational questions, we start spinning our wheels. One co-chairman is afraid to show initiative, the third thinks that everything proceeds from the fourth, and the fourth... There is simply not enough time to have endless meetings and consultations. We are now searching for an optimal form of control and organization. Of course such a personality, for example, as Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov (when these lines were being written the country was saying farewell to him.—A.O.) will not engage in organizational issues—because of his job and because of his personal qualities. We are now creating a so-called rapid reaction group—at the sessions and at the congresses.

In the United States I met with the "minority" in congress and met their leaders. They work in grand style. This minority has 164 newspapers while we have only one information bulletin and even it has not gone beyond the first issue. We are hampered. We are always being hampered.

Part Two

90UN0742B Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 4 Jan 90 p 3

[Second of two-part interview with Boris Yeltsin by SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH correspondent Aleksandr Olbik, submitted on 25 November 1989: "42 Questions for Boris Yeltsin"]

[Text] [Olbik] From the standpoint of the MDG and from your own viewpoint have the people been given a government that can lead the country out of its impasse?

[Yeltsin] No, it has not.

[Olbik] Why do you think that?

[Yeltsin] There are many reasons. One of them is the critical shortage of talented administrators. Ones who are completely free of ideological dogmas. We should have created a firm foundation first: **We should have conducted a complete political reform** and then, based on it, we should have solved other key problems.

From a Radio Liberty interview with G. Starovoytova, a member of the Interregional Group, on 20 December 1989: "We are extremely dissatisfied with the work of the Second Congress of People's Deputies.... Andrey Dmitriyevich was also dissatisfied with it and the MDG was forced to change to different methods for its parliamentary struggle.... In a couple of days the MDG will be forced to declare itself as the parliamentary opposition."

[Olbik] Have we become the slightest bit wiser in the last year?

[Yeltsin] With respect to parliamentary activity, of course, experience is accumulating. But the hole in our bucket is getting bigger. Interethnic relations are becoming more strained. There is no doubt that the society and its parliament are moving more and more to the left while on the whole the leadership is moving to the right. There is more and more separation between the "shores." Unfortunately, Mikhail Sergeyevich has taken an appreciable step to the right, and it is probably not just Ligachev but the general secretary himself who is on the right wing. One gets the impression that he has invited society to enter an extremely complicated labyrinth of political relations, but does he himself know the way out of it....

[Olbik] What justification do you have for saying that?

[Yeltsin] The adoption of fundamental laws on property, land, and the press is bogged down in red tape. The unconcealed desire to keep Article 6 of the Constitution intact shows once again the adamant wish of the party elite to preserve their "leadership" which nobody recognizes. The attempt to fatten up the apparatus by increasing their wages—does that really not tell us something? It is time to recall a simple truth, that "the state is great only by virtue of the greatness of its peoples; that its correctly understood interest is linked essentially to their interests and, finally, that its duty is to make them happy." The same thing can be said about the leading party. But so far the party is lagging behind perestroyka and all the higher values are the same as they were. They are continuing to hang on to them tooth and nail just as they always have. Why are Shchelkov's relatives still confined for treatment in the fourth administration of the USSR Ministry of Health? It would be interesting to know how they are different in terms of the Homeland. At the time when Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov was exiled to Gorkiy, what was Shchelokov doing?

[Olbik] Muscovites say that the Mikoyan family ("from Ilich to Ilich"...) is "served" by a Chayka and two drivers to go with it. Gromyko's grandson has a Volga and also two drivers....

[Yeltsin] That is a completely "normal" phenomenon in Moscow. In my opinion there is a kind of cynical teasing of the people. Judge for yourself: The cost of food in an ordinary Moscow hospital is R1.5 [rubles] and in a special hospital of the fourth administration—from R3 to R9. When was the last time you, a journalist, had salmon with lemon? There you see.... But for patients in the special hospital this is everyday fare. For the time being the people are still being offered only spiritual food—thank God there is plenty of that. But the tragedy is that faith in perestroyka is waning as is faith in the apostle Mikhail Gorbachev. Because the concept of perestroyka as, incidentally, those of all preceding "reforms," was not scientifically substantiated. Of course it is not just our president who is to blame for this. Although we have a right to direct a large share of our reproaches to him—as the captain of our state ship.

The miners' strike is, after all, a deafening alarm, and just try not to listen to it. If the elite with their full set of the corresponding privileges and their pseudo-revolutionary projects wish to live as they used to, those on the bottom also want to live like human beings.

[Olbik] In my opinion, fate is preparing for Gorbachev the difficult lot of a martyr. Does he deserve such a heavy cross?

[Yeltsin] Perhaps he does not deserve it but he is surrounded by pharisees....

[Olbik] Boris Nikolayevich, it turns out that perestroyka has reached a certain phase of stagnation.

[Yeltsin] We do not have much choice left: Either radical (peaceful) changes or again—the bog, or an extraordinary situation with a dictatorship and an iron hand.

[Olbik] Incidentally, some people see Yeltsin as an iron hand.

[Yeltsin] Manipulators of public opinion are shouting about that from every corner. From time to time this canard flies out of the windows of officials of stagnation. Either Yeltsin has had a stroke, or he suffered two heart attacks, or he almost brought half of the Capital home with him.... The Muscovites, thank God, have figured out what is what and no longer talk about such things. Now there is another trend—Yeltsin the populist. As though this were a dirty word. A populist—and that says it all: A disturber of social peace, an underminer of the foundation of perestroyka, of the authority of its apologists. Excuse me but this is unscrupulous. I think that the people themselves will figure out without being prompted on behalf of what and against what the "populist" Yeltsin is working.

[Olbik] "Everyone swears that I am the son of Jupiter, but that wound divulges to everyone that I am a person...." This, Boris Nikolayevich, pertains to the above.

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY wrote in No 25 for this year: "The representative of the Summit Books publishing house announced that B.N. Yeltsin's memoirs would be published in the United States in 1990."

[Yeltsin] I have concluded a contract with an English lawyer—15 percent of the royalties from the publication of this book will go to him. I shall give my part of the royalties to the fight against AIDS. This lawyer turned out to be an extremely enterprising person: He went to the United States and organized an auction there. While the publishing firm offered him $150,000, as a result of the auction the publishing house acquired the publishing rights for $450,000. One book will cost $15.

[Olbik] Did you have problems with your trip to America?

[Yeltsin] In the Union they dragged their feet in filling out my exit documents until the last moment. In addition to a decision of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet it was also necessary to get an "OK" from the CPSU Central Committee where the documents gathered dust for a long time, even as the plane on which I was to cross the ocean was warming up its engines.

[Olbik] You are being reproached because while in the United States you were very complimentary about America. When did it dawn on you that you were in a strange country?

[Yeltsin] This was indeed the discovery of America. The people of this country are able to work with excellence and relax with good taste. They are not obsessive, they are quite free, and they live without looking back. On the streets I met many polite, smiling people. Did I see any of the social problems in America? That is not what I went there for—I have seen enough social problems at home to make me sick. I was not looking for the speck of dust in someone else's eye.

Now about how extremely complimentary I was.... I do not think so: I said what I thought was appropriate, the same things I would have said at home.

[Olbik] Would you not like to take back anything you said in the United States?

[Yeltsin] No way! Time and again I have been convinced that while developing our own model of socialism we must not cast off the 200 years of experience of American democracy.

But there is one statement I would like to deny. In America, when asked how I feel about the Pamyat Society, I said approximately the following: I do not know them and I do not wish to know them. I wish to take back the words, "I do not wish to." Such a haughty tone does not become a parliamentarian, the more so since it goes against my principles. I myself have suffered from the arrogance of bureaucrats and their refusal to communicate, when all around me was a real conspiracy of silence. Dialogue must be conducted with both formal and informal groups, with both the left and the right. The battle should be waged at the level of discussion and not mud slinging. The more so since Pamyat has many positive aspects and it is simply impossible not to take them into account.

[Olbik] Did the leader of Pamyat not pay you back in kind recently, when speaking on the program Vzglyad, when he blamed you for the fact that the Ipatyev House in Sverdlovsk was torn down supposedly with your permission....

[Yeltsin] This was a decision of the Politburo signed by Brezhnev. We were given three days to tear the house down. I asked the people who had sent the paper to Sverdlovsk—How am I to explain this to the people? "However you want to." They told me to take responsibility for everything. At that time I was the youngest first secretary of the obkom, and although I had teeth, they had not been sharpened yet. Days passed and the building was still standing. Then telephone calls started coming from Moscow: The building is old, it has no amenities, the people living in it were shot.... In a word, one night they leveled it and the spot was covered with asphalt—and K. Libknekht Street was no more.

[Olbik] In the Sverdlovsk newspaper NA SMENU, however, it says that "the single family dwelling where the tsar's family was shot was destroyed on initiative from Moscow (presumably by an order from the minister of internal affairs at that time, Shchelokov)."

[Yeltsin] No, that was done on orders from the Politburo.

[Olbik] Incidentally, about actions carried out at night.... They say that one night a memorial plaque in honor of Brezhnev disappeared from the house on Kutuzovskiy Prospekt where he lived.

[Yeltsin] I do not know the details but I can tell you one story that glorifies Ilich-II. In the campaign for magnifying Brezhnev's "genius," in Sverdlovsk they found the house where he worked as a landscaper during 1928-1929. People began to pressure me, wondering why there was no museum in this house. I asked: And the baptismal font in the town where he was born—did you line that with gold? The trough in which I, for example, was baptized you cannot even find now.... That was perhaps the first time I showed my disobedience—I did not submit to the decision of the Central Committee. They called me to Moscow and put me through the wringer. They sent me through the various offices until I got to Mikhail Sergeyevich who at that time was a member of the Politburo and secretary for agriculture. I was acquainted with him and we talked on the telephone once in a while. I went into his office and he asked me: Well, do you not agree with the Central Committee decision? I answered: I do not entirely agree.... He repeated that twice.

That is how the idea of creating a museum for Leonid Ilich in Sverdlovsk originated.

MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI—16 April 1989: "Of course Yeltsin has an advantageous position as the "shadow leader," a critic of that which is done poorly in real politics. The majority of his admirers engage in the same kind of criticism but, unlike Yeltsin, they have only one possibility of being heard. And they support a person who raises their ideas to the level at which decisions are made."

[Olbik] Since we began our conversation with historical parallels, allow me to continue the analogy. We are speaking about your "Declaration for the Press and Other Mass Media" of 17 October of this year. What is this—a translation of the Rubicon?

[Yeltsin] I stated in it what it is.

[Yeltsin] In the third point of the "Declaration" you make a threatening-defensive "gesture": "In the event that the persecution continues, I reserve the right to take the appropriate steps against people who impeach my honor and dignity as a citizen and deputy."

[Yeltsin] After they began to badger me I considered it necessary to warn those who were participating in this. I do not deny that I put words of warning in the ears of certain people who know how and with what I can defend myself and which measures I can take. (In connection with this issue I told Boris Yeltsin about how the editorial staff of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH "fought" for the publication of the "Declaration," uncompromisingly defending the right of a people's deputy to make declarations in the press. The editor of SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH, **Aleksandr Blinov** , his deputy **Svetlana Fesenko,** and the official secretary **Vladimir Shulakov,** unafraid of pressure from above, defended a main principle of human rights—the right to freedom of the press.—A.O.)

[Olbik] What was the reaction to your "Declaration"?

[Yeltsin] None so far.

[Olbik] You parliamentarians are very much enamored of the word "consensus." So is this principle not applicable in your relations with the person to whom your "Declaration" was actually "dedicated?"

[Yeltsin] This is not only about my relations with him—it is about restoring understanding between him and the society. His movement toward the "right wing" did not elevate him and did not increase his authority but, rather, created uncertainty and generated unhealthy doubts. A leader of his stature must not change course in politics without having considered all variants carefully.

[Olbik] Do you think that Mikhail Gorbachev has changed course?

[Yeltsin] I have already discussed that.

[Olbik] Are you prepared to discuss the question of an attempt on your life?

[Yeltsin] As you have probably been convinced, I do not back down before questions, even if I dislike them very much. Rumors are worse than any questions.

[Olbik] Incidentally, about rumors, Boris Nikolayevich. I heard this version: After meeting with the voters in Ramenki you supposedly went to Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov's dacha and there you ran into Mikhail Sergeyevich.... In a word, there was a disagreement between the two of you, a scandal and—they hosed you down with fire hoses... (Yeltsin laughed for a very long time.)

But you obviously lost a good deal of sleep over the story about the attempt on your life. There is much that is uncertain in that story which, incidentally, someone has used against you to his own advantage....

[Yeltsin] All right, it is not so terrible. You have in mind, Aleksandr Stepanovich, when Tikhomirov wrote that slanderous letter to MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA before the elections and many people thought that this blow would put me out of commission. But then the people quietly figured it out and the wheels of injustice began to turn in the opposite direction. I am convinced that that story "gave" me at least 15 percent of the voters. That is what is happening now. I am receiving hundreds of letters in which people express their support and understanding.

I always have had and always will have enemies—after all, this is no joking matter, politics. My statement yesterday at the session on increasing the wages of the apparatus will give me a couple thousand more enemies. Who likes it when his lollipop is taken away?

Now let us proceed from the other direction. **First.** Why was it that at the session of the Supreme Soviet they discussed so extensively such a personal problem—the attempt on my life? This never happens in the practice of any parliament. This means that somebody needed this. **Second.** At the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet I expressed a categorical protest against the discussion of my problem at the session, but this did not change things. **Third.** When USSR Minister of Internal Affairs Bakatin was speaking both his hands and his lips were trembling even though he can by no means be considered a weak person. He was disturbed because he was forced to speak and to speak a lie. **Fourth.** We have before us a discrepancy between what Bakatin said and what actually happened.

I left Ramenki (after the meeting with the voters—A.O.) at 2150 hours, although the minister of internal affairs stated that at 2100 hours I was already with the police patrol, that at the turn in the road where the police patrol was I stopped and shook hands with a policeman. This is a lie! It was also stated that the distance to the bridge is a couple of kilometers.... After Bakatin's speech hundreds of people went to the place of the "incident" and they all measured it—it turned out to be 900 meters. The height of the bridge is not 15 meters but only 4, and the depth of the river in that place is not "Bakatin's" 1.5 meters but 3.5.

I did not make any—official or semi-official—statements and therefore there is not the slightest reason for initiating a criminal case in connection with the attempt. No, it is more likely that the side that wanted to compromise me had the motivation.

[Olbik] So what really happened?

[Yeltsin] In the mass media more and more frequently one hears calls for order, a firm hand, a dictatorship which could calm down the reformers and for a certain amount of time take down the "scaffolding" of perestroyka. What is this—an accident? There have already been several attempts to lead the country into an emergency situation. It is a good thing that the deputies turned out to be wiser than those who raised this question for a vote. But what if they had not been?! They are looking for reasons and you can imagine how those Sverdlovsk or Moscow citizens would have reacted if they had been convinced that an attempt had really been made on my life.

I am hoping that as people gradually start thinking and comparing the facts they will understand what is happening. This understanding will come.

[Olbik] But still, Boris Nikolayevich, you were thrown from the bridge.

[Yeltsin] Tell me I can count on the fact that the people will figure all this out for themselves.

[Olbik] Undoubtedly.

[Yeltsin] Thank you. That is what I am counting on. I told Minister Bakatin that I had drawn a quite definite conclusion for myself: I will never walk or ride anywhere alone....

[Olbik] But today you went to work at the Moskva Hotel on the trolley....

[Yeltsin] Well, of course, I do that.... But on the trolley I am not alone. I am with people there and I am not afraid.

From B. Yeltsin's speech at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies: "The economic reform needs the support of the congress and the people and the creation of a multisectoral economy is the cornerstone of the economic reform. What is the government suggesting? The growth of the administrative system into a market economy. Is it really not clear that such a hybrid is not viable? We must finally take a position that is clear and comprehensible to everyone: Anything that will make it possible to feed the country is expedient."

[Olbik] The newspaper PRAVDA (like, incidentally, other mass official press organs) has lost one-third of its subscribers. Many people link this to the publication by PRAVDA of odious material from the Italian newspaper REPUBBLIKA which discusses your visit to the United States.

[Yeltsin] Translators have compared the text—the Russian version with the Italian—and have come to the conclusion that the article was most likely initially written in Russian and then translated into Italian. Its author had trained in Russia at one time and was personally acquainted with the editor of PRAVDA, Afanasyev. Various versions are possible here. But whatever the case may be, I shall never believe that Afanasyev—this 100- percent market competitor who is afraid of his own shadow—made such a decision himself. In order to print such an unconscionable lie it was necessary to have strong support in the Kremlin. At the Central Committee Plenum I told Afanasyev approximately the following: If we were to settle this as men, we would have to.... But I would knock you down, and lying there on the floor would be a piece of something, and the members of the Central Committee would have to look at that piece of something.... I despise you....

I turned around and left. Sometimes I am sorry that the time of duels has passed.

From Boris Yeltsin's conversation with the voters in Ramenki: Question: "Do you not think it is time for PRAVDA to change its name?" Answer: "I think it is time to replace everyone who deals in insinuations, including in the Politburo of the Central Committee,"—stated B. Yeltsin.

Aleksandr Olbik. Riga-Moscow-Riga. 25 November 1989.

Reasons for CPSU Defections Examined

PM2601152390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 90 Second Edition p 1

["Editor's Opinion" by Aleksandr Ilin, PRAVDA editor for Party Life Desk: "Is Link Sound?"]

[Text] The letter was brief and disheartening: "I am quitting the CPSU's ranks as the party has lost touch with me."

My first reaction was this: The guy has gotten carried away! It is not he who has lost touch with the party but, you see, the party that has lost touch with him.... Does the comrade not have too high an opinion of himself? And who is he, in fact—a famous cosmonaut, a popular writer, a leading light of science? Nothing of the sort. Then why does he claim a special status?

Stop, stop—why special? Does not every party member have the right to reckon on the involvement of his communist comrades in his destiny? On joining the party, does he alone assume responsibilities to it, while the party has no obligations to him?

I foresee the indignation of uncompromising readers: Does the author not wish to justify a "deserter" whom the party has supposedly shortchanged in some way? Is he not advocating privileges for Communists—for the sake of which some people sought to secure a party card in recent years? I hasten to assure you: I am not justifying or defending those who associated or now associate their presence in the party with a prestigious career "portfolio" or unjust benefits. And I am not calling for those who have suddenly been prevented from making a new career—this time out of criticizing and denying the party—to be retained in its ranks by hook or by crook. The sooner we rid ourselves both of calculating self-seekers and of "knights of the phrase," the more easily real communists will start breathing and the more successfully perestroyka will proceed in the party.

However, I cannot agree with those who frivolously believe: A person has submitted his request—good riddance to him, we will do without him.... Is this so? Will a detachment which does not notice the loss of a fighter today be battle-worthy tomorrow? First one fighter, then another.... Customarily repeating that the party serves the people, we frequently forget that the people consist of individuals and that the party itself is not some suprahuman force in which "the unit is zero, the unit is nonsense." Yes, an organization increases its strength tenfold. But only if everyone in it is a vivid individual. If it unites people in an organization and there is a living, full-blooded link with the organization rather than mechanical "membership." If the organization helps a person to find himself and to become spiritually richer and morally purer, if work in the party (precisely work, not just presence) ennobles him and fills his life with noble meaning.

Let us recall the chief idea of the "Communist Manifesto": Each person's free development is a condition of the free development of all. This should not be forgotten by the latter-day critics of Marx who arrogantly discourse on the dogmatism of his theory and extrapolate from it both Stalinism and all our troubles on the complex post-October path. Not that this reminder applies only to critics—it applies to us all. For movement toward a society which will embody truly democratic, humanist ideals is today the practical substance of our perestroyka. How are we to lead others toward the great goal without creating first of all an atmosphere of democracy, humanism, and creativity in our own party home?

We still have to cure completely one of the "congenital" defects of Stalinism—the communist's alienation from the party and from involvement in its policy-making. Many decisions were adopted in the party's name and, thus, in the name of each of its members, and various deeds, sometimes bad and impure, were carried out. The party's stratification into "generals" and "privates" occurred. The former made decisions, the latter were obliged to carry them out. This was "sanctified" by the letter of the Statutes. Moreover, the Stalinist party "generals" occupying the top rungs of the multistory hierarchy which they themselves created shamelessly flouted the statutory rights of the majority of "privates." They dictated to all the rest not only how to act but also how to think, punishing the slightest dissidence severely and not even stopping at most brutal repression.

Can it be said that all this happened only in days long gone? Fortunately, much has changed and much has vanished never to return. But, alas, much has not yet been eliminated. An atmosphere of party comradeship has not yet replaced the stilted official climate of relations between the "top" and the "bottom," between the apparatus and members of elected organs. There are even cases of victimization for criticism—there is no way we will get accustomed to the direct views of party comrades....

I understand perestroyka in the party as a return to the person, to humanity in relations between communists. As the demolition of the suprahuman hierarchical structure in which the will of party members means nothing and the diktat of officials means everything. As the acquisition by every communist of inner freedom and his own dignity which nourishes conscious discipline, creative initiative, and readiness to act in his party's ranks for the sake of its cause.

A stony route leads up to the pass of perestroyka. Whoever has walked in the mountains knows how frequently—it would be better to say always—both the success of the climb and the mountaineer's very life depend primarily on the reliability and the human fortitude of the people to whom you are roped. A single hesitation is sufficient to make your head spin and drain your strength.... I am reminded of this by the brief letter with which I began my ponderings. Yet we will not be slaves to the analogy. Life is not a sport. How easy it is to yield to temptation and to shout after someone who has left the route: Weakling! Seven do not wait for one! Look, what do you want...! Do you and I not want the same thing and perceive as a bitter insult inattention or indifference to our fate? But—let us admit honestly—are we ourselves always attentive and responsive to others, are we capable of striding toward a weakened person, stretching out our hand to him, and trying to breathe our own strength and warmth into him? Do we strive not only to be heard, but also ourselves to hear and understand?

Let us recall how we are sometimes intolerant of another's opinion, trying to measure everything—from history to family relations—with our own yardstick. Or we demand punishment for someone who is sincerely (frequently only in our view) going astray and who seeks and awaits not a shout but advice. The attaching of sticky labels has become an everyday business—as though the very complex dialectics of life can be reduced (out of tragic habit, perhaps) to the separation of society into sworn friends of perestroyka and its inveterate enemies....

In the thunder of the "struggle" we have already repeatedly lost sight of the person. Yet it was for his sake, it seemed, that verbal cannonades thundered and lances were broken in arguments and debates. Perhaps the time has come to check the broken link and to restore and adjust it? To endeavor to hear the voice of everyone who hopes to be heard.

Then there is a hope that we will be heard, too.

'Democratic Platform of CPSU' Adopted

LD2201010190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 21 Jan 90

[Video report by correspondent D. Kiselev on All-Union Conference of Country's Party Clubs held in Moscow 20-21 January; from "Seven Days" program]

[Text] [Kiselev] [Video shows conference in progress] An all-union conference of the country's party clubs was held in Moscow yesterday and today, at which the so-called Democratic Platform of the CPSU was adopted [russ demokraticheskaya platform kpss]. This document calls for a multiparty system, for the CPSU to be turned into a parliamentary-type party, for it to reject the principles of democratic centralism, and for the abolition of Article 6 of the Constitution. The movement which has been formed within the party proposes its own variant of the party rules and sets itself the aim of winning a majority at the 28th party congress. One condition alone is required for this, these communists consider—the holding of direct and secret elections of the congress delegates from a choice of candidates representing various platforms. The corresponding proposals have been submitted to the CPSU Central Committee. [video shows banners around conference hall reading: Choice of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress is the affair of rank and file communists; authority according to merit, not by order]

[Begin recording] [G.Kh. Popov, member of the Coordinating Council of the CPSU Democratic Platform, at rostrum addressing conference] It is quite obvious that without perestroyka of not only the local soviets, to which power is being transferred, but also without perestroyka of those same structures from which power is being transferred, we shall not get things moving at all. The huge majority of all the ills of our perestroyka over the last 5 years is connected precisely with the fact that we devote a great deal of thought to how to change where power is going, but devote no thought at all to whence we derive that power. As a result, we get one contradiction after the next, each worse than the one before.

[V.N. Lysenko, member of the Coordinating Council of the CPSU Democratic Platform, at rostrum addressing conference] The January plenum of the CPSU Central Committee will, I think, be a watershed: If it is like the preceeding one, then when it ends, a whole series of communists—and many are already talking about this—will leave the party. The barometer of public opinion will, I think, change completely in regard to the party, and in a negative direction. [end recording]

[Kiselev] [video shows delegates looking at ATMODA journal in foyer, map of conference delegates' areas, delegate interviewed] Meanwhile, in the foyer of the Moscow Aviation Institute, appropriate literature is on sale. It was here that I met Dr Shastakovskiy, rector of the CPSU Central Committee Higher Party School, one of the 56 members of the newly-elected Coordinating Council of the Democratic Platform.

[Begin recording] [Shastakovskiy] One must honestly admit that our party has, for many years, failed to function as a political organization in the precise meaning of that word. It has functioned as a sort of bureaucratic structure at which was established the power of the minority (?not the rank and file member. The so-called rank and file were the generals, marshal, and non-commissioned officers brought in by Stalin, that was the party of the rank and file). The rank and file member essentially had no real opportunity—nor does he have today—of influencing the drawing up of party-wide policy, the formation of (? elected) structures including the Central Committee of the Party and other central bodies; he is in fact without rights in his organization. We propose, as a way towards the radical renewal of the party, as, more precisely a strategic course for this radical renewal, establishing in the party the power of the party mass, the formation of organizational structures and statute norms that would guarantee and ensure this.

[Kiselev] But what is involved here is the formation of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU. Are you not afraid of being accused of splitting?

[Shastkovskiy] I said in my address that all attempts at an actual split would at present be untimely, to put it mildly. The political situation in the country is very complex. As the saying goes, this is no time for joking. I do not think this is a split: It is, all the same, an attempt to breathe new life into and galvanize the process of renewal of the party. [end recording]

[Kiselev] Delegates from 102 towns around the country took part in the conference.

Ideological Commission Discusses Lenin Legacy

LD2601234390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1840 GMT 26 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 26 Jan (TASS)—The routine session of the CPSU Central Committee's Ideological Commission, which took place 26 January in Moscow, was devoted to issues regarding the active use of the theoretical legacy of V.I. Lenin in the course of restructuring. Leaders of ideological establishments, scientists and social scientists, cultural figures, and party personnel took part in it.

V.A. Medvedev, chairman of the commission, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, who opened the session, said that in 3 months time the 120th anniversary of the birth of V.I. Lenin is to be marked. In past years Lenin anniversaries were turned into pompous events and were accompanied by unrestrained eulogy from the then leadership. Assurances of following Lenin's principles acquired a more and more ritual character. People swore by them, but did not follow them.

Today, the topicality of turning to the Lenin legacy is dictated not by considerations of anniversaries but by the real demands of our public development, by profound reformations of all aspects of life, and by difficult processes in the sphere of public consciousness. Restructuring has posed with full acuteness the problem of genuinely creative interpretation of Lenin's legacy, and of understanding Lenin as a theoretician, politician, and person. Now, when Soviet society has embarked on the cleansing road of self-knowledge and self-renewal, there can be no place in our spiritual life for a lie about Lenin—whether apologetic or slandering.

A discussion then took place in which there were speeches by G.L. Smirnov, director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee; I.T. Frolov, chief editor of the PRAVDA newspaper; I.I. Antonovich, pro-rector of the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee; playwright M.F. Shatrov; A.A. Belyayev, chief editor of the SOVETSKAYA KULTURA newspaper; V.N. Kudryavtsev, vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences; R.G. Yanovskiy, rector of the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU; Yu.A. Krasin, rector of the Institute of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee; G.I. Marchuk, president of the USSR Academy of Sciences; N.N. Maslov, professor of the Moscow Higher Party School; M.F. Nenashev, chairman of Gosteleradio; V.V. Chikin, chief editor of the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA newspaper; V.G. Zakharov, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers; V.A. Kuptsov, first secretary of the Vologda Oblast

CPSU Committee; and G.A. Yagodin, chairman of the State Committee for Education.

V.A. Medvedev summed up the results of the discussion. He devoted special attention to the need for an objective evaluation of the ideological and theoretical legacy of V.I. Lenin and to the resolution of a dual task: Ridding Leninism of dogmatic encrustations and defending it against the latest falsifiers; and the creative development of Leninism in close contact with the solution of tasks concerning the socialist renewal of our society. The Central Committee secretary noted that these issues are at the center of the pre-congress discussion which is unfolding more and more broadly.

The results of the activity of the commission in 1989 were discussed, and a plan for its work in the current year was adopted.

People's Deputy Views Rule-of-Law State

PM1201105090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Jan 90 Second Edition p 4

[Article by USSR People's Deputy Academician V. Kudryavtsev under rubric "Questions of Theory: Discussion Platform": "On Way to Rule-of-Law State"]

[Text] The urgent need to develop a rule-of-law state in our country is becoming increasingly widely recognized. This attention to a question that until recently could very well have been called "academic," that is, abstract and remote from pressing needs, is no accident. The creation of a rule-of-law state is one of society's real needs, an immediate task of our time.

The idea of a rule-of-law state is today associated with at least two things: Order in the state and the protection of the citizen. Naturally, we are talking about interconnected elements of a single whole: A way of organizing state and social life so that every person can count on the predictability, consistency, and reliability of decisions adopted by the state, have firm confidence in his own present and future, and know that his rights and duties are clearly defined and safeguarded by law.

Alas, this is not yet the case today. Firstly, it is not the case in the economy. No one has confidence in tomorrow, be he a miner, kolkhoz member, cooperative member, or pensioner. It is not the case in political life. There is no stability in everyday human relationships, spiritual culture, or ethical standards of behavior: Even at the Congress some people's deputies, unembarrassed by the countrywide (indeed, worldwide) relay, permitted themselves to violate these standards.... To say nothing of the grave interethnic conflicts. All this naturally generates a thirst for order, stability, and truth. But where to find them, how to ensure them, if not in a rule-of-law state, through laws?

Acute emotions are manifested in all these aspirations—emotions that are founded, incidentally, on the distressing experience of life over many years in the past. But there is also another aspect to this demand. It is associated with the new social, economic, and political realities—the processes of renewal of all aspects of our life, which were generated by perestroyka and must develop actively.

A renewed, human, democratic socialism: Is it possible, outside the rule-of-law form? No, it is not possible. Furthermore, what it needs is not just any legal framework, but a very solid juridical substructure differing radically from the patterns of the administrative edict system and at the same time having nothing in common with lawless anarchy.

The idea of creating a rule-of-law state, as historical experience shows, can arise and be developed in various socioeconomic formations. In itself it is panhuman, although it is interpreted and implemented in different ways depending on social class interests, national traditions, the level of cultural development, and many other factors. Socialism is in principle capable of creating economic, social, and political conditions such that the formation of a rule-of-law state would be indissolubly linked with the democratization of social life and the implementation of true people's power.

For us, this process was slow and difficult. After the 1917 revolution a new, socialist legal system began to develop in the country, based on the principles of equality and social justice. The transition to the new economic policy created a basis for the establishment of the idea of the rule of law [zakonnost]. But that policy did not last long. Disregard for elementary legal principles and their most flagrant flouting resulted in enormous political, social, and moral losses for our society. After all, the law [pravo] is indissolubly linked to morality and is called upon to establish the ideas of freedom and human dignity and to promote the attainment of social justice. Acts of lawlessness sever socialism from morality, from its own fundamental principles and values; they inevitably entail the deformation of the socialist system.

It would, of course, be naive to reduce all the causes of deformations solely to deviations from rule-of-law principles and the imperfection of legal mechanisms. Nonetheless, given a society with a high level of legal civilization, which presupposes firm protection of the inviolability of the individual, freedom of opinion, and protection of the individual's honor and dignity and erects barriers against the imposition of restrictions on democracy, the deformation of the socialist social system would become considerably more difficult.

We are now again returning to these problems. But in a new way, with a comparatively full understanding of our past, and indeed the present. However, the ways of building our legal and political future require in-depth study.

In this connection, a fundamental question must be answered first of all: What does the concept of a socialist rule-of-law state mean? Can the term "rule-of-law state" be qualified by an adjective: Socialist, bourgeois, feudal, and so forth? Is a state qualified by such an adjective truly a rule-of-law state?

I think these questions can only be answered from a historical standpoint. Two conclusions suggest themselves: First, in every historical epoch ideas on the legal forms of organization of state and social life have changed and evolved. There is therefore every reason to speak of a rule-of-law state and its specific characteristics in different socioeconomic formations (and, indeed, to speak of concepts that have not been put into practice). Second, any concept of a rule-of-law state (and its implementation in practice) contains several principles, as a minimum: the panhuman, the class, the national, the cultural and historical, and so forth. All these principles are present in the concept of the socialist rule-of-law state.

Indeed, many elements of this concept have a clearly manifested panhuman nature. The law itself is a social, cultural, historical, panhuman value. To put it in more concrete terms, the following are panhuman: The ideas of the dominance of right in society's life, the paramountcy of the law; the recognition of the significance of human rights; the theory of the separation of powers; the proposition that "everything that is not banned, is permitted," and much more. It would probably be impossible to name a single principle forming part of the concept of the socialist rule-of-law state that was not formulated long before our time or does not have analogues in states existing today that belong to different social systems.

At the same time the concept of the socialist rule-of-law state is not confined to panhuman values. The class principle is also present in it, and is very clearly expressed. Suffice it to say that very many principles of the rule-of-law state, when they are put into practice, reflect and defend values that are specifically socialist: People's power and political democracy; the paramountcy of social tasks; collectivism and social ownership as the economic basis of society; and others. The very nature of the activity of the rule-of-law state is determined by the socialist interpretation of justice, which is based on the thesis: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his labor."

The socialist rule-of-law state should not only proclaim human rights and enshrine them in the Constitution and laws, but should really guarantee and defend them. While including the rights and freedoms that are generally recognized by the world community, at the same time it should not tolerate standards of behavior that our society has rejected, such as racial and national discrimination and the exploitation of man by man. This is one manifestation of the socialist choice in our economic and political development. The social aspect is equally plainly seen in the operation of the principle "everything that is not banned, is permitted." After all, the list of prohibitions is far from identical in different social formations. The ideals are different, and the ideas on the just organization of society are also different. The rule-of-law state therefore cannot be identical in differing sociohistorical conditions.

The demand for the formation of a socialist rule-of-law state is not a whim, but an objective challenge of our times.

In economic terms, renewed socialism is impossible without a rule-of-law state, because its entire economic system must, it is presupposed, be built on civil law principles. Chief among these is the economic autonomy of entities engaging in property relations and their independence of each other. The socialist market is conceivable only as a relationship between free property-owning entities. That means that each of them must be comprehensively protected and guaranteed both against the encroachments of the "exchequer" and against contractors' diktat. Therefore, it is very important quickly to adopt laws on ownership, land, and local self-management and other acts that create the legal basis of the new economy.

In the political sphere, the socialist rule-of-law state is called upon to provide the conditions for pluralism of opinion and action for citizens and organizations within the framework of the Constitution and the laws. The uncertainty of a situation in which, supposedly, "everything is permitted," but no one knows what is actually banned, is fraught with the risk of unpredictable excesses as well as recurrences of the edict system. That is why it is necessary—and the sooner the better—to adopt legislative acts strengthening and guaranteeing people's political activeness: Laws on the press, on freedom of conscience, on social organizations and movements, and on the rights of small peoples, and other norms without which it is impossible to restore a democratic civil society.

In the sphere of everyday life, which in our country traditionally comes last, the creation of legal guarantees is equally urgent. The citizen is not yet protected in the most elementary manifestations of his daily activity in life, from relations with housing organs to trade enterprises. It is well known that the Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the USSR and the union republics and civil codes exist, but only someone very naive would resort to them to protect his rights against the administration of a workshop, vegetable store, or railroad station. Go to court!—we do not have any other, simpler mechanism for protecting property interests or resolving conflicts.

These are only small illustrations of what people expect from the rule-of-law state in their daily affairs. Naturally, the tasks of the renewed legal system are incomparably larger and wider. The rule-of-law state is linked in the most inseparable way to the socialist civic society; it is called upon to promote its emergence, establishment, and development.

The formation of a socialist rule-of-law state offers the opportunity to adopt a new, wider approach to the problems of human rights. These are not only the rights of the individual, but also the rights of nations and ethnic groups and labor collectives, and, finally, the rights of the minority in cases where questions are decided by the will of the majority (of deputies, voters, members of a social organization, and so forth). All these questions need detailed study and thorough normative and legal regulation.

The establishment of the principles of the rule-of-law state is today put forward as a most important condition without which it is impossible to free society from everything associated with the consequences of the personality cult, administrative edict methods of management, bureaucracy, the alienation of working people from power, and deviations from the Leninist norms of party and state life. To free society in this way, it is necessary resolutely to reinterpret the widespread ideas of the "primacy" of the state over the law and abandon the stereotypes that have grown up over the decades in this sphere.

Relapses into this approach have by no means been eradicated yet. That is why the idea of a rule-of-law state is not only a definition of practical measures and the principles of its creation, but also a most important ideological and moral milestone in the reorientation of the people's consciousness and the establishment of their decisive role in the life of society and the state.

The formation of a socialist rule-of-law state entails specific actions. They can be divided into three groups.

First, great importance is attached to the very fact of the proclamation of this goal and its theoretical interpretation and social recognition. After all, formerly in our political life the concept in question was not only not recognized, it was deemed blasphemous and non-Marxist.

Until the seventies, scholars were reluctant to write about a rule-of-law state under socialism. Clearly, in our time the situation has changed radically. The very fact that the task of building a rule-of-law state under socialism has been put forward by our party (as well as by many other communist and workers' parties) is a fact of historic significance. It substantially changes our political and legal ideology in this sphere.

Second, there are the concrete legal innovations necessary in order to ensure that the process of formation of a rule-of-law state does not remain only on paper. A substantial part of this work has already been done: There have been important changes in the organs of political powre. A working USSR Supreme Soviet has been created, and a government answerable to it and a Constitutional Oversight Committee have been elected; the principle of separation of powers is being gradually put into practice, and the judicial system is strengthening.

But that, of course, is not everything. Specialists have proposed a long list of juridical measures that should be implemented to ensure the fuller exercise in practice of just one principle—the universal safeguarding and protection of citizens' rights. This list includes the creation of effective legal mechanisms for ensuring and defending such "traditional" citizens' rights and freedoms as the right to labor and to education, the right of personal ownership, the right of inheritance, and so forth; the consistent implementation of international policy in the sphere of human rights on the basis of the new political thinking; and so forth.

Third, in speaking of practical ways of forming a socialist rule-of-law state we must not forget the legal education of the population and officials. After all, one can create correct, sensible, progressive laws, but if they are not observed, or if they simply remain unknown to the citizens, then we will not have created a rule-of-law state. Yet the level of legal knowledge remains very low. There is not enough legal literature, and the study of the fundamentals of state and legal structures has not been organized everywhere. But it is not only a question of knowing about specific norms, there are more important problems, too. Among them is, for instance, the establishment in the mass consciousness of those truths and legal principles without which a civilized society is inconceivable.

The difficulty here is that when certain fundamental legal principles have not been assimilated in society, the building of a new legal system could prove malformed and one-sided. Especially if it is built in a stressful situation. A specific example: the formulation of urgent measures to step up the struggle against organized crime. There are all kinds of proposals here, and many of them, unfortunately, are far removed from socialist rule-of-law ideals. In the course of the struggle against organized crime it has emerged that witnesses to crimes (such as racketeering, robbery, and bribery) are afraid to appear in court. So this proposal was put forward: Let us do without public questioning of witnesses and confine ourselves to the militia statement. A "compromise" idea was also suggested: Let the witness appear in court... under a pseudonym! Why not in a mask, as in the times of the Inquisition? After all, from the viewpoint of the violation of the principles of public and direct court proceedings, the difference is not very great.

In enshrining in legislative form the freedom of society and the individual, the state itself cannot be free from restrictions on its own decisions and actions. In adopting laws and other decisions it takes on commitments of a domestic and foreign policy nature which it must fulfill without fail, ensuring justice in its relations with the citizen, social organizations, other states, and the entire international community. Confidence in the state can easily be undermined by the instability of normative acts, the abandonment of assurances given earlier, and decisions adopted behind the scenes. This was spoken of repeatedly at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. The draft Law on Ownership in the USSR makes provision for the compulsory payment of damages by the state if it occasions such damages to a property owner. That is an important step forward in strengthening the legal relations between the state and citizens.

A rule-of-law state is inconceivable without clear and concrete legal accountability measures against any officials violating their duties under the law. Behind every unfulfilled obligation is a specific person or group of persons, and without their real accountability one cannot expect to increase the effectiveness of the activity of ministries, departments, and party organs. In other words, the rule-of-law state must have the support of an efficient machinery of legal responsibility.

The principles of a rule-of-law state are not a toy. In essence they are objective laws of social life, as strict as the laws of nature. They can, of course, be ignored, but the result will the the same as we see when we ignore the laws of economics or ecology. We must learn this truth, and the sooner the better.

Ryabev 'Confident' on Kuzbass Visit Results

LD2901181790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 29 Jan 90

[From "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] We have just received the following report: The government commission led by Ryabev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, which is in Kuzbass, has completed the examination and discussion of progress in implementing the protocols signed by the government commission last July. On the whole, the dialogue between the government commission and the workers' committees was productive. In the course of the talks, however, the sides' views on a number of issues failed to coincide. Differences on clauses relating to regional financial autonomy and granting full independence to enterprises had their effect. You will agree that these are important clauses. Therefore, it was mutually agreed to set up a commission, which will include members of the USSR Supreme Soviet, to examine the interpretations on which the sides' views do not coincide. Commenting on the results of the government commission's stay in Kuzbass, Ryabev, its leader, maintained that after the commissions's visit, despite the fact that a final protocol had not been signed, he was even more confident that everything that had been entered in the summer accords will be fulfilled in full. Some shortcomings in the field of supplies for individual construction sites are not excluded, however.

Commission Examines KGB Archive Destruction

LD2601185590 Vilnius in Lithuanian to North America 0100 GMT 26 Jan 90

[Text] A commission of deputies that is examining the protection of documents at the archives of state offices has met under the chairmanship of Algirdas Brazauskas, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party [LiCP] Central Committee. The meeting was attended by Presidium Deputy Chairmen Vanda Klikuniene and Eduardas Miezelaitis; Presidium Secretary Liudvikas Sabutis; Presidium members Romualdas Ozolas and Kazimieras Motieka; Deputies Petras Ignotas, Stanislovas Imbrasas, and Jurate Kupliauskiene; USSR People's Deputies Julius Juzeliunas and Mecys Laurinkus; and Supreme Soviet Deputy Eduardas Eismontas, chairman of the Security Committee.

There was a heated discussion at the meeting. Supreme Soviet member Romualdas Ozolas told Vilnius radio that it was sufficiently proved today that the KGB archives were being destroyed and removed, although not all facts known to him were produced at the meeting.

Romualdas Ozolas is the main accuser of the KGB chairman. His arguments about the destruction of archives started last year at a Supreme Soviet session. According to Romualdas Ozolas, at today's meeting Eduardas Eismontas clearly admitted such accusations, stating that he would continue his work in accordance with the USSR KGB's instructions. The Supreme Soviet decision has instructed all the holders of Lithuania's archives, disregarding various departmental instructions, to protect the funds until the law on the Lithuanian archives is passed. According to Romualdas Ozolas, that part of the KGB files which should be protected according to this instruction, is also being destroyed. Eduardas Eismontas stated at the meeting that a large part of the archives consists of personal or service files of former KGB employees. They are pensioners now. Eduardas Eismontas did not disclose at the meeting that in this situation he consults with or gets concrete instructions from Moscow. He noted that the KGB is not only a state office, but also a military unit and the he, although a general, must carry out his instructions like a soldier.

In the opinion of Romualdas Ozolas, up to now there has been a certain selection in the destruction of files, but now one might guess that there would be a lot of haste.

Romualdas Ozolas said that Algirdas Brazauskas, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, listened with attention to all arguments, then stressed in a correct manner that the KGB was under the jurisdiction of the republic although it came under union administration. Therefore, Eduardas Eismontas should carry out the decision of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. If he did not want not carry it out, or could not carry it out, he had to consult the republic's leadership. Unfortunately, he did not do this, Algirdas Brazauskas noted.

According to Romualdas Ozolas, Eduardas Eismontas agreed with this. At the meeting, Kazimieras Motieka and Romualdas Ozolas expressed no confidence in the KGB chairman, and said that they would repeat this publicly and officially at the next Supreme Soviet Session. However, this does not mean that one would quietly wait for that session at the beginning of February.

Attempts will be made tomorrow and the day after tomorrow to solve this matter in a positive manner, Romualdas Ozolas said.

Conference on Police Work Held in Moscow

LD3001151490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] A conference was held today in the Main Administration of Internal Affairs of the Moscow City Executive Committee, which summed up the results of its work over the past year.

The situation in the town continues to be complex, Lieutenant General Bogdanov, head of the Main Administration, USSR deputy internal affairs minister, stressed in his report. The growth of crime is caused in particular by the difficulties in solving economic tasks, and the worsening of public discipline. Both the degree of organization and aggression of the criminal element has increased. Mercenary aims, boldness and cruelty are showing through more clearly when attacks are made using weapons and the latest in technology. But even in these conditions, the members of the Moscow militia solved more than a third more crimes in 1989 than in the previous year, and with practically the same strength. The criminal investigation department detained 178 active members of criminal gangs, which had divided the city into spheres of influence.

With the beginning of economic reform, the criminal activity of those with contacts with foreign firms has been stepped up. The situation in the cooperative movement is not good.

The conference noted that at the present time, the fight against dangerous, organized forms of crime is a task for the state. Success can only be achieved when not only the efforts of all services are combined, but when a reliable link with society has also been made.

Comrade Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, took part in the conference.

Head of Central TV Programming Interviewed

LD3101031190

[Editorial Report] Moscow GOVORIT I POKAZYVAYET MOSKVA in Russian 29 January Issue No. 5 page 1 carries an interview with V.L. Bogdanov, identified as newly appointed general director of the General Directorate of Programs of Central Television, by an unidentified correspondent.

Asked how the Programs Directorate considers viewers' wishes concerning programs, Bogdanov says: "Central Television last year received more than 2 million letters." Viewers make complaints and put forward suggestions. "We believe that today the channels of Central Television are very similar to each other. They copy each other not only in form and genre, but also in content. Our efforts are being directed toward making them different, and alternatives to each other. Alternatives not only in content, but in task, function, and manner of communicating with the viewer."

The interviewer asks: "Readers will be interested to know what, specifically, is being done in this direction?"

Bogdanov responds: "Bearing in mind television viewers' wishes as expressed in letters, we are now thinking about how we can improve the morning programs. The "120 Minutes" program, which has become a favorite with many, needs to be renewed. Therefore, a new model of morning programs is being worked out together with psychologists, sociologists, and creative staff which should give an optimistic send-off to television viewers that will last the whole day.

"In February we are going to carry out an experiment. We are planning night programs on the First Program of Central Television on Fridays and Saturdays after 2400 [2100 GMT]. They consist of a summary news bulletin, a feature film, and a concert. We expect to make the night program a daily event from the beginning of the second quarter."

Bogdanov outlines possible improvements to the format of the New Year's festive programs which people have complained about this year.

The interviewer asks: "Does Central Television have a system for repeating films, plays, and the most significant programs?"

Bogdanov answers: "Several different channel models are being worked out in Central Television at the present time. One of these is a channel of round-the-clock broadcasting in blocks. For example, each block would consist of 8 hours of original programs which would be repeated three times in the course of a 24-hour period for all the regions of the country, from Brest to Kamchatka. But this is in the near future. The problem of repeats still exists today."

Bogdanov categorizes the different kinds of repeats that can occur. He speaks of the importance of the style and way of life of Soviet people as a topic for treatment; of the reasons for last- minute changes to program schedules; of the role of the commentator as program announcer and the continuing role of the announcer.

The interviewer asks: "Vsevolod Leonidovich, what other forms of public opinion studies on programs, besides viewers' letters, do you propose to use in Central Television?"

Bogdanov replies: "It seems to me that regular news conferences are capable of greatly improving television programs. The first such meeting of leaders of the USSR State Television and Radio with representatives of the press has already taken place. It was shown on Central Television and was broadcast on the radio. In the future, these news conferences will take place no less frequently than once every 2 months.

"A center for sociological research has been set up under the General Directorate. I hope that this will become a center for communications with television viewers in both directions. In addition, we are setting up the Institute of Public Opinion of USSR State Radio and Television Committee. Its task is to study not just the problems of television, the ratings of programs and of announcers, but also political, economic, and social issues of perestroyka.

"We will use the results of this research in programs. It will be possible to hold a session of the Institute of Public Opinion in the Ostankino concert studio, inviting viewers to attend and broadcasting the event live.

"In conclusion, I want to say that all our work can be seen by the viewers. They are the only people who should decide the extent to which we are working productively and the extent to which we are taking their interests into account."

'New Style' Commercial TV Channel Planned

LD3001231690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2122 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Here is information for television fans. The setting up of a special commercial television channel is planned, dealing with the problems of the family, upbringing, and career. This is one of the aims of the association of business cooperation with foreign firms. This association is called New Style [Novyy Stil]. Among its founders is the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, the Soviet-Swedish enterprises (Inmed), the Svetogorsk association, and others. New Style is also preparing to produce and sell videocassettes, to publish the magazines ON and ONA [HE and SHE], and to engage in the manufacture of clothing and the construction of hotels, and thus to facilitate the formation of a new modern form and style of Soviet person.

Readers Cited on Coverage of Congress, E. Europe

PM2501114990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by IZVESTIYA letters department editor Yuriy Orlik under rubric "Reading the Mail": "No Compliments About IZVESTIYA"]

[Excerpts] In October last year we wrote about things that IZVESTIYA is being criticized for. Now once again quite a lot of letters have accumulated containing remarks and proposals addressed to the newspaper and readers' thoughts about what the editorial office is doing and what it is not. As last time, let us make the proviso that all letters to the newspaper containing declarations of love—for which we are grateful, of course—are left out of this review. [passage omitted]

Readers' opinions about the stenographic reports of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies have a direct bearing on the discussion about increasing the newspaper's informativeness. I recall May last year—the opening of the Congress. The editorial mailbag was full of gratitude to IZVESTIYA precisely for publishing the stenographic reports. In December the Congress renewed its work, and the newspaper once again began to print the stenographic reports of it, but gratitude was encountered less and less in your letters. It is not a question of the character of the discussions, but of the fact realized by an increasing number of readers that a newspaper by its very nature cannot be a collection of speeches, and that the drama of the Congress, which to a certain degree is dependent on the television screen, dies when it gets to the newspaper page. "Thick issues of IZVESTIYA carrying the transcript of the Congress arrive and almost immediately end up as waste paper," L. Kazmin writes from the city of Shakhta. "Save your paper and our time," A. Zayko, a construction worker from the village of Zorkino in Nizhnegorskiy Rayon, Crimean Oblast, advises. "The Congress stenographic report should be published separately from IZVESTIYA and should be sold at 'Soyuzpechat' kiosks," B. Sedov from Rybinsk suggests. "Those who need it will buy it." [passage omitted]

There are many letters in the mailbag connected with the newspaper's coverage of events in international life. Naturally, all attention now is focused on the changes taking place in the socialist countries. "Yes, IZVESTIYA now has its finger on the pulse of events," V. Ryazantsev from Ulyanovsk writes. "But remember that just yesterday you were writing about Romania. We knew virtually nothing about the Ceausescu regime or about how people in Romania reacted to our perestroyka. Is this not why December's events for us were like a bolt from the blue? The same can be said about coverage of the life of the peoples and parties in the DPRK and in Cuba. You get the impression that it is as though IZVESTIYA is waiting to see how events will develop further, and will tell the truth only after the event. Why is the paper so cautious? What or who stops it making forecasts?" [passage omitted]

More on New CPSU Sociopolitical Magazine

LD2601211590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 26 Jan 90

[Text] The first edition of DIALOGUE, a new sociopolitical magazine from the CPSU Central Committee, has been published. It gets under way with a conversation with Medvedev, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary. The magazine invites readers to take part in discussing the material featured in the sections The Party and Society, the Political Struggle, Ideas and Concepts, and others. Acute problems are dealt with in the article by USSR People's Deputy Travkin entitled: Either Let Us Work for Strasbourg or for Ryazan.

In his conversation, The Time for Action, Gidaspov, first secretary of the Leningrad CPSU Oblast and City Committees, compares our party with a boat that spins around on the spot because of the uncoordinated efforts of the rowers. Unity of effort and choice of path—that is the main theme of the article. You can read of the stances of various public movements and fronts in the survey written by Semina entitled: According to the Laws of Civil Time. It is to be continued. Readers are invited to read an article about Kondratyev, the prominent Russian economist, while Kasparov and Karpov muse on the subject of chess and more.

Efforts To Revive Pilgrimages to Palestine

LD2201004190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1530 GMT on 21 January in the "Seven Days" newscast presented by Eduard Sagalayev carries an 8-minute correspondents video report from Jerusalem by Ye Kiselev on efforts under way to revive Russian pilgrimages to Palestine.

Introducing the reportage, Sagalayev says: "Do we do everything to see that each one of us can realize his spiritual searchings, even if the path to this is not quite the ordinary one for us? To a certain extent this question will be answered by an event that will take place the day after tomorrow in Moscow: An international symposium Russia and Palestine—Religious and Cultural Links in the Past, Present, and Future opens."

The video opens with shots of a Russian nun tolling a bell and a religious fresco, then cuts to a view of the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem and other religious sites there. The video is attributed to Ye Kiselev and others, including journalists from Israeli television. Kiselev recalls seeing pilgrims there during his visit last summer. The film shows him interviewing Father Superior Yelisey, deputy head of the Russian Spiritual Mission, who recalls how thousands of pilgrims used to come before the revolution. An old man recalls the same thing, and archive footage of them is shown. Kiselev explains that the Russian Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society was set up by prominent political, public, religious, and imperial persons to help the pilgrims and it bought land and built churches and hostels for them. There is a whole quarter of Russian buildings in Jerusalem, many of which are still there, says Kiselev, though not all of them still belong to "us." The property of the Society and the Orthodox Church passed from hand to hand, though some remained whole, he says. "The members of the Russian Spiritual Mission are now serioulsy thinking of starting to receive pilgrims from our country," Kiselev adds.

Kiselev then visits the Orthodox nunnery on the Mount of Olives, and speaks to the mother superior, who says she would be delighted to receive pilgrims at any time, in any number. Kiselev says: "If we are to talk seriously about renewing pilgrimages to Jerusalem, we should evidently turn to the experience of the past, the experience of the Palestine Society, all the more so since it has not ceased its existence. True, after the revolution it lost its basic purpose. It was included in the system of the Academy of Science."

The video then cuts to the office of O.G. Peresypkin, professor and chairman of the Russian Palestine Society, identified by screen caption. Peresypkin says: "Our society was previously, let's say, forgotten. Now, when our society is changing, we hope that we will also reach the point where our people will be able to fulfill their religious duty and go to Jerusalem, and pray at the various holy places. We would very much like this function to be revived, because the Russian Palestine Society, which was set up in 1882, had as its first and basic task to organize the journeys of our pilgrims there."

Kiselev then moves on to a church and asks a young churchgoer his opinion about going on pilgrimage. He says it is the dream of every normal orthodox christian.

Kiselev concludes: "Yes, the church in our country is separated from the state, but can our society separate itself from millions of believers? Do we have the right to remain indifferent to their needs, including their lofty moral need, at least once in their lives to pray at the ancient stones of Jerusalem?"

Back in the studio, Sagalayev says: "The revival of the Russian Palestine Society comes up against the prosaic, and so familiar problem of the lack of money. Once one of the richest voluntary societies in Russia, it is now in a difficult financial situation. It is in serious need of help. So the author and producer of the item you have just seen have asked for their payment to be paid into the account of the Russian Palestine society." Sagalayev gives the account number and invites viewers to contribute as well.

Report on Georgian Nationalist Army

LD2601201590 Stockholm Domestic Service in Swedish 1130 GMT 26 Jan 90

[Text] In Georgia, nationalist groupings and organizations have formed the first so-called national independent army, which in various ways will fight the Soviet Army if Georgia is not allowed its independence. Vladislav Savic met one of the young nationalists.

[Savic] I am standing next to (Dato), a young man clad in a home-sewn camouflage uniform. I will fight those who fight Georgia, he says. Along Rustaveli Street—which is the parade street in the capital, Tbilisi—in the metro, in fact everywhere today, you can see young boys and even middle-aged men parading in their home-sewn uniforms: green and white camouflage uniforms with Georgian symbols and flags on the breast-pocket.

It all began with hunger strikes 2 months ago by young conscientious objectors boycotting the Soviet Army. They are supported by the many nationalistic groupings and organizations who say that Georgia should not recognize an army of occupation. The nationalists remind the young people constantly about how the Soviet Army, with arms and poison gas, attacked a peaceful mass demonstration. Twenty-one people were killed and 1,000 people were injured by the poison gas.

For the past month, the so-called Georgian Army has been patrolling the streets of Tbilisi, and every day there are more of them. And even though the nationalist leaders say that Georgia should fight by peaceful means, these young fellows, at least, say that they will fight with weapons in their hands.

(Dato) makes a nice impression: an upright, pleasant young man, a champion of freedom. Well, it depends on your point of view. The first time I saw the camouflage-dressed men in the Tbilisi metro system, I had a certain feeling of revulsion. I saw a few people move aside as the camouflaged ones came: mostly people who looked different to Georgians in the multicultural republic where ethnic conflicts have occasionally led to bloodbaths.

The question is, who is actually behind these young men? Today there are 33 groupings in Georgia, most of them nationalists, everything from monarchists who want to give power back to the Georgian tsar's family, to more or less militant groups. The camouflaged ones say proudly that they are Georgians: But the question is, how are the many minorities seen in this context? This is what a father of a family, half Armenian, half Georgian, says. He has a child by a woman who is also the offspring of a mixed marriage; she has no Georgian blood.

[Begin recording in English fading into reporter's Swedish report] The most dangerous thing is that some people mix patriotism with nationalism. For example, I am a patriot but not a nationalist. I'm afraid of what these nationalists will do with people who aren't Georgian. The political situation in the republic today is very dangerous and unstable, and nobody knows what will happen when the different nationalist leaders start the internal struggle for power, says this father of a family. The mother says she would rather emigrate from Georgia now. She is one of those who move aside on the street when she sees the camouflaged young men. I feel terror-struck when I see those uniformed ones. I don't know what will happen, and my fear is not just due to my being a woman, but I also feel fear as a mother. [end recording]

Party Ideologists Fail in Turkmen Elections

PM1201154790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Own correspondent V. Kuleshov report: "Everyone Has Their Own Deputy"]

[Excerpts] Turkmen SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]—Some 93.5 percent of the Turkmen SSR's voters took part in the 7 January elections of republic people's deputies and local soviet deputies. [passage omitted]

What are the preliminary results? First of all I want to point out the following positive fact: Approximately 75 percent of the 13,407 electoral okrugs, in which almost 24,000 candidates ran for election, had multiple-candidate elections.

Many contenders did not win voters' support. Of 175 okrugs holding elections to the republic's Supreme Soviet, Turkmen SSR people's deputies were elected in 111 okrugs alone. Admittedly, some who failed to get in in the first round have the chance to win a majority of votes during runoffs. But many people were knocked out of the race at the first stage. They included several party gorkom [city committee] and raykom [rayon committee] first secretaries and Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee officials.

"A worrying fact," S. Niyazov, first secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee, said in this connection at the Central Committee Bureau, "is above all that most of the raykom and gorkom secretaries who failed in the elections are ideological workers. Are they in the right jobs and working in the right place if they failed to master the situation, find their bearings in the situation, and mold the situation in the light of the demands of aspects of perestroyka?.."

The question is not an idle one, although something else cannot be disregarded either—the parochialism and tribal kinship dependence characteristic of the republic. It was not for nothing that the Central Committee Bureau noted: Many of those nominated to Turkmenistan's Supreme Soviet and local soviets were given a magnificent opportunity to win votes where they were born and raised.

Be that as it may, the voter has the deciding say. The voter is different now from what he was 4 years ago. People's hearts are unbending, albeit slowly; hearts which spent a very long time socially dormant are melting. As it gains self-confidence, public opinion can uphold its choice.

Commission Begins Work on Kazakh Miners' Demands

PM3001164990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
31 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Oleg Stefashin dispatch under the rubric "Direct Link": "Commission Drawing Conclusions"]

[Text] Karaganda—The state-public commission for monitoring the fulfillment of USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No. 608, headed by F. Gukasov, first deputy chairman of the [Kazakh] republican Council of Ministers, has spent a week at work in Karaganda. Its arrival was prompted by miners' dissatisfaction with the way the demands they put forward during the strike are being fulfilled. Here is the way the miners' current mood was described by P. Shlegel, chairman of the oblast workers committee, when he addressed the all-union conference of representatives of the working class, peasantry, and engineering and technical personnel: Unless the situation changes by spring, they will call a strike again.

Having studied the state of affairs, the commission members drew the conclusion that the government resolution is indeed being implemented downright badly.

Only 14 of the miners' 47 demands have been met so far. Having granted full economic autonomy to all enterprises in the coalfield as of 1 January this year, the Ministry of the Coal Industry has washed its hands, reasoning that this actually meets one of the main demands. No order has been introduced yet in the system of coal prices and mine working and no mechanism for new economic relations is yet operational in the sector—so there can be no question of autonomy. Another example: The so-called zonal wage supplement, amounting to 30 percent, will be instituted as of 1 April. Meanwhile, one of the miners' mandatory conditions was that the supplement should apply to all working people in the oblast, regardless of their vocation or place of work.

It also became apparent that a considerable proportion of the demands are still being ignored not only in the center but also at the local level. The oblast and republic leaderships are in no hurry to repay the debt they owe to miners in terms of housing or to change the situation as regards food and medical supplies for the region.

The commission gave assurances that many questions will be taken off the agenda in the very near future. It was decided that henceforth it will meet monthly. A working group comprising representatives of collectives from the Karaganda and Ekibastuz coalfields was set up to assist the commission. It was given the widest of powers, right up to the adoption of tough measures against those who sidestep the solution of problems which are important to the miners.

Kazakh Muslim Spiritual Administration Set Up

PM3001165590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 7

[Own Correspondent V. Ardayev report: "Spiritual Administration Created"]

[Text] Alma Ata—A Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Kazakhstan has been created in the republic. It was founded by the first kurultay—Congress of the Muslims of Kazakhstan—held in Alma-Ata, which was attended by more than 250 delegates and visitors from other republics.

Qadi Ratbek Nysanbay-uly delivered the report of the Qadiate of the Kazakh Muslims. He noted that last year alone 15 new mosques were registered in the republic. Many are having their former buildings returned to them. The total number of mosques in Kazakhstan is now 63.

The kurultay elected the Spiritual Administration Presidium. Ratbek Nysanbay-uly has become mufti of Kazakhstan's Muslims. Recently the residents of Chimkent Oblast nominated him as their Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic people's deputy.

Changes in Kazakh Local Soviets Outlined

PM2601162990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Interviews with K. Zhusupov, secretary of Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium, and K. Baykenov, first secretary of Alma-Ata party gorkom, by own correspondent E. Matskevich in Alma-Ata: "How Power Is Being Renewed"; date not stated]

[Text] Alma-Ata—In Kazakhstan sessions of local soviets have ended in 17 oblasts, 84 cities, and 209 rural rayons, as well as in over 2,500 village, aul, and settlement soviets. Presidiums and chairmen have been elected everywhere. But did this great campaign proceed smoothly everywhere? K. Zhusupov, secretary of the Kazakh SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic) Supreme Soviet Presidium, answered this question.

[Zhusupov] Party leaders in the localities received the support of the deputies. But there were exceptions. Metallurgists in Temirtau, for example, did not elect party Gorkom (city committee) First Secretary A. Katyshev chairman of the soviet, but preferred Deputy V. Yantsen, who works in an administration of the Karaganda combine. V. Rakhimov, former chairman of the gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee], was not elected for a new term either. This post is now filled by K. Mukhametzhanov, deputy director of the same combine.

In all, 9 raykom [rayon committee] and gorkom first secretaries in the republic were not elected, and 18 gorispolkom chairmen were replaced.

Kazakhstan was one of the first republics in the country to hold elections and sessions. And in resolving a number of questions, we came up against the lack of a precedent. This happened particularly often in the countryside. Indeed, who will head the soviet? The all-powerful leader of an enterprise located in the settlement or the authoritative director of a local state farm? And what should be done about towns and urban-type settlements where there is an executive committee but no territorial party organization? We tried to immediately get the new corps of deputies to appreciate that each specific case must be approached individually, that alternative candidates should not be put forward artificially, and, still more, that no pressure of any kind must be exerted. [Zhusupov ends]

At a session of the Alma-Ata city soviet of the new convocation party gorkom First Secretary K. Baykenov was elected chairman of the city soviet.

[Matskevich] How do you see your activity in your new role?

[Baykenov] The functions of chairman of a local soviet presidium are defined in the model statutes approved by the supreme legislative organs of the republic and the country. I will merely remind you that the soviet now carries out all work with deputies, prepares for and convenes sessions, coordinates the actions of standing commissions and deputies' groups, monitors the implementation of decisions and voters' instructions, and so on. The executive committee will no longer do this. It is entrusted with all economic activity and the resolution of tasks regarding the region's socioeconomic development. The soviet and the chairman do not have the right to supplant its activity.

Deputies themselves now have more opportunities to raise urgent questions at a session via standing commissions and the presidium. The presidium will meet not less than once a month. In addition, its full-time apparatus, comprising the deputy chairman, the soviet organizational work department, the standing commissions, and the administration of affairs (17-19 people) will operate permanently.

There are no deputies in the ispolkom [soviet executive committee] apart from the chairman. The organizational department has been abolished. A new attitude to work was displayed even at the first session, when the standing commissions and the executive committee leadership were ratified. At the deputies' insistence, an extra commission was formed—on ecology and the rational use of resources. This is quite justifiable: The state of the environment has recently provoked all too much criticism from the city's inhabitants.

Ratification in the soviet standing commissions was a serious test for the gorispolkom deputy chairmen and the leaders of its departments, administrations, and committees. They had to answer a great many questions connected with their work in the present and future. The deputies, as it were, weighed up the practicability of prospects and the sincerity and capability of contenders for leading posts. The soviet reserves the right to assess their competence and suitability in the future.

[Matskevich] What are the soviet's immediate plans?

[Baykenov] Let me first speak about its composition. A city raykom secretary has been elected as my deputy. He will be in charge of the day-to-day work of the apparatus. The presidium includes a doctor, a writer, a construction worker, a railroad worker, a servicemen, and a designer...

We are faced primarily with the task of improving legislation wherever its interpretation is unclear with respect to the specific territory and introducing the concept of self-management and self-financing in Alma-Ata, which is now being discussed and will be examined at our second session.

It is very important to utilize all sources for strengthening the city budget. We must carry out systematic work to eliminate social inequalities in the development of individual rayons of the republic's capital. Some of them do not have even half of the schools, movie theater, or stores they need.

Kirghiz KGB Seen Breaking Away From Past

PM2601144790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jan 90 p1

[Own correspondent K. Bayalinov report: "Different Agenda for KGB"]

[Text] Kirghizia—A vast marble cube with an inner courtyard you would hardly guess was there stands in the city center. In the past, people have avoided this cold building, the headquarters of the republic's KGB, or at least tried to walk past it in silence.

The first years of restructuring were no exception either. The republic KGB heads were busy exposing enemies: "nationalists" this time. After the December 1986 events in Alma-Ata, the blacklists included hundreds of students and representatives of the national intelligentsia whose opinions differed from the official viewpoint, or people who raised the question of the status of the Kirghiz language. Tough sanctions followed. Party meetings could barely keep up with expelling this latest batch of "wreckers" from the CPSU or "raking them over the coals." Professor Sabyr Attokurov, an ethnographer well known in the republic, found himself caught between the millstones of the noisy campaign simply because he had referred in his lectures to... the past division of the Kirghiz people on the basis of race and tribe and had quoted a number of Kirghiz sayings. This was regarded as a sign of extreme nationalism!

The republic's KGB also interfered in theaters' repertoire and was involved in the appointment of arts leaders and chief stage managers. What theater has there been to speak of anyway? Thanks to prompting from the KGB... break dancing was forbidden in discotheques in the city and throughout the republic.

A year has passed since the former chairman of the KGB was taken away to Moscow. Quite recently a Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee plenum returned to the events of those days. In his speech A. Sultanov, member of the Central Committee, criticized V. Ryabokon, former KGB chairman: "... Many of our comrades were defamed. Among them were Comrade Tadzhibayev, former chairman of the Osh Oblast Soviet Executive Committee; Comrade Alymov, former chief of the Civil Aviation Administration; and Comrade Rumyantsev, former chief of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] KGB Counterintelligence Department...."

I would like to add with regard to the latter that V. Rumyantsev refused to take part in the gathering of compromising material against a member of the Central Committee. But, as always in such cases, others were found to do the job....

After an 11-year break (because of differences of opinion with the former leaders of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee), the republic's KGB is once again headed by Major General Dzhumabek Asankulov, USSR people's deputy.

One sign that the old methods are being abandoned is the fact that the republic's KGB did not issue a single official caution in the whole of 1989. The archives are gradually being opened and the KGB is following a policy of glasnost. It is also well known that the KGB has raised the question of "declassifying" Issyk-Kul and opening it to foreign tourists.

In the middle of January a meeting was held in the republic KGB collegium sessions hall between its chairman and journalists. It was not often that journalists had wandered along the brightly lit, wide corridors past the identical polished office doors with no nameplates. Moreover, they had brought their cameras, videocameras, cinecameras, and dictaphones along with them.

Perhaps some were unsatisfied by the course of the meeting and failed to get exhaustive answers to all their questions. But something else is important: the precedent. One would like to believe that the time will come when we will be able to visit the KGB on official business like any other department.

Decree Issued on Abolishing Tajik Oblast

LD2401195990 Dushanbe Domestic Service in Tajik 1700 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Decree of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium on the aboliton of Khatlan Oblast and the formation of Kulab and Kurganteppa Oblasts in the structure of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic—read by announcer]

[Text] The Presidium of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. Khatlan Oblast of the Tajik SSR is to be abolished.

2. Kulab Oblast, its administrative center being Kulab town, and Kurganteppa Oblast, its administrative center being Kurganteppa town, are to be formed in the structure of the republic.

3. The rayons of Vose, Dangara, Kulab, Leningrad, Moskva, Farkhar, Sovet, and Khovaling, and the town of Kulab are to be included in the structure of Kulab Oblast and the rayons of Vakhsh, Dzhilikul, Ilich, Kabadiyan, Kalkhozabad, Kommunisti, Kuybyshev, Kumsangir, Pyandzh, Shahrtuz, and Yavan and the town of Kurganteppa are to be included in the structure of Kurganteppa.

4. A delegation of deputies of the Khatlan Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies who have been elected from among the inhabitants of rayons and towns which are included in Kulab Oblast, should be transferred to the structure of the Soviet of People's Deputies of Kulab Oblast. The delegation of deputies of the Soviet of People's Deputies of Khatlan Oblast who have been elected from among the inhabitants of rayons and towns which are included in Kurganteppa Oblast, should be transferred to the structure of the Soviet of People's Deputies of Kurganteppa Oblast.

5. The town of Narak is to be (?included) in the category of towns which come under the republic.

6. This decree should be proposed for the approval of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet.

Supreme Soviet

Next Session's Tasks, Problems Viewed

PM3001124590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 90 Second Edition p 2

[Miroslav Buzhkevich article under rubric "Parliamentary Observer's Notes": "No Vacation"]

[Text] This year the New Year vacation lasted nearly twice as long as usual for the capital's schoolchildren. Unlike them, many people's deputies, primarily members of the USSR Supreme Soviet, were themselves forced to give up the winter vacation which they had earned last year by the sweat of their brows, as they say, because they have, without exaggeration, a mountain of work ahead of them. At one of the Supreme Soviet sessions it was said that in the next few years parliament will have to formulate and ratify a minimum of 60 laws. Some of them have already become an objective reality, but the overall number, in my view, has not decreased: Life and perestroyka are "throwing up" an increasing number of problems.

One of our parliamentarians noted wittily that the most urgent, first law is the law banning the hasty adoption of laws. If they are incomplete, they will do far more harm than good. But then it costs nothing to break them, particularly in our country, where disdain for the law still flourishes. There are such examples in our parliamentary practice. We only have to recall the Law on the Procedure for Resolving Collective Labor Disputes. It seemed that during the prolonged discussion at the session the Supreme Soviet members, figuratively speaking, took it apart "down to each nut and bolt", put it back together again (there were no spare components), and ratified it by an overwhelming majority. They began to implement this law and it began to falter. What was the matter? They had not prepared the subordinate legislation, that is the rules about how and when to apply the law's specific provisions.

Perhaps we can now understand the step taken by deputies that the chairmen and members of the Supreme Soviet commissions and committees to go back to work in the first days of this year, only a week after the Second Congress had ended.

Remember this Moscow address: 27 Kalinin Avenue. Three fourths of the USSR Supreme Soviet commissions and committees are staying here.

In the quiet corridors where two or three deputies are talking quietly, in noisy offices and the session halls crammed with people a common component can be traced: All the conversations are about the upcoming Supreme Soviet session where a package of economic and social laws, which must be prepared on time so that parliament will approve them without delay, will be ratified .

So the next session is approaching. For this reason articles of the law on ownership are being debated in one commission. One person believes that instead of individual ownership we should reject outdated ideological reticence and recognize the legitimacy of private ownership. After all, it in no way contradicts socialism. Others raise objections, but they don't brand him as defender of "the capitalist path of development." People argue various viewpoints of how best to work for the common cause.

The Commission for Labor, Prices, and Social Policy Questions chaired by Professor Nikolay Nikolayevich Gritsenko is perhaps regarded as one of the most active commissions in the USSR Supreme Soviet. It is the head commission, as people say here, for two of the most important laws which the entire people are expecting: On pensions and on leave. The commission is working on them in close contact with the USSR Council of Ministers, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the State Committee for Labor, and scholars. In the first 10-day period of January a sitting was held at which the interim results of the public discussion of the draft law on pensions were summed up. The number of letters with proposals and amendments to it is measured not in hundreds and thousands but in... sacks bulging with envelopes. Representatives of a number of our parliament's other commissions and committees and the State Committee for Labor working group were present at the sitting held jointly with the working commission formed by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium to sum up the results of the nationwide discussion of the draft law on pensions. The final editing of the draft, which has to be presented to the Supreme Soviet 15 February, lies ahead.

When the discussion moved on to the draft law on leave being dealt with by a special commission headed by Deputy Vera Aleksandrovna Rogozhina—this draft is also being prepared for ratification at the next parliamentary session—Gritsenko said with conviction that Soviet people should be given full social protection as soon as possible.

Suppose the whole package of economic laws is adopted: On ownership, land, the socialist enterprise, taxation and others. But if they are not reinforced by social acts, perestroyka will not only falter, but may founder altogether. Let us take, for example, the right to work. Soviet man obtained this through the Constitution. But it only declares this as a citizen's right. This declaration must rely on the legal mechanism to put it into effect. But this mechanism still does not exist in our country.

Of course, the country is solving problems of placing people in jobs. First and foremost those who have finished secondary and higher school and those who have been educated in vocational and technical schools. There is a system of apprenticeship and retraining at enterprises. Finally, everyone knows about the principle of organized recruitment which makes it possible in a certain way to "decant" labor from one region to another. But all this is a sort of unproductive mechanism built in to the extensive system of managing public labor. In the past it seemed to satisfy us. But suddenly, or rather quite logically, unemployment emerged in some regions of the country.

"For us," N. Gritsenko said, " this problem is completely new. We stopped talking about unemployed people in the traditional sense of this word 60 years ago when the last labor exchanges were closed in 1929. It was thought that in our country, a socialist country, there was enough work for everyone. This turned out not to be so. Take the Central Asian republics. Many hundreds of thousands of people there are not employed in production and so they live in poverty. Another example. Significant changes are taking place in construction: The construction of industrial facilities is being curtailed, and the building of facilities in the social sphere is expanding. This means that construction workers will flood out of a number of regions in the country, particularly from West and East Siberia. Where and how can they be given work? Finally, hundreds of thousands of servicemen are being demobilized on account of the army cuts. What kind of work will they find and where? These problems forced us to speed up the preparation of the draft law on employment."

Can one talk about minimal social protection for some of our esteemed readers, if the law is powerless to prevent their dismissal? Do you know of any instances of a plant director groundlessly released from his post taking the ministry to court? Don't rack your brains, don't strain the gray matter. You won't remember. For the court does not deal with conflicts between directors and the ministry. According to the regulations in operation this conflict is examined in accordance with subordinate status [v poryadke podchinennosti]. That is, the director has no one to complain to, only the International Labor Organization under the United Nations. And it is not only he who has no one to complain to. Some 23 million Soviet people, mainly economic leaders, cultural and scientific workers, and many others, can be dismissed by the administration without the trade union's consent and without the right of appeal to the court.

And many deputies believe that a draft law on the introduction of necessary amendments to the legislative acts should be prepared immediately in order to stop millions of Soviet people from being discriminated against at work.

Generally our deputy corps is demonstrating legislative initiative increasingly frequently, proceeding first and foremost from the interests of developing the economy, raising the population's living standards, and protecting it legally and socially. Valentin Mikhaylovich Vologzhin, chairman of the Committee for Economic Reform Questions, together with his associates is now "devising" the concept of a new law on joint stock companies. He initiated the creation of the first enterprise of this kind in the country—the Lvov "Konveyer" Association. The actual process of this idea's "germination" is interesting. Joint stock companies were mentioned in the committee for the first time in the summer, before the Second Supreme Soviet session. They started to accumulate information from the socialist states and the developed capitalist countries where a lot of experience of joint stock companies had been amassed. Interesting articles on this problem appeared in newspapers and journals. Finally, there was an appeal from the parliamentary platform to get down to the practical creation of joint stock companies. As a result a note to this effect was incorporated in the decision made at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

A glance into the future is the distinguishing feature of the work of most USSR Supreme Soviet standing committees and commissions. A rule-of-law state is being created. And its strength lies in progressive, democratic laws. The adoption of a verdict at the parliament's plenary session is the end of a "marathon" lasting many weeks and sometimes many months, of a preliminary study of the problems, of the hatching of a concept and the comparison of alternatives. This is being done by the deputies jointly with government members and experts of every rank and hue. And the more patiently and painstakingly they penetrate the essence of the matter and the more deeply they "X-ray" each paragraph and article of the new law, the more competent the state verdict will be.

Committees, Commissions Continue Work

LD3001064190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0300 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] The committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the commissions of its chambers are continuing their work. Today, an open sitting of the Committee on Issues of Defense and State Security is planned. A report by the USSR KGB will be heard on the rehabilitation of citizens illegally repressed in the thirties, forties and early fifties. The Commission on Issues of Labor, Prices and Social Policy will discuss a number of draft laws, including those on pensions, ownership, and land.

Draft Land Law Examined

LD3101060690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0400 GMT 31 Jan 90

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet has not yet been called to session, but the deputies are continuing to work in the committees and commissions. For example, a final sitting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Committee is planned for today. It will be devoted to examining the proposals of the working people on the draft law on land. A sitting of the International Affairs committee will also be held. It is devoted to an appeal by mothers and relatives of soldiers who served in Afghanistan.

Committee Chairman Discusses Election Campaign

LD2701220990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 27 Jan 90

[From "Vremya" newscast: interview with Nikolay Dmitriyevich Pivovarov, chairman of USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Issues of Work of Soviets of People's Deputies and Development of Government and Self-Government, by correspondent Zolotarevskiy; date, place not given]

[Text] [Zolotarevskiy] The burning news of the last few days has overshadowed many important subjects. Among the latter, I would name, first of all, the campaign for preparing elections to the republican and local soviets.

Nikolay Dmitriyevich, fairly alarming reports have been coming in which show that at the first stage of the election campaign the electorate's activity was rather low. In some constituencies, only one candidate has been nominated. Aren't you worried about that?

[Pivovarov] Yes, I am very concerned about that, and we have discussed this issue in our committee. Well, it has failed in some places, but there still are the second and third rounds to come.

[Zolotarevskiy] Do you have in mind agitation, the presentation of candidates, and finally, the decisive round: the elections?

[Pivovarov] Yes, and among these issues I would emphasize in particular the second stage, which includes agitation, meetings with the candidate, clarification of his position, examination of the candidates as individuals, getting to know their platforms and those comrades who nominated them and who are standing by them. By meetings I mean meetings with organizations, both official and unofficial meetings, with both formal and informal organizations of citizens.

[Zolotarevskiy] Voices of extremism can be heard which bluntly call on people to boycotte the elections. What can you say about that?

[Pivovarov] I will say one thing: Boycott is a road that leads nowhere, but we have to live and work. I think that the best thing will be to elect the kind of deputies who will get down to solving the issues facing the people and the residents of the constituency in which they are elected. [Zolotarevskiy] Thank You.

Transcaucasus Situation

Weapons Level Suggests Advanced Planning

PM3001153990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Article by V. Yanchenkov, chief of USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Department for Collaboration With Mass Media: "Weapons Remain in Extremists' Hands"]

[Text] The forces of law and order are confiscating weapons captured by extremists in the Azerbaijan and Armenian Soviet Socialist Republics.

But the weapons which are voluntarily returned are, as a rule, hunting rifles and sundry "homemade items," while combat weapons still remain in the extremists' hands. And not just firearms.

It is well known that even hail guns have been used in clashes between opposing groupings. They functioned despite the fact that—as Army General D. Yazov, USSR defense minister, noted in a meeting with Moscow journalists—an order to confiscate the firing pins of these guns was issued as early as last year. The guns appeared in position with new and illegally manufactured pins.

The following conclusion suggests itself: Does this mean that some people were preparing for terrorist actions and had organized in advance the illegal manufacture of combat parts for weapons? Does this mean that the actions of Armenian extremists, who used a tow truck to hijack a disabled tank from Yerevan's Victory Square 22 January and captured guns and light machineguns, had also been planned in advance?

The terrorists now have quite a large quantity of weapons captured in armed robberies. Here are the facts: A total of 5,906 different firearms have been taken in the region since 1 January, including 5,742 units in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. Only 1,744 barrels have been returned, 1,463 of them hunting rifles.

It is no longer any secret who it was who needed to arm themselves in the Transcaucasian republics, or why. The actions of Azerbaijani and Armenian extremists alike are aimed, just as before, at destabilizing the situation, further escalating the violence, and resisting the forces of law and order.

Weapons have been taken. Where and with whom will they end up tomorrow, in whose hands will they be? Where could the next seat of bloodshed explode? Who will be the next victims of violent thugs who have lost all reason?

These are complex and by no means rhetorical questions. They concern the life and death of totally innocent people. Meanwhile, a rally attended by many thousands was again held in Yerevan 29 January. There were renewed calls to people to arm themselves and not to surrender their weapons.

Baku Commandant Notes Efforts To Build Dialogue

PM3001162190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jan 90 p 1

["Own information" report under general heading: "Transcaucasus, 29 January"]

[Text]

Baku

The main distinguishing features of the day are people's faces. They still look preoccupied and tense. Here and there small groups can be seen discussing the situation in the city. They are particularly in evidence near subway stations and at bus stops.

Yesterday we met with Lieutenant General of the Internal Troops V.S. Dubinyak, military commandant of Baku. Vladimir Sergeyevich is familiar with work in emergency situations. Two years ago he worked as deputy military commandant in Sumgait.

We intended to ask him the following questions: Was there an alternative to moving troops into the city, why did the troops enter at night, why were they not brought in back during the days of the Armenian pogroms, why did they begin to move in from 0020 hours when the decision to bring them in was broadcast at 0530 in the morning? Vladimir Sergeyevich warned us that he would not answer these questions. The reason: He was appointed military commandant after the troops were brought in. Consequently, the questions remain.

The characteristic feature of the first days of the state of emergency, Dubinyak said, was the mourning for the dead which prevailed in everything. This left its mark on the work of all the instruments of power.

However, the situation is changing now with the active assistance of the commandant's office. Gradually, with difficulty, but getting there nonetheless, the complex, multilayered mechanism of the city administration is setting itself in motion. We had a meeting at the Baku party city committee with the city's party and economic aktiv. We discussed how, through joint efforts, we could begin to disentangle the tough problems. After all, it is one thing to talk about an early withdrawal of the troops and the lifting of the state of emergency, and another thing to bring them closer in practice. We have met with understanding, we are aware of this understanding among the indigenous population of Baku. Dialogue is the only way out of the situation which has taken shape. Dialogue with all parties, including the positively-minded section of representatives of the republic People's Front.

[Question] What can you say about the panic among the Russian-speaking population and rumors about the evacuation of the families of servicemen?

[Dubinyak] There was no evacuation. It was neither announced nor carried out. However, it is true that many servicemen's families indeed left Baku during the first days of the state of emergency. This was the result of rumors about threats against them and the death of the wife of a warrant officer. However, I can say with utmost responsibility that since the introduction of the state of emergency not one Russian has come to grief here, apart from the instance which I have cited.

We receive telephone calls at the commandant's office every day from indigenous inhabitants of Baku who express sincere outrage at the rumors and panic that are being spread and speak of their wish to retain the Russian-speaking population in Baku.

We were able to witness this ourselves when we tried to buy up-to-date newspapers on Sunday. On that day they finally appeared in the city. Right there, at the kiosk we were surrounded by people. Both Azerbaijanis and Russians were asking us why Mamedov, member of the People's Front board, was arrested; why D.T. Yazov and V.V. Bakatin did not attended the republic Communist Party Central Committee plenum; when the troops would be withdrawn from the city. But most of all they were asking us who is spreading the rumors that the Azerbaijanis are against the Russians.

Workers Vladimir Ivanovich Imokin and Viktor Ivanovich Glukhov and pensioners Nina Nikolayevna Ivanova and Mariya Prokopyevna Petrishcheva confirm the words of their compatriots. They were born in Baku and have lived there for a long time and they find it particularly painful to have to hear about this inflammatory talk.

The interest in the tragic events in the Transcaucasus is entirely understandable. As are the numerous references in the foreign news media to our articles in particular.

However, the arbitrary interpretation of our items sometimes causes puzzlement. A European paper, making use of a reportage of ours, added that it had not got past "Soviet censorship." The denial of this report may make people think that "there is no smoke without fire," but despite this we assure our readers that this did not happen. We hope that our information exchange will be more correct in the future.

Moscow TV Continues Reportage of Events

Primakov on State of Emergency

LD3001213890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 30 Jan 90

[From "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Comrades Primakov and Girenko, who returned from Baku a few days ago, met representatives of the mass media at the PRAVDA newspaper's editorial office in Moscow today.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] Yevgeniy Maksimovich, what conditions are necesary for the state of emergency in Baku to be lifted and the troops to be withdrawn?

[Primakov] I believe that both the leadership and the population understand that the troops' presence is a condition for the stabilization of the situation there after what happened and in conditions which might grow ripe for a new explosion, until all the elements have been isolated and all the weapons which the population now possesses have been removed.

What can we be dealing with, and what are we actually dealing with? We are dealing with reducing the level of the state of emergency now and maybe changing it subsequently into a curfew, gradually removing equipment from the streets, getting matters to a point where units might transfer to their barracks—in other words, undertaking measures which might be implemented, depending completely on the process of stabilization, which must develop. That's what we're dealing with. [end recording]

Answers were given to questions from representatives of other mass media.

MVD Briefing 30 Jan

LD3101002590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2122 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Video report from Transcaucasus by correspondent S. Milyanchikov]

[Text] Once again we report on the events in Transcaucasia. this time in more detail. This information is from competent sources.

[S. Milyanchikov] A briefing which was held today at the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] was devoted to the situation in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Troops and the forces of law and order are in control of the situation.

In Baku the majority of the enterprises and public transport are operating. More than 100 firearms have been handed in voluntarily, including 50 machine guns. Seventy-two people have been detained, all for violating the curfew. On the Azerbaijan railway 163 freight trains are standing idle, including 117 destined for Armenia. Twenty-four people of Armenian nationality have been evacuated from Baku.

In a number of enterprises in Sumgait and Pushkino strikes are continuing. In the towns of Yevlakh and Geokchay unsanctioned rallies have been held.

In the Nakhichevan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], in the town of Dzhulfa, the possibility of restoring train traffic is being discussed. An accord between the train drivers and the leadership of the republic has still not been achieved.

Nagorno-Karabakh: Incidents of an interethnic nature have not been registered. A train carrying economic cargo has arrived at the station in Stepanakert. Twenty-seven people have been detained for violating the curfew. The strike is continuing. Industrial enterprises, schools, and preschool institutions are not operating. Bus services between the towns in the oblast have ceased.

Armenian SSR: An unsanctioned rally was held in Yerevan at which the 28 January incident was discussed—in an exchange of fire with servicemen who were conducting an operation to return previously confiscated weapons, one Armenian was killed and three injured. At the meeting criticism was heard of the republic's leadership and the Soviet Army. Some of the participants in the rally called for stolen weapons not to be given in. Eight freight trains arrived on the Transcaucasian railway.

Although today we verify a lessening of the tension on the whole throughout the region, here is an excerpt from an interview with Colonel Prelin, a representative of the USSR KGB Press Bureau.

[Begin Prelin recording] Certain forces, especially extremist minded forces, will continue to try to cause provocation of various types of conflicts. They are continuing to whip up the situation. They are trying to urge the bodies of law and order and the Army subunits, let's say, to fire at one another, to cause fresh victims, because that is playing into their hands, of course. [end recording] [video shows scenes at briefing, interview with Prelin; at the end, tanks and troops, a snow-covered village, trains standing idle, photographed from the air, large groups of strikers, also rally in Yerevan]

'Shield' Demonstration

LD2801180190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 28 Jan 90

[From "Seven Day" newscast]

[Text] [Correspondent D. Kiselev] The Union for the Social defense of servicemen, which refers to itself as Shield [shchit], today tried to organize a picket outside the pentagonal Defense Ministry building on Moscow's Arbat Square.

[Unidentified woman] ...to the mothers of the whole country—work everywhere, defend as best we can!

[Kiselev] Shield was planning to protest the way the army is being used in the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, but the sentries were prepared to regard this as an unsanctioned rally, and those who had congregated were obliged to move closer to the Supreme Soviet reception building.

With this, the action changed into an election meeting between the electorate and the prospective People's Deputies. However, the theme remained the same.

[V.G. Urazhtsev, coordinator of the Shield union] At the address 12 Aviamotornaya Street, room 107—that is near Metro Aviamotornaya—we have organized a collection in aid of refugees, whether Armenians, Azerbaijans, or Russians. I repeat....

[Kiselev] To be perfectly honest, I did not notice any of the assembled congregation make a note of the address of this latest collection point. Not because they are callous—they will probably already have contributed to funds in aid of children, culture, health, or charity; funds for the victims of Chernobyl and Afghanistan; funds to purchase disposable syringes and catheters. People merely want the state which they built to operate efficiently, and they expect political solutions from the leadership, rather than the army on city streets. The models for such solutions must be discussed.

[V.A. Ivanov, secretary of the Russian Popular Front] Take Cyprus for example. Turks and Greeks there could not find a point of agreement. In that instance, what happens? A border is set up; the people are kept apart and the army just guards the border. So you have the Greeks on the right and the Turks on the left. And the army sticks to the border—it doesn't move into either the right sector or the left sector.

[Urazhtsev] This army, which has not resolved ethnic conflicts within itself, today has to establish peace between nationalities in the Transcaucasus. This can never happen, because our army is quite simply not suited for this objective. Undoubtedly, two great peoples like Armenia and Azerbaijan should get to the negotiating table to work out solutions to their own problems by political means, political methods. Violence—which we are demonstrating against—will just breed more and more violence. There will be an escalation in violence. We are afraid that the violence which is occurring in the Transcaucasus could spill over the Caucasus ridge and infect the whole country.

[Kiselev] In international affairs we have grasped the fact that strong-arm solutions are imperfect and short-term solutions. However, as yet no other approaches may be glimpsed in what is currently going on.

[Irina Semenovna Sonkina] I have sent a telegram to Gorbachev, Yazov, and Moiseyev. There's been no feedback on what I sent Gorbachev! I will read it! "I am a single parent. My only son is a soldier on compulsory service. I demand that my son be brought back without delay from Azerbaijan, where he was sent on 20 January. Through no fault of its own, my family paid a harsh price in 1937. That was enough! My father was executed. He was an instructor with the Ukrainian Komsomol Central Committee. Then it was the camps—the corrective labor camps—for me—an 18-month old baby and my mother. Then an orphanage. Then exile until 1955. That is a high enough price paid to society, the party, and the government! Now to have my son taken away—the last person I have left! I demand the immediate return of my son. I no longer have the health to fight all the disgraces that are perpetrated in our country."

[Kiselev] Meanwhile, our parliament is in recess. It is Saturday for these people, too, and they are leaving.

[Unidentified army officer] We also want order there.

[Unidentified woman] You are not doing anything to that end.... [voice fades as report ends]

People's Front Member

LD3001231590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2006 GMT on 30 January, in its "Vremya" newscast, broadcasts a recorded 19-minute interview with (Sharbulla Agayev) of the People's Front of Azerbaijan.

(Agayev) is first asked how he was drawn into the ranks of the People's Front of Azerbaijan. He admits to being an active member of the Front and says he has always been a constant fighter for the truth. He recalls his long-standing fight against bribery and lawlessness, against bribetakers in top positions at the institute he attended. He was attracted to the People's Front by its ideals, which were his ideals. He described his initial activity in providing relief to refugees, mainly from Armenia, who had become homeless and who were provided with apartments by the Zangezur organization. (Agayev) is asked how much he knows about the Baku pogroms. He recalls being asked to help victims and speaks of his horror and realization that this was the work of extremist organizations. He is asked about the announcement by the new Defense Council and says its members were not elected by the people. He is asked whether the clashes in Baku could have been avoided and says that, yes, there were numerous opportunities. He says there were armed guerrillas among those blockading the troops. Finally, asked whether there is a way out of the situation in the republic, (Agayev) says that there is, but it is not one that can be found soon. The solution lies in explaining things properly to the people.

Primakov, Girenko Describe Transcaucasus Visit

LD3001191190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] A news conference was held today at the PRAVDA editorial office on the situation in the Transcaucasus. Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov, chairman of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Andrey Nikolayevich Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, spoke. From 14-28 January they were in Baku; they briefed those assembled on their personal impressions of what they saw and about the work that they did. Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov is speaking:

[Begin Primakov recording] Two things amazed us most of all when we arrived there on the 14th. This was the state of complete psychological shock that everyone was in and the absolute concentration on one issue alone—on the issue that Azerbaijan had been deprived of its sovereignty, that its sovereignty is being flagrantly stepped on, that among those who are to blame for that is the center, perhaps the center is to blame to a greater extent than any of the rest. It is a question of the helplessness, as they put it, of the whole of the Soviet Union when Armenia officially declares that a part of Azerbaijan is to be annexed to its territory and when sovereignty is completely violated in this manner. This is the first thing. And, incidentally, on this basis, there came into being the absolute power if you like, of the so called People's Front.

Second, what dismayed us most of all was the complete vacuum in authority—party and local soviet—everything was filled by the threads of the People's Front. The People's Front is not a uniform organization. It is obvious that there were people there who were sufficiently authoritative, who had adequately gained a serious position in society. But already—and I dare to assert this—already by the time we arrived, by that time the situation was under the control of the terrorist faction of the People's Front. This portion is in control of the situation in a number of rayons even today. A bacchanalia starts, with the borders to begin with, then after that in Lenkoran and Dzhalilabad, and then the anti-Armenian pogroms start. Now the crucial moment is obviously coming. The people are beginning to understand where that so called People's Front has led them, where those so-called militants from the People's Front have brought them. They understand that they have led them into a national tragedy. [end recording]

Andrey Nikolayevich Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, then spoke at the news conference:

[Begin Girenko recording] From the very first days our group of members of the Central Committee staff, members of bodies of law and order, and leaders of Azerbaijan took every measure to see that everything which had happened came to an end. We imagine that today one can already say that we managed to do that, although normalization of the situation is not going ahead simply, but in a complicated and difficult manner. For almost a week all enterprises were not operating. Public transportation was not running. Shops were closed. At the present time the work rhythm is being restored. We flew in on Sunday after a plenum of the Central Committee. It went on all night. A sufficiently thorough discussion was held on the situation and on the reasons for it. A decision was adopted on completing the work connected with implementing the decisions of the USSR Supreme Soviet on Nagorno-Karabakh. The decisions were adopted by the supreme body of Soviet power. We do not have grounds for doubting the objectiveness and the correctness of these decisions, and these decisions should be carried out. Some people may have their doubts; they may think that the matter can still be changed. But those who think that are, of their own choosing or not, consciously or unconsciously, preparing for fresh, inflammatory events. We must not allow them to happen. [end recording]

TASS Updates Transcaucasus Developments

Militants Still Active

LD3101114190 Moscow Tass in English 1045 GMT 31 Jan 90

["Situation in Transcaucasia Under Control But Serious"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow January 31 by Tass special correspondents:

The situation in Azerbaijan is under control, a Soviet Interior Ministry official told TASS in Baku. Up to 80 per cent of enterprises in Baku, Lenkoran, Gyandzha and in several other cities of the Republic are in operation. Transport is resuming regular service and stores and food shops are beginning to work their normal shifts.

The military authorities, party and government bodies are forming closer contacts with the public, TASS was told. General Valentin Varennikov, a people's deputy of the USSR and commander-in-chief of the land forces, met members of the republic's Popular Front in Gyandzha and functionaries of the party city committee. An agreement was reached to take joint measures to stabilise the situation.

Nevertheless, militants are still active in various parts of the country, disseminating anti-Soviet material and alleging clashes among soldiers of different nationalities in the Baku garrison.

According to the figures of the Azerbaijan state committee for statistics, losses due to strikes after January 18 amounted to over 250 million roubles.

Soviet Deputy Railways Minister Leonid Pingarev told TASS that over 10,000 carriages are standing idle through the fault of receivers at stations of the Azerbaijan railway and on tracks leading to industrial plants.

The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh remains serious. Enterprises, organisations and pre-school establishments are shut in Stepanakert. Classes are suspended. Public transport is at a standstill.

"A power vacuum aggravated the situation in Azerbaijan and Armenia," Yevgeniy Primakov, chairman of the Council of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet, said at Tuesday's meeting with Soviet journalists in Moscow. "The extremist forces of the Azerbaijan Popular Front made use of this," he said.

"The armed forces can maintain law and order but cannot ensure a general stabilisation of the situation," Vyacheslav Mikhailov, first deputy head of the inter-ethnic relations department of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, said on the same day at a news conference in Moscow.

"Political means are needed and, more importantly, republican constitutional bodies should understand their drawbacks, foster a true dialogue with working masses and get down to solving energetically the more pressing matters."

The situation in Armenia is under control but remains serious, noted speakers at a regular meeting of the republican council on the emergency situation chaired by Azerbaijan Communist Party Chief Suren Arutyunyan.

Reporting the meeting of the council, the republican KOMMUNIST newspaper points out today that no attacks with the aim of seizing weapons were registered in the past 24 hours. The situation in the areas bordering on Azerbaijan is being gradually stabilised.

The stabilisation process is continuing on the Soviet-Iranian section of the state border. The operation of transport and the movement of cargo through the Astara checkpoint has been restored. Border guards detained 363 people when the latter tried to bypass checkpoints, including 255 people trying to cross the border into Iran and 108—from Iran into the USSR.

Minister Defends Measures

LD3101120790 Moscow TASS in English 1155 GMT 31 JAN 90

[Text] Moscow January 31 TASS—The measures taken recently in Azerbaijan and Armenia are well-considered, urgently needed, justified and quite legitimate, Soviet Justice Minister Veniamin Yakovlev said in an interview with the Soviet PRAVITELSTVENNY VESTNIK (GOVERNMENT HERALD) weekly.

Yakovlev stressed that the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet had a strong legal basis to introduce the state of emergency. Under Article 119 of the USSR constitution it has the right, in the interests of defending the USSR and the safety of its citizens, to declare military or any other state of emergency throughout the country or on some of its parts.

It is obligatory for this question to be discussed with the presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic involved. In the above cases special forms of administration can be introduced to be carried out by the state bodies of the USSR and Union Republics.

At the same time, the minister said, the law does not lay down any more detailed procedure for declaring the state of emergency. At the instruction of the USSR Supreme Soviet a relevant bill was drafted by the council of Ministers of the USSR and is now under consideration by people's deputies.

In September 1973 the Soviet Union ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article Four of the Covenant gives the right to the state to introduce a state of emergency, provided it does not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.

The state of emergency in some regions of Arzerbaijan and Armenia, the minister said, fully meets this requirement: it aims not to violate but to protect the rights, health and life of soviet people, to rein in national strife and enmity and to return social development to a normal channel.

Gradual Baku Normalcy

LD3101130390 Moscow TASS in English 1247 GMT 31 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 31 TASS—Life is gradually returning back to normal in Baku. City transport is working, shops and cafeterias are open and schools have resumed classes. Several major industrial plants are operating, according to Soviet Interior Ministry officials.

However, several other Azerbaijani cities are still paralysed by strikes. A total of 164 freight trains, including 113 for Armenia, are standing idle on the Azerbaijani railway.

Interior Ministry troops and the Army with the help of the public are taking measures to restore law and order and protect citizens.

Baku Procurator's Office launched an investigation in connection with criminal proceedings started after mass disturbances in the city which began on January 13. A total of 107 people were detained in Baku for curfew violations.

Increasing numbers of people are realising the need for an early normalisation. There is a growing public resentment against the militants who are whipping up tensions.

In Khachmas and Khanlar cities, residents have given in 300 shot guns, four sub-machine guns and four anti-hail guns in the past twenty-four hours.

Protesters, at several rallies in Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic on Tuesday demanded the emergency situation in Baku to be lifted and troops withdrawn.

The situation remains tense in Nagorno-Karabakh. All enterprises, except key municipal services are at a standstill in Stepanakert and Martuninski region.

A total of 45 people were detained for curfew violations in the past twenty-four hours. Two freight trains arrived in Stepanakert.

Authorities continue to collect stolen firearms in Armenia. Commandants of the Gorisskiy region in Armenia and the Lachinskiy region in Azerbaijan agreed to cooperate, meeting to discuss the distribution of forces and means in border areas.

A Zhiguli sedan with two bodies with gun-shot wounds was found on the road from Krasnoselsk to Artsvashen on Tuesday. Authorities are taking measures to identify the bodies and find out what happened.

Criminal Activities Noted

LD3001121890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1006 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 30 Jan (TASS)—"Pogroms and murders, seizure of hostages and weapons, blockade of transport arteries and strikes, and the other unlawful acts which have shaken the republics of the Transcaucasus, are incited by powerful forces which are upholding their own selfish interests," the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA stresses today in an article about the tragic events in Armenia and Azerbaijan. It points out that in the years of stagnation in Azerbaijan and Armenia major criminal associations were formed on a clan basis, controlling the criminal sphere of the shadow economy, sale of narcotics, speculation, and a number of other fields of criminal activity. It was then that a stratum of corrupt elements in the law-enforcement bodies were formed.

The calls for civil disobedience, the organization of pogroms, the armed resistance to the forces of law and order—all this is directed against stabilization of the situation and radically contradicts the interests of the working class, the peasantry and the people's intelligentsia, while playing into the hands of the racketeers, the dealers in the shadow economy, and the leaders of extremist nationalistic circles, the article notes. The presence of specially trained fighters, trained in methods of hand-to-hand fighting, in the use of firearms and sidearms, explosives, in mastering the tactics of confronting the law enforcement bodies, gives the extremist gangs a structural and functional similarity to organized criminal associations.

The present events in the Transcaucasus have been played to the same scenario as those which occurred last year in Sumgait and Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), and in Fergana (Soviet Central Asia), the paper states. Now, as then, big groups of teenagers and youth who gather stones beforehand are used as the strike force. Hysteria is whipped up with the help of women's groups. Rumors of "atrocities" by outsiders are spread. Terrorist acts are perpetrated with the aim of intimidating the population. Cases have been noted of the distribution of large sums of money for participation in pogroms and organization of disorders.

"The people who provoked the tragic events, who set peoples against one another, are blatant enemies of perestroyka," writes SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. "They are trying with all their might to halt the development of democratic processes and to return the country to the pre-perestroyka times of stagnation. That is why the demand is being heard more and more often: Laws are needed guaranteeing the irreversibility of the perestroyka processes, along with the inevitability of severe punishment of those who stand in their way."

Azerbaijan Continued Improvement

LD3001121890 Moscow TASS in English 1208 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 30 TASS—The situation in Azerbaijan is controlled by law-enforcement forces and army troops. It continues to improve, the Soviet Interior Ministry said in a mid-day communique today.

In Baku most industrial and trade enterprises, public catering and service outlets, and city transport are functioning.

More than 50 automatic rifles, a hand machinegun, eight carbines, 55 rifles, a revolver, a grenade launcher, hunting rifles and cartridges were turned over to the Mingechaur and Khanlar departments of the Interior Ministry.

Seventy two people were detained for violating the curfew in Baku. A total of 163 cargo trains, including 117 bound for Armenia, are stranded on the Azerbaijani railway. Two Azerbaijanis died in hospital from wounds received on January 20. Twenty four Armenians were evacuated from Baku by planes.

Strikes continue at some enterprises in Sumgait, Pushkino and several other cities. Unsanctioned meetings demanding the release of militant leaders of the popular front and a lifting of the state of emergency were held in Yevlakh and Geokchai.

The leadership of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic and heads of the interior troops met drivers of the locomotive shed in the town of Dzhulfa, Nakhichevan, to discuss the resumption of traffic on the railway.

No inter-ethnic clashes have been registered in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. A train with vital supplies arrived at Stepanakert. Twenty-seven people were arrested for violating the curfew.

Due to a strike, industrial enterprises, schools, preschool establishments were closed down, inter-city bus traffic stopped. Transportation between villages is maintained by buses allocated by state and collective farms.

A sanctioned meeting took place in the Armenian capital following the accident on January 28, when one Armenian was killed and three wounded in a shoot-out with troops trying to recover weapons that had been seized. The republic's leadership and the Soviet Army were criticised. Some speakers at the rally supported not returning stolen weapons.

Eight cargo trains with fuel and other cargo arrived in Armenia by the Transcaucasian railway.

Azerbaijan Mission Incident

LD3001142890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1320 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 30 Jan (TASS)—Igor Prelin, a spokesman for the USSR KGB press bureau, announced at a briefing which was held here today that some sections of the mass media in their publications have been stretching their interpretations of the recent incidents in the Azerbaijani mission in Moscow. As has already been reported, on the 26 January Zukhrab Shamkhalov, a representative of the Azerbaijan People's Front [APF], reported at a press conference in the Azerbaijan mission in Moscow "two attacks," on the mission by armed people, carried out the day before in the late evening and night. During the first attack, in his words, these people "smashed down doors with rifle butts" and entered the building, where "a search was carried out." After this the mission representative phoned the duty section of the KGB and USSR Internal Ministry. As the participants in the press conference confirmed, an investigative group of KGB officers arrived soon afterwards, examined the building and drew up a report. After the group left "a second attack" was carried out, during which, in the words of the participants in the press conference, men who were in the mission were seized, put onto a bus and taken away, and released some time later.

Pointing out that, as opposed to the press allegations, "during these two incidents not a single shot was fired in the area of the Azerbaijan mission," the KGB spokesman announced that the first time it was staff of the State Motor Vehicle Inspection (highway militia) who went to the mission building, and detained a citizen of Azerbaijani nationality who had infringed road traffic regulations and had sought refuge in the mission.

The second time was connected with the arrest by law enforcement bodies of an activist of the so-called "National Defense Committee" of the APF, Etibar Mamedov, who was wanted for inciting extremist acts. As the official statement on this pointed out, Etibar Mamedov had come from Baku to prepare antisocial actions, involving in them persons of the Azerbaijani nationality living in the capital.

Igor Prelin said that Mamedov's arrest was carried out on lawful grounds, not at all under the circumstances reported in the press. The rumors and conjectures regarding the incident in the Azerbaijani mission are being spread with a wholly definite purpose—that of heating up the situation and, possibly, provoking some sorts of incidents in Moscow, he declared.

"As for the assertions that the arrival in Moscow of people of diverse nationalities, including people from the Transcaucasus, has given rise to some sort of outbreak of crime or some sorts of new crimes in Moscow, the Committee for State Security has no confirmations of this, Igor Prelin went on to stress. However, measures are being taken in regard to people coming to Moscow of the likes of Mamedov and his heavyweight bodyguards," the USSR KGB spokesman stressed.

Use of Stolen Weapons

LD3001151690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1434 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Excerpt] Moscow, 30 January, (TASS)—Weapons previously stolen by fighters in Azerbaijan and Armenia are possibly falling into the hands of criminals. This is the opinion of spokesmen of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

As was stated at a briefing in the ministry today, such weapons may appear in various regions of the USSR, including Moscow. All this is giving rise to serious anxiety among the staffs of the country's law enforcement bodies. They are already taking the necessary measures to seek out and confiscate such weapons.

Igor Prelin, a spokesman of the USSR KGB press bureau, who took part in the briefing, announced in this connection that the USSR KGB has information about the transfer of large consignments of weapons in the Transcaucasus from region to region. Furthermore, he stressed, this is a matter of trading in these weapons. Such incidents have been noted on the borders between the Transcaucasian repubics. In particular, there have been instances of selling weapons from Georgia to Armenia and from Armenia to Azerbaijan. [passage omitted]

CPSU's Mikhaylov Comments

LD3001184890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1656 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 30 Jan (TASS)—Full responsibility for the loss of human life during the intervention by troops in Baku lies with the guerrillas of the Azerbaijan People's Front, who provoked these events and who were the first to open fire. Vyacheslav Mikhaylov, first deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee's department for interethnic relations, has made a statement about this. He has just returned from Transcaucasia, where he stayed for 3 weeks.

Addressing a press conference in Moscow today, Vyacheslav Mikhaylov emphasized that the pogroms in Baku were well-thought-out by the extremists, who aspired to destabilize the situation and to seize power. The introduction of troops into the city was dictated by the need to ensure security for the population and to prevent bloodshed.

Having noted that the problem of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] (a significant part of this oblast's population which is situated within Azerbaijan are Armenians) lies at the center of the situation, the representative of the CPSU Central Committee reminded that the 28 November resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet on measures for the normalization of the situation around Nagorno-Karabakh offered a constructive way of overcoming the situation that has arisen. However, neither the Armenian, nor the Azerbaijani nor the NKAO leaderships agreed to sit down at the negotiation table and begin to look for a constructive solution at the time when it was possible to find a way out of the crisis.

The development of the conflict in the Transcaucasus has certainly been affected by the social and economic crisis and the influence of corrupt gangs and dealers in the "shadow economy" who have an interest in whipping up the conflict, Vyacheslav Mikhaylov said. He noted that the slowness of the Azerbaijani official organs in resolving the most acute matters, including the problem of nearly 200,000 refugees from Armenia, led to the extremist wing of the Azerbaijan People's Front gaining ever greater popularity.

Replying to a question from journalists regarding the "influence of pro-Islamic feelings on the events in Azerbaijan," Vyacheslav Mikhaylov noted that there were attempts by individuals to exploit this factor, but "there is no appropriate base for the development of these ideas in Azerbaijan".

The CPSU Central Committee representatives said that the Armed Forces could secure the maintenance of law and order, but could not secure the overall stabilization of the situation. Political methods are needed, and the main thing here is that the republican constitutional organs of power should understand the very great failings in their work, begin a real dialogue with the working masses, and get down to the energetic solution of the most acute issues. "Everything now depends on the activity and political vigor of these organs," Vyacheslav Mikhaylov stressed.

Transcaucasian Arms Trade

LD3001171690 Moscow TASS in English 1703 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 30 TASS—Weapons seized by militants in Azerbaijan and Armenia may get into the hands of criminals, a briefing at the USSR Interior Ministry was told today.

Law-enforcement bodies are concerned that such weapons may emerge in various regions in the Soviet Union, including in Moscow. They are taking measures to search for these weapons and to confiscate them.

Igor Prelin, spokesman for the USSR State Security Committee (KGB), told the briefing the KGB has information about large-scale trade in armaments between various districts in Transcaucasia. Such information was corroborated by reports from the borders of the Transcaucasian republics. There were cases when weapons were sold from Georgia to Armenia, and from Armenia to Azerbaijan.

Prelin also told the briefing that some reports about "two attacks" on the Azerbaijanian mission in Moscow on January 26 were highly sensationalised.

He said that, contrary to assertions in the press, not a single shot was fired during the two incidents in the area of the Azerbaijani mission. He reported that on the first occasion traffic patrollers arived at the mission to detain an Azerbaijanian who had violated traffic rules and hid on the mission premises.

The second occasion involved the arrest of Ekhtibar Mamedov, an activist of the so-called "national Defence Committee" of the Azerbaijani Popular Front. Mamedov was wanted for instigating extremist actions.

Prelin said the KGB has no confirmation of assertions that the arrival in Moscow of people of various nationalities, including those from Transcaucasia, caused an upsurge of crime and some new kinds of crime in Moscow.

The KGB spokesman said measures are being taken against such people as Mamedov and his guards.

Roundup of Events

LD3001195290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1812 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 30 Jan (TASS)—TASS correspondents report from the Transcaucasus:

Up to 80 percent of enterprises are working in Baku, Lenkoran, Gyandzha and a number of other towns in Azerbaijan. In Baku transportation, shops, and canteens are functioning more and more reliably. The people in the towns and rayons of Azerbaijan are supporting further normalization and hastening the solution of the situation that has arisen.

The airline ticket offices of the central agency for air travel in the capital of Azerbaijan sold about 1,500 tickets today to various destinations. Yet just as many tickets were returned to the offices. Why?

"The explanation is as simple as can be," said T.N. Sivoklokova, the agency's shift supervisor. People are handing in their tickets because the need for them is no longer there thanks to the stabilizing situation in the town..."

As has already been reported, investigations are underway in the criminal case instituted by the procuracy on the mass rioting that took place in Baku on 13 January.

A number of people, including leaders of the so called "National Defense Council" and the "Defense Committee of the People's Front of Azerbaijan," have been arrested for premeditated acts aimed at whipping up discord between ethnic groups causing deaths and other serious consequences. Investigations are underway and the results will be announced.

In Khachmasskiy Rayon, where a group of extremists has been terrorizing the population over the last several days, seizing a mosque and blockading enterprises and institutions, measures have been undertaken by military subunits and law and order bodies on the basis of the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 15 January to bring about normal life and production activity. Six terrorists, including two who participated in preparing and implementing the seizure of the mosque, have been detained and an investigation is being made.

People are condemning the instigators through whose fault the tragic events took place and blood was shed. Those who at the will of the extremist leaders found themselves among the perpetrators of disorder are also coming to understand this. As has already been reported, a member of the "National Defense Committee"—Sh.G.Agayev, a fourth-year student at the Azerbaijani engineering and construction institute—has been detained in Baku. Having confessed in full to the charges made against him, he made an appearance on the republic television on 28 January, condemning the actions of the leaders of the Azerbaijan People's Front who provoked the clash, and he said that he considered himself to have been deceived by them.

Contacts between the military authorities, the party, and the soviet bodies on the one hand and the representatives of the public and local inhabitants on the other are becoming closer and more specific. In Gyandzha a meeting has taken place between Army General V.I. Varennikov, USSR people's deputy and commander-in-chief of land forces, and workers of the city committee of the party and representatives of the "People's Front." An understanding has been reached on joint measures aimed at stabilizing the situation.

Nevertheless, the actions of destructive forces are still perceptible. Work has not yet resumed at a number of enterprises in Baku, Sumgait, Yevlakh, Sheki, Geokchai, and other towns.

As has been reported by L.I. Pingarev, USSR deputy minister of railways, more than 10,000 wagons carrying output destined for the republic's economy have accumulated at stations on the Azeri railway and on the approach tracks of industrial enterprises. Even more wagons are awaiting onward movement into Azerbaijan from neighboring railways.

Things are nervous in the towns of Imishli, Sabarabad, and Yevlakh.

In Stepanakert enterprises and organizations and preschool institutions are not working, classes in schools have been halted, and public transportation has stopped.

In Armenia, too, the situation still remains complex. At the same time, as a result of the measures that have been taken, eight freight trains with fuel and other economic loads have arrived in the republic along the Transcaucasian railroad.

Concern is growing among the population in connection with the increasingly frequent cases of attacks and theft. The situation is still complex on the border of Idzhevanskiy (Armenia) and Kazakhskiy (Azerbaijan) Rayons.

The process of stabilization continues on the Soviet-Iranian sector of the state border. Movement of transport and of freight has been restored through the Astara border control point. Altogether 363 persons have been detained at border outposts while trying to avoid border control points, including 255 persons trying to cross the border into Iran and 108 from Iran to the USSR.

Today the activists Guseynov and Muradov of the "People's Front" of Dzhalilabadskiy Rayon were detained by border troops when trying to go abroad. The violators were carrying 13,000 rubles. Two border violators from Iran were detained in the sector of the Lenkoran border detachment based on information from local inhabitants.

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs has announced that a proposal has been passed on to representatives of Iran by the Soviet side for a bilateral agreement on simplifying crossings of the Soviet-Iranian border by citizens living in the border areas, and for a memorandum on conditions for reciprocal visits to relatives and for those on private business, which envisages the easing of arranging this type of visit. The aforementioned proposals are being studied in Tehran. Essential measures are being taken so as to complete work on these documents in the very near future.

Azerbaijan Railway Status

LD3001190690 Moscow TASS in English 1835 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Baku January 30 TASS—By AZERINFORM correspondent:

The Azerbaijani railway has reached half of the planned train turnover for the first time in the four days since the railway transportation was restored in the area.

Today the Azerbaijani railway exchanged 30 trains with the northern Caucasus railway at the Samur station.

"However, these rates are too slow to restore the normal functioning of the railway and to increase traffic from the northern Caucasus," Soviet Deputy Railway minister Leonid Pingarev told TASS.

"Over 10,000 train cars with products for the Azerbaijani economy have stored at Azerbaijani railway stations because of consignees. [sentence as received] Even more train cars are stuck at neighbouring railways. They are loaded with medicines and foodstuffs."

It is necessary to improve the situation as soon as possible in order to avoid such extraordinary measures as limiting the dispatch of cargo to Azerbaijan, Pingarev believes.

The Railway Ministry is ready to render comprehensive help to restore the normal functioning of the railway. Measures are being taken to resume train movement in the southern part of the Azerbaijani railway, located in the Armenian Megrinskiy region, and explanatory work is under way in all divisions of the railway.

Population Safety Ensured

LD3001201190 Moscow TASS in English 1951 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Yerevan January 30 TASS—Despite the complicated situation in Armenia, the local party, government and economic bodies have managed, in close cooperation with public organisations and groups, to secure control over developments in cities and village of the republic and prevent unfavourable excesses, it was announced on Tuesday at a session of the republican council for the state of emergency.

Sufficient troops have been deployed in areas bordering on Azerbaijan to ensure safety of the population as a result of close interaction between regular Army and Interior Ministry forces. Favourable conditions have in this way been created for returning on a voluntary basis arms and equipment where they belonged.

At the same time attacks have continued against Interior Ministry stocks of weapons.

The republican prosecutor's office jointly with the military procurator's office have been investigating the incident of January 28, when a worker was killed during an operation to recapture stolen weapons and combat equipment from the population.

The continued blockade of Armenia is causing immense losses to all spheres of life in the republic. The situation is dramatic in the field of education, for one. Classes have had to be suspended in many Yerevan schools.

Catholicos of all Armenians Vasgen I has addressed a message to Patriarch Pimen of Moscow and all Russia to inform the patriarch that the Armenian Apostolic Church has donated 300,000 roubles to help the families of soldiers and officers which had to flee from Azerbaijan.

"We express our grief and condolences and pray for peaceful rest of the innocent souls of killed servicemen and their relatives," the message says.

Armenian Patriarch Appeals

LD3001205890 Moscow TASS in English 1957 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Yerevan January 30 TASS—By TASS special correspondent Sergey Petukhov:

Vazgen I, supreme patriarch-catholicos of all Armenians, expressed his deep sorrow over the recent tragic events in the Transcaucasia. Vazgen I told TASS he is sure that these events brought pain and grief to both Armenian people and all peoples of the Soviet Union.

He expressed hope that the central authorities will take necessary measures to rule out the possibility of similar events in future. The church is ready to bring its peacemaking word to Armenians and Azerbaijanians.

Vazgen I believes that Muslim clergy will also call only for peace making and hopes that this will contribute to the restoration of peace.

Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples have been neighbours for centuries and that is why interethnic feud must be stopped, Vazgen I said. He expressed hope that the problems will be solved by legal means in a short time and that peace, accord and cooperation will return to the land of Transcaucasia.

In addition to material aid to Armenian refugees, the Apostolic Church of Armenia has donated 300,000 roubles to the relief fund of families of military men who had to leave Azerbaijan.

Yerevan Radio Reviews Events In, Around Armenia

Commandant Briefs Meeting

NC3001205390 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1700 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Major General Safonov, state of emergency commandant in the region, and Colonel Sechenykh, chief of the political department at the commandant's office, met with the leaders of Stepanakert's party and soviet bodies, enterprises, organizations, and associations at the premises of the Stepanakert city party committee on 30 January.

The state of emergency commandant briefed those attending the meeting about the operational situation in the region. He said that all necessary means are being employed to prevent any possible clash on interethnic grounds. He stated that the oblast is sufficiently protected. The measures to clear the roads are continuing. This task has virtually been accomplished within the borders of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. At present, 700 to 1,000 passengers of both nationalities are commuting daily. There have been no attacks on road transportation for the last few days. The commandant stressed that any attempt in this connection will be resolutely resisted by the troops; special measures will be employed for this purpose and, where necessary, arms will be used.

Maj Gen Safonov assured the participants in the meeting that the Goris road will very soon be cleared, followed by the Gazak road. He admitted that the unsettled psychological situation in which the oblast's population finds itself is also affecting the troops and for that reason appropriate explanatory work is being carried out with the latter. It is difficult for everyone, he said.

The commandant reminded the meeting that strikes are prohibited under the state of emergency and that the leaders of the labor collectives have already been informed of this.

He referred to the arrival of the four-man republican organizational committee in Stepanakert, which is headed by Polyanichko, second secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, and which was the reason for the present almost total general strike. He said that the purpose of the visit was to restore the oblast's party and soviet bodies. But the commandant also mentioned the fact that there is no balancing representation in the organizational committee and that the primary duty of the committee which has come from Baku is to augment the organizational committee with the representatives of the Armenian population of the NKAO.

Comrade Safonov replied to the participants' many questions on the mandate of the state of emergency commandant, the fate of detained persons, and so on. The commandant specifically stated that persons under 30-day administrative detention are being kept in Don-Rostov and Krasnodor and all will be released when their time is up.

In discussing the restoration of the work rhythm, the participants in the meeting arrived at the unanimous view that the stabilization of labor activity and the elimination of the prevailing tension is possible only if the organizational committee members from Baku leave the autonomous oblast; this is because the Armenian population of the NKAO considered, and continues to consider, the latest decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the NKAO as unacceptable.

Council Reviews Situation

NC3001194190 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1700 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] The republican council on the special situation met today under Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee. (?It was indicated that) the situation in the republic is under control, but remains complex. There were no incidents involving attempts to seize arms in the course of the day [passage indistinct]. The situation in areas that border Azerbaijan is gradually stabilizing. The redeployment of the army units in these areas is basically completed and this has created the prerequisite conditions for the disbanding of the guerrillas and the return of illegally obtained arms.

The operational staff attached to the republican council on the special situation instructed the Armenian Internal Affairs Ministry and Araratskiy rayon party committee to continue their efforts to stabilize the situation in the border areas of the [names indistinct] regions.

The republican council on the special situation particularly stressed that in the work carried out by the party and soviet bodies, public organizations, and associations' political methods alone must be used. The most important problem (?for the concerned groups) remains the need to instill the indisputable truth that only sincere and truthful dialogue, cooperation between formal and informal organizations, and mutual agreement on actions can mitigate the tension of emotions and feelings.

Detailed information relating to the republican council on the special situation will be published in the press.

The operational staff of the republican council on the special situation gave the following information to an ARMENPRES correspondent on 30 January:

The situation has been relatively calm in the republic in the past 24 hours. There have been no incidents involving attempts to seize arms. Rather, arms that were seized earlier have been returned to the Internal Affairs Ministry departments in a number of rayons of the republic.

The attempt to settle the uprooted families from Azerbaijan in Kerki village in Ilichevskiy rayon of Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic came under strong criticism during the staff meeting. Such an attempt is indeed fraught with unpredictable results.

The staff denied rumors that the servicemen deployed in Armenia are urgently moving their families out to other parts of the country supposedly in preparation for a punitive (?action by) the servicemen. This rumor is probably being disseminated with the intention of creating anti-army sentiments. Such an attitude would be alien to our people who have always assumed a friendly (?stance) toward the army.

Radio communication with Stepanakert, Shaumyanovskiy, and Getashen is (?normal). Regrettably, so far it has not been possible to ensure the reception of Armenian television in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.

According to information from the Health Ministry, 266 refugees are being treated in Yerevan hospitals. Four refugees uprooted from Baku died in the clinics during the previous day.

Economic Blockade Continues

NC3001132890 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1000 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] The Armenian republic's state committee of people's control has stated that despite all the measures adopted by the union bodies, the republic's Council of Ministers, and USSR communications ministers to unblock the transportation routes of Azerbaijan, the economic blockade is still continuing.

From 26 to 28 January, 45 trains arrived in Yerevan by way of Georgia on the Transcaucasian railways. The freight included: 65 tankers of benzine, 340 of fuel oil, 34 of diesel oil, 8 of aircraft fuel as well as industrial goods and containers. Food also arrived, including 8 freight cars of meat, 16 of sugar, 4 of canned food and eggs, 2 of flour, 3 of grain, and so on.

Rayon Elects Party Secretary

NC3001134690 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0545 GMT 30 Jan 90

[From review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] The paper published an ARMENPRES report on the Shirakskiy Rayon party committee plenum, which discussed organizational questions. The plenum elected Babanyan from among three nominees as the first secretary of the Shirakskiy Rayon party committee. He was the second secretary of the same rayon party committee.

Arutyunyan Visits Gorisskiy

NC3001174690 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0545 GMT 30 Jan 90

[From review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] As we have already reported, Suren Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee and chairman of the republican council on the special situation, visited Gorisskiy rayon on 27 January.

In Goris the leadership of the refugees committee appealed to the first secretary of the republic's Communist Party Central Committee, calling for the solution of the refugees' housing problems by the payment of compensation for the losses they have sustained. This is an important issue. At present 2,300 refugees live in Goris. There is a substantial number in the rayon villages as well.

Comrade Arutyunyan pointed out that during the 17 January meeting with the country's leadership we brought up this problem as being a matter of the utmost urgency. Soon after our meeting, the USSR Council of Ministers reached a decision providing for wide and comprehensive measures to give assistance to the refugees, he said. As regards the housing issue, we all know that we face enormous problems in settling the refugees arriving in Yerevan; after all, the population of the city now exceeds 1.5 million.

The conversation continued. The people of Goris expressed their views and talked about their daily lives. I am sure that the workers of the rayon will ensure calm and stability, Comrade Arutyunyan said. The army units which have come here will assist you in maintaining security and calm. Actions which might complicate the situation and cause the Armenian people to be blamed must not be allowed to take place.

At the request of the population of Goris, the first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee described the complex situation prevailing in the region. He stressed that under these conditions we must display perseverance, patience, and sagacity and must help in the stabilization of the situation.

Later, Comrade Arutyunyan met with the party and economic aktiv of the Gorisskiy Rayon. The secretary of the rayon party committee spoke about issues related to the socio-economic development of the region, the improvement of the policy of capital investments, a radical improvement in living conditions, the solution of the water requirements of the rayon, and the need to set up local construction organizations.

In reply to questions, the first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee stressed that the necessary measures are being taken in the republic to stabilize the situation and to maintain law and order.

An extensive report by ARMENPRES correspondent Liloyan on the meeting of Comrade Arutyunyan with the workers of Gorisskiy Rayon has been published.

Strike in Stepanakert Continues, Work Halted

NC3001191190 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Stepanakert, 30 Jan (ARMENPRES)—Work has come to a halt once again in Stepanakert. Industrial enterprises, construction organizations, transportation, public services, cultural and intellectual institutes, and educational establishments did not operate in the oblast's center on 29 January. Party, soviet, trade union, and Komsomol workers left their offices. Only essential services, such as medical centers and provision stores, were operating.

The reason for the new wave of protest is the arrival in Stepanakert of a group of representatives of the republican organizational committee, headed by Polyanichko, the second secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee. Eduard Petrosyan, deputy director of the oblast party committee apparatus, stated this to an ARMENPRES correspondent. He added: First of all, there are no Armenian representatives from the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] on that committee, in line with the principles of equilibrium as envisaged in the 28 November 1989 decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the NKAO. Second: Our people had earlier expressed their unequivocal negative stance on that document, regarding it as unacceptable. It is to the point to mention that the Azerbaijani side, too, is rejecting that decision. However, the main issue is the fact that, as was expected, this decision of the country's supreme authority not only did not improve the situation in the region, but rather caused the unprecedented intensification of the tension. We consider the arrival of the Azerbaijani representatives in Stepanakert as yet another attempt to prove the unprovable: That the root cause of the irregularities taking place in the republic is to be found in the NKAO. This was specifically stated at the open meeting of the workers of the oblast party committee apparatus. The meeting endorsed an appeal addressed to Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

New Appointees To Head Committees in Armenia

NC2601175090 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 23 Jan 90

[Text] Yerevan, 23 Jan (ARMENPRES)—Stepan Pogosyan has been appointed chairman of the State Committee for Publications, Printing, and the Book Trade. He replaces Gegam Mugnetsyan, who was released from that post when he requested retirement.

Genrik Azatyan has been appointed chairman of the State Committee for the Reception and Settlement of the Armenians Returning to Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR].

The decrees of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on these appointments have been published in the republican press.

Baku Radio Carries Announcements on Events

Area 'Largely Peaceful'

NC3001183490 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1704 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Notice by military commandant of Baku dated 30 January—read by announcer]

[Text] The situation in the city has been largely peaceful during the past day. Public transport and the trade and services establishments continued to work. The workers want the situation to be normalized. On Monday, 50 percent of the establishments and 60 percent of the (?shops) were functioning. However, a number of collectives failed to resume work, particularly in the Nasimi, Kirov, and Karadag Rayons. It should be noted that the military troops positioned in Karadag's [name indistinct] town have detained one person who was distributing leaflets to the houses in the town calling for the continuation of the strike. Such activities will be prevented.

I wish to draw your attention to the fact that the number of persons detained recently for violating the curfew has increased. Last night 72 persons were detained. Furthermore, the military troops detained five persons for violating the passport regime. Another three individuals were detained for [words indistinct].

I urge all the residents of Baku to comply with the curfew hours.

The troops and the law enforcement organs have been taking all necessary measures to establish order in the city and safeguard the constitutional freedoms of the citizens.

Six persons who were involved in [word indistinct] and the killing of people were arrested during an operation by the internal affairs organs and the internal affairs units on the night of 29 and 30 January. Two radio receivers (?acquired from a ship), 1 kg of narcotic substances, and 15 syringes were seized from them.

I call on the residents of Baku once again, urging them to inform the (?military commandant's headquarters) and the internal affairs organs on [words indistinct] and (?malicious activities). It is only through your help that we can succeed in [words indistinct] in the capital and safeguard the life of the people.

Comrades, the citizens are appealing to the commandant's headquarters with various questions. You can receive replies to many of your questions by dialing the following telephone number: 98 28 10. I repeat the number: 98 28 10.

[Signed] Lieutenant General Dubinyak, military commandant of Baku.

Railway Situation Reviewed

NC3101112390 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
1700 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] Azerbaijan railway workers have prepared half the railway cars included in the movement plan within 4 days after movement on the tracks resumed. At the [name indistinct] railway station, they moved 65 railway cars to and from their colleagues affiliated with the northern Caucasus railways. Work at the (?Buyukkesik) railway station has also been significantly restarted. Azerbaijan and the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] change railway cars there as well. The work to load and unload the freight cars is improving. Compared with a few days ago, the number of railway cars being loaded and unloaded has tripled.

[Name indistinct] deputy minister of USSR railways, told an AZERINFORM correspondent the following: [word indistinct] is not enough to resume normal work in the railways network and to bring more railway cars in from the northern Caucasus. Due to the fault of those who receive freight, hundreds of railway cars loaded with freight for Azerbaijan's [word indistinct] have been stranded on the tracks. [passage indistinct]

According to what the deputy minister said, the employees in Sumgait, particularly those affiliated with the Azerbaijan metal pipes and [word indistinct] factories, and the workers of the construction administration number 8, are creating a difficult situation for the railway workers. Dozens of railway cars awaiting unloading have been standing for many days inside tracks of those establishments. Consequently, many empty railway cars have been parked outside the city. The accumulation of the railway cars is seriously harming not only the work in that region but also the work of the entire Azerbaijani railway network. (?Shortages) may result from the failure of the freight-receiving departments of various industrial establishments, trade organizations, and (?supply centers) to work satisfactorily. It is their fault that thousands of containers have piled up in Baku's [name indistinct] railway station.

The deputy foreign minister said that the situation, which has prevented the adoption of measures required to improve the dispatch of freight to Azerbaijan, has to be rectified as quickly as possible. The railway workers and those who cooperate with them have every opportunity to do this. The Ministry of railways is ready to extend help to restore work on the railway network.

Meanwhile, measures are currently being taken to restore more movement of railway cars on the tracks, that is, in the section of the railway network crossing Armenia's Megrinskiy Rayon. Significant briefings are being given to all personnel on the track.

Border Region Withdrawal

NC3101063490 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
1800 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] The agreement reached on withdrawing armed groups in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] from the Armenian SSR and Nakhijevan Autonomous SSR border region is still being implemented. One tank, one armored vehicle, [word indistinct], eight [word indistinct] vehicles, and three mortars previously seized by armed individuals in the republic were taken back on 28 January.

The border guards have brought the entire Azerbaijan SSR state border under control by implementing effective political and administrative measures. Efforts made to smuggle arms into the country have been foiled. About 400 individuals were arrested for trying to cross the border from illegal points from 26 to 28 January. Six smuggled parcels, about 2 million Iranian rials, 300 [word indistinct], and other types of soft drinks were confiscated.

Generally, the local people and the social organizations are contributing toward following the border regime.

Mutalibov Relieved as Chairman

NC2601191190 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
1803 GMT 26 Jan 90

[Decree issued by Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium on 26 January in Baku—read by announcer]

[Text] The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet made the following decision: because of his appointment as the first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, Comrade Ayaz Niyaz Oglu Mutalibov is relieved of his responsibilities as the chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers Presidium.
[Signed] El'mira Kafarova, chairwoman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and Refiga Kaziyeva, secretary of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Baku City, 26 January 1990.

Gasanov Appointed Chairman

NC2601192390 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1805 GMT 26 Jan 90

[Decree issued by Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium on 26 January in Baku—read by announcer]

[Text] The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium has made the following decision: Comrade Gasan Aziz Oglu Gasanov will be appointed chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers Presidium.
[Signed] El'mira Kafarova, chairwoman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and Refiga Raziyev, secretary of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.
Baku City, 26 January 1990.

Brazauskas Message to Gorbachev on Conscription

LD3001152990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Text] The Lithuanian Telegraph Agency announced today that Algirdas Brazauskas has sent a telegram to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in connection with the request and demand of Lithuanian women. The telegram reads:

Concern is voiced by the public of Lithuania about the situation which has developed in the republics of Transcaucasia as well as about the fate of soldiers who are doing their military service in those republics.

In connection with this, we convey the demands of a mass rally which was organized by the Movement of Lithuanian Women and which took place on 24 January in Vilnius opposite the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet building.

Efforts must be made so that all conflicts in the country are solved by peaceful means. Soldiers from Lithuania must not be sent to the Transcaucasian republics; those who have been sent there must be returned immediately.

The question of setting of a professional, employed army should be considered. Military formations on the territory of Lithuania, in which citizens of Lithuania could do their military service, must be reinstated.

Military construction units which have nothing to do with national defense and where unprofessional attitudes between servicemen are especially common must be disbanded.

A new form of state insurance must be set up; compensation to the parents whose sons perished in the armed forces and to the servicemen who were maimed during army service must be paid from the funds of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

We ask you to assist in the solution of the above issues.

Agricultural

Ryzhkov Holds Talks With Peasant Farmers

PM3001163990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by I. Abakumov and V. Gavrichkin: "Peasant Is He Who Has Land. Meeting in Kremlin With Delegates of First Russian Farmers Congress"]

[Text] As already reported, the first (inaugural) Congress of the Association of Russian Peasant Farms and Agricultural Cooperatives (AKKOR) was held in Moscow 22-24 January. Strictly speaking, it should be called the fourth congress because in the first year of the revolution deputies from the peasant soviets met three times. But in January 1918 congresses of free rural working people ceased and their executive committees were disbanded. This effectively marked the elimination of the all-Russian class organization of peasants, which ultimately facilitated the transition both to war communism and to mass collectivization and its repressions, in which millions of farmers lost their lives. The consequences of this great tragedy for rural folk still shake society through the convulsions of the food crisis—an intolerable phenomenon in a civilized country at the end of the 20th century.

Now, 72 years on, a new generation of independent rural masters has gathered **for their** congress to found **their** organization. Its statutes have been ratified. Its leading organs—the association council, presidium, and auditing commission—have been formed. USSR People's Deputy A. Yemelyanov, an academician of the V.I. Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences, was elected president. And on 25 January, as IZVESTIYA has already reported, N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, received a group of Russian peasant congress delegates in the Kremlin.

...By the Spasskiy Gates, as the delegates were setting foot on the Kremlin's cobblestones, Vladimir Konoplyannikov, a pleasant young farmer and a good organizer (he was the first one in Saratov to form the local peasants into an association), addressed his colleagues: "**Muzhiks,** remember this day. Today we receive the right to life..." People were commenting on that remark all the way to Kremlin doors themselves: Many delegates went to their peasant congress feeling almost like social outcasts—so great are the hostility and social suspicion with regard to this reborn, yet new tenor of life in the countryside.

Vladimir seemed to have foreseen that; literally just a few minutes later Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov would stress, when opening the meeting, that the Russian peasants' congress was far from a ordinary event in the country's life. It is just 10 months since the CPSU Central Committee March (1989) Plenum, which officially confirmed the vital need for the development of a mixed rural economy and a diversity of forms of economic management in the countryside—and now there is a meeting with the all-Russian organization of Soviet farmers, which will present and defend the interests of individual peasant farms, agricultural cooperatives, and lease collectives. Thus, things have begun to move.

N.I. Ryzhkov also noted that the time has come to move on from slogans of support for all forms of management to practical support for them—this is where the greatest gaps are now. The government's task is to remove all the administrative and economic obstacles to the development of peasant farms and provide them with living and management conditions that really are equal to those enjoyed by collective farms [kolkhozes] and state farms [sovkhozes].

Informing N.I. Ryzhkov about the results of the congress' work, AKKOR President A. Yemelyanov noted that peasant farmers are not looking to make enemies for themselves on kolkhozes and sovkhozes and are not aiming to create a new political party. Their goal is to integrate with the existing economic system and to achieve equality with it.

The questions of land and ownership are still the main ones here. But it is particularly important to create an efficient mechanism for obtaining land.

Another problem (which virtually all the speakers emphasized) is that peasant farms and cooperatives were effectively cut off from the supply system and are subject to rigid economic dictates on the part of the kolkhoz and sovkhoz administration.

"Farms in our rayon have switched entirely to the cooperative system," V. Ushakov, first secretary of Chita Oblast's Karymskiy CPSU Rayon Committee [raykom], said in his speech. "The most urgent question for us now is the Ministry of Finance's insidious instruction on taxation. The progressive tax scale could fleece everyone. We ask the ministry to exempt peasant farmers and peasant cooperatives from taxation for 5 years and allow them to find their feet. One more thing: Peasants would like to work directly with soviets, bypassing the superfluous intermediate links and associations of the agroindustrial committee."

Ryzhkov: There are proposals to allocate land via the soviets, too. What is your attitude to that?

Ushakov: All peasants support that. And they should not just allocate plowland but also allocate other farmland, woodlands, reservoirs, and so forth.

Ryzhkov: Should there be a new land organization?

Ushakov: Yes. It is necessary to analyze who is using the land and how to redistribute it. [Ushakov ends]

The idea of the fair redistribution of land in favor of its real masters was mentioned in one form or another in the speeches by farmers and cooperative members V. Chumak from Penza Oblast, A. Osipov from Kalinin Oblast, O. Kharitonov from Leningrad Oblast, A. Yezhikov from Yaroslavl Oblast, N. Oseledko from Novosibirsk Oblast, P. Bazarov from the Buryat autonomous republic, M. Dzhlaukhyan and A. Chistov from Rostov Oblast, F. Timoshenko from Krasnodar, V. Tarasov from Stavropol, A. Frolov from the Moscow region, and other participants. The speakers presented a thorough and reasoned analysis of the advantages of the new forms of economic management, pointed out that they had no rights in the face of the kolkhoz and sovkhoz bureaucracy, and cited a host of examples to show how leaders of local farms are stifling individual farming and agricultural cooperatives by charging exorbitant rent, including for land, and discriminatory prices for output, and are artificially driving a wedge of contradictions between the new masters, kolkhoz members, and sovkhoz workers.

Osipov: I am a city dweller who has decided to work on the land. I used to think that lessees could be a good supplement to the kolkhoz system. But when I went to the kolkhoz I encountered the amateurishness and hostility of the leadership. I am a lessee. I waited 7 months for the conclusion of a contract, in that period I bought tractors and a farm, that is, I became a peasant, I produce output, but the kolkhoz takes all the subsidy. Well, I'm not against that, but the money is going to waste. The kolkhoz is old, it hasn't got workshops or anything. The way people live—that can't even be called living. You try to get something done—the chairman opposes you and a struggle begins. And after all, it wasn't just at our request that we came here: There was an appeal, we supported the party's policy, but we are treated like enemies. In the end either I will join the independent farmers or lease the entire kolkhoz.

Tarasov: In our kray everything is permitted but you can do nothing—they cut the ground from under your feet. When I began work I asked for some cows—they can't sell them; I asked for land—there is none. I live by my own efforts. And even though I produce three times as much milk as the kolkhoz I have nowhere to pasture my cows: On one side there is a restricted zone, on the other plowland, but they have built dachas there. Where are people to get meat from? Now they even ban you from herding your cows across the farm.

Ryzhkov: Why?

Tarasov: They tell me that there are flowers growing there, the cows will eat them.

Ryzhkov: But do the residents have their own cows?

Tarasov: No, they have flowers... I have two tractors, a truck, a farm. But the worrying thing is the constant pressure and the fanning of hostility toward farmers. It is the farm leaders who do that. Deliberately. Even our raykom first secretary cannot cope with them. That being so, even if we pass a good law they won't let it work.

Chumak: Why do they make us pay for the land? I understand that a tractor has to be leased from the kolkhoz—the kolkhoz owns it. But the land doesn't belong to the kolkhoz, and the kolkhoz itself doesn't pay for it. However, I agree to pay for the land. But to pay the soviet. Let the kolkhoz pay the same rate as me. And as for subsidies... I would ask most earnestly: Remove these supplements! They stop people working. The worse they work, the bigger the subsidy.

Timoshenko: Our main aim is to feed the people. And we would kindly ask you to give us the opportunity to work toward that aim... We ask the local leaders. They all say that they support the March Plenum's decision. But in this respect each of them sees and senses in us a competitor, a force which will bring him down. For example, take the place where I work: There are 1,200 people on the farm but only around 200 are directly employed in production, while the office staff gets bigger and bigger. The result is that agricultural production is falling even across Krasnodar Kray as a whole. If we don't accept the new forms of management the result will be poverty. [Timoshenko ends]

The character of the discussion which took place, the content of the problems raised at the meeting, the interest in the opinions, and the depth of reflection on the state of affairs in the countryside all demonstrate that a qualitatively new stratum of workers is being formed in our countryside—peasant masters.

N.I. Ryzhkov drew attention to the fact that the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Food and Purchases and the republic agro-industrial committees should not be neutral toward the development of peasant farms, lease enterprises, and agricultural cooperatives. All economic organizations should have equal rights because they are working toward a single goal—to speed up the saturation of the consumer market with food products.

At the meeting instructions were given to leaders of the relevant departments to generalize the proposals voiced at the AKKOR Congress with a view to removing the unwarranted restrictions on the development of peasant farms before the adoption of the laws on land and ownership.

Thus, AAKOR has been given official recognition. Now the real work begins....

Russian Agro-Industrial Complex Council Meets

WA3001205290 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 28 Jan 90 p 2

[Ye. Petrakov report: "Russian Agro-Industrial Complex Council"]

[Text] The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Agro-Industrial Complex Council has held its first session. This body, which coordinates the activity of enterprises and organizations and various sectors of the agro-industrial complex of the biggest union republic, incorporates the leaders of the state agro-industrial committees and agro-industrial committees of the autonomous formations, krays and oblasts of Russia and of the ministries and departments which are a part of this complex. Ye.S. Stroyev and G.I. Usmanov, secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee, and senior officials of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR and RSFSR Councils of Ministers took part in the session.

The question of the results of the work of the RSFSR agro-industrial complex in 1989 and the tasks pertaining to an increase in food in 1990 in light of the CPSU Central Committee March (1989) Plenum and the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies was examined. A report was delivered by Ye.I. Sizenko, first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers.

It was observed that it had not been possible to remove the strain on the food market. The rate of growth of the production of agricultural products and foodstuffs was failing to conform to demand. In addition, there had been a decline in the production of potatoes, vegetables, and melon crops. The Bashkir, Tatar, and Mordovian ASSRs, Krasnodar Kray and Volgograd, Omsk, Orenburg, Rostov, Ulyanovsk, and certain other oblasts failed to fulfill the state order for supplies of meat products to all-union and republic stocks. As a result the continuous provision of the population of the major industrial centers and areas of the North and Far East with food was disrupted. The numbers of all types of livestock, particularly cows, have declined. Considerable losses of products of the fields and livestock sections have been allowed to occur.

The council proposed measures aimed at the accelerated development of the republic's agro-industrial complex.

Assessments Made on New Farm Association

PM3001154390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 26 Jan 90 Second Edition p2

[V. Mikhaylov report: "Peasant Revival. Notes From Constituent Congress of New Russian Association"]

[Text] I think that until quite recently today's farmers were called individual peasants or something even more scathing. This concept immediately caused many to recall the notion of anarchy, stubbornness, or, at the very least, intractability. The very first minutes of the recent Congress of the Association of Peasant Farms and Agricultural Cooperatives seemed to confirm the popular myths of the old days. When it was discovered that a large proportion of those gathered in the presidium were "white-collar workers," an implacable woman's voice demanded:

"We must split up: Let the real peasants sit on one side of the hall and those who simply intend to assist them on the other..."

But fears that the unavoidable diversity of views and opinions would lead to a split were not borne out. Yes, the people who had gathered for the congress were not an obliging lot. The majority of delegates had to put up a fight to get independence. There were a considerable number of trials and ordeals to overcome and some people became a little overwrought, but, despite this, in the main, the congress demonstrated striking unanimity: One decision after another was adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes. Just like in the "good old days" of the stagnation era. The only difference being that, this time, the unity was sincere and natural.

It is worth repeating the figure given by V.V. Nikitin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Commission for Food and Purchases, when addressing the congress: According to official statistics, the country already has something in the region of 10,000 independent peasant farms. Is this a lot or a few? On the scale of our great state, this is nothing at all. Just think, however: At present there are only party decisions and party directives proclaiming a policy of equal rights for different forms of ownership and economic management. Either this is not backed up by law at all or it is backed up badly. Legislators have evidently failed to keep pace with the political branch and, to some extent, with the executive. Consequently, it often happens that our management structures put off what many see as newcomers from the past. But the latter are breaking through nevertheless.

"I am among the 30 percent of delegates who have come here from small, remote villages," I. Khodakov from Kalinin Oblast began his speech. "I have lived with my wife and three daughters in the sticks for 2 years. Bread is delivered to us once a week or once every 10 days. To get a gas cylinder I was forced to go to the first secretary of the party rayon committee, and when the pump broke the chairman of the oblast soviet executive committee was the only person who could help me."

"We often hear that individual farming is only suited to the Non-Chernozem Zone or regions that have been totally ruined. It is supposedly unsuited to our fertile region," V. Timoshenko, a peasant from Krasnodar Kray, said. "But here are some figures for you to think about. In the Kuban, collective farms [kolkhozes] and state farms [sovkhozes] have 4,126,000 hectares of land at their disposal, while individual farms in the region have only 143,000 hectares. There would seem to be no comparison. Nevertheless, individual truck gardens and farms provide 22 percent of all vegetables, 29 percent of meat, and 12 percent of milk. A fertile southern hectare of plowland owned by kolkhozes and sovkhozes generates an income of R1,300, while the same land in a peasant truck garden generates R7,000, or 5-6 times more."

The comparison is not totally correct, of course, as grain is not sown in truck gardens: They are usually used to grow only highly intensive, highly profitable crops. But, at the same time, there is no doubt that, even allowing for this, the difference is still considerable and in individual farms' favor. So did the congress come out in favor of an immediate total transition to individual farms? Nothing of the sort! Peasant good sense and peasant hostility to any hasty action were in full evidence at the congress. The congress reports, speeches, and documents took it for granted that the formation of an individual farming sector in the agricultural economy is no simple and speedy task, and so to call for the immediate disbandment of kolkhozes and sovkhozes would be pure adventurism with catastrophic consequences. In a letter addressed to all Russia, the founders of the new association said frankly and unequivocally: Independent peasant farms are not an alternative to collective forms of labor—the two should complement one another.

Generally speaking, it could not be otherwise, because the congress formed an association—we particularly emphasize this—not just of peasant farms but also of agricultural cooperatives. In this respect it is vitally important that kolkhozes and sovkhozes reorganized to operate on cooperative principles are classed as cooperatives on an equal footing with all the rest. They were very broadly represented at the congress. In particular, one of the biggest delegations came from Karymskiy Rayon in Chita Oblast, where all farms have become cooperatives. SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA has written a great deal about them and promoted their formation.

There is a natural logic in the fact that cooperatives formed from kolkhozes and sovkhozes and the owners of independent peasant farms have united in the same association. They not only have common interests. They also have a common destiny. In leased farms the independence of their constituent cooperatives will continue to grow, while individual farmers are going to arrive at the idea of cooperatives sooner or later, but definitely at some stage, as V. Chayanov, the remarkable Russian agrarian scientist, predicted. The present differences between these two outwardly opposed forms of economic management will gradually disappear. Or, to be more precise, are already disappearing. While scientists and politicians are arguing about whether to give preference to kolkhozes over individual farmers, in the real world agricultural associations are forming which, as it were, integrate cooperatives and independent peasant farms. This is what V. Menshatov, chairman of the "Impuls" Association in Perm, said from the congress rostrum, for example:

"Three years ago, I was sent to a laggard kolkhoz where 150 people produced just 100 tonnes of meat. What was to be done? We called a general meeting and agreed, by a majority vote, to disband. We formed 26 individual farms and cooperatives in place of the kolkhoz; some of them only had two machine operators each. We divided the land and livestock between them and sold them equipment, which they pay for in installments. I was elected chairman of the lessees' council, but I am not a totally free chairman, because I am not allowed to give orders. My assistant and I have 100 hectares, and this land helps me to feed myself. Nothing has fallen apart because we have disbanded and nothing that the kolkhoz had gained has been destroyed."

Let me note that the representatives of the individual and cooperative farms were united in their rejection of the administrative-edict system. This is partly the aim of the Association of Peasant Farms and Agricultural Cooperatives: to defend the interests of the free peasantry and struggle against the food requisitioning system—in whatever guise it may appear—as it is damaging both to the countryside and to the Food Program.

Nevertheless, the most extreme points of view were sometimes expressed behind the scenes at the congress. One of these extremes spilled over onto the rostrum toward the end of the proceedings. Additions to the congress resolution on attitudes to the laws on land and ownership suddenly said: Only independent peasant farms have the right to acquire land for ownership; kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and cooperatives can only lease land. Is that not strange? Where is the equality for different forms of ownership and economic management? Doesn't it look as though the individual farms now emerging are trying to suppress all possible rivals in the cradle, so to speak? Or perhaps the situation is even worse? Perhaps rapacious dealers in the shadow economy are hankering for land in the guise of farmers and livestock breeders inspired by peasant ideals?

This point of view was unanimously rebutted. Delegates said that, even if the right to ownership is ratified, they are against free trade in land. Lifetime possession and the possibility to bequeath everything you have earned to your heirs is perfectly adequate for the real working person. So the argument here is more about the terminology than the substance. Those who favor "possession of land" and those who favor "ownership of land" want the same thing: They need to protect themselves against unlawful interference in their work by anyone whatsoever and against rapacious encroachments on their work and the fruits of their labor.

Association of Peasant Husbandries Inaugurated

LD2401175490 Moscow TASS in English 1639 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 24 TASS—Russian enthusiasts, who have set up peasant husbandries or farm production cooperatives, have inaugurated an association of peasant husbandries and cooperatives of Russia. Its constituent congress ended in Moscow today.

The association is headed by Alexey Yemelyanov, vice-chairman of the agrarian problems and food committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet, academician of the USSR Academy of Agricultural Sciences. He is a zealous advocate of new forms of economic management.

The main goal of the new public organisation is to render economic, social and legal assistance to Soviet farmers and cooperatives in promoting efficient production methods, reviving the peasant way of life and labour. The association has the right to effect export and import transactions and propose legislative initiatives. The constituent congress expressed its attitude to the published draft principles of the federal and republican law on land. They demanded that "workers of collective and state farms not be denied the land they cultivate."

Yemelyanov told TASS that the Free Association of Farmers had the purpose of helping "self-management organisations to gradually gain ground and oust the administrative-command system, imposed from above, that is still in force." The association, he believes, "can create a managerial mechanism meeting not only the principles of socialism, but the essence of normal human society."

Yemelyanov realises that it is very difficult to foster a real farmer, aware that he is master of his land, because the administrative system has stripped him of this feeling. "This is why our task is to create a favourable and sound climate for people who are eager to run their farms independently. I believe the peasant and cooperative sector will grow steadily. The number of people in it will increase as we overcome the administrative system and create conditions for the development of peasant and cooperative husbandries."

Military

General Moiseyev Rejects Volunteer Army

WA3001205190 Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian No 1, 1-7 Jan 90 p 7

[Interview with General of Army M.A. Moiseyev, chief of Armed Forces General Staff and first deputy minister of defense of USSR, by correspondents O. Yermolina and A. Zubkov: "Realities of Our Time"; place, date not given]

[Text] Military spending, alternative service and the objectiveness of certain speeches at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies were dealt with in an interview conducted by our correspondents O. Yermolina and A. Zubkov with General of the Army M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the Armed Forces General Staff and first deputy defense minister of the USSR.

[Correspondent] Mikhail Alekseyevich, a release of the USSR Defense Ministry says that the sum total of arms spending in 1990 will be R6.3184 billion less than in 1989. Does this not reflect a reduction in our defense capability?

[Moiseyev] Of course not. Before this decision was made, a thorough evaluation of the state of the current military and political situation and possible prospects of its development was made at all levels. A decision on a unilateral reduction, by 500,000 men, in our Armed Forces with their simultaneous transfer to a new qualitative basis was made with regard for this. I refer here to the fact that the dynamics of the imparting of a defensive thrust to the Armed Forces should maintain such military potential as ensures the reliable preservation of peace, which is being done. The structure of the Armed Forces is being revised; a purely defensive thrust is being imparted to it; plans for operations and combat training are being specified; the system of the training and education of the servicemen is being revised; and the Armed Forces are being furnished with qualitatively new models of arms and military equipment.

[Correspondent] Deputy G.A. Arbatov's speech at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies cited certain comparative figures pertaining to the military budget of the Armed Forces of the United States and the USSR. How objective were these figures?

[Moiseyev] In our officially published data the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces as of 1 January 1990 is put at 3,993,000 men, of the U.S. Armed Forces, 3,289,000 men, that is, 704,000 less. However, this comparison does not reflect the actual correlation of the potential of the armed forces of the opposed blocs. Nor does it reflect the extent of the existing threats to the Soviet Union on the part of NATO, particularly in Europe. Thus the overall strength of the armies of the NATO bloc is 6.5 million men, but of the Warsaw Pact joint armed forces, 5.1 million, including 3.6 and 3.1 million men respectively in Europe. Thus the probable enemy is superior to us in Europe by 500,000 men.

In addition, in accordance with the unilateral reductions, in 1990 the USSR Armed Forces will be reduced by 240,000 men, and by 500,000 men altogether. [sentence as published] Whereas the United States and other NATO countries have not yet in practice embarked on any reduction. There are on this score only the statements of individual members of the American Congress. Official administration spokesmen, however, are of a different opinion. Thus according to a statement by the U.S. defense secretary made on 15 December 1989, "the Bush administration does not plan a reduction in the U.S. Armed Forces at least until agreement is reached at the Vienna negotiations."

As far, however, as a reduction in U.S. military spending is concerned, there did indeed appear at the end of November 1989 in overseas mass media a report on a possible reduction in total appropriations for the 5-year program of the organizational development of the U.S. Armed Forces, beginning 1991. However, at a recent meeting with F. Mitterrand, President Bush declared that at the present time he personally did not see any possibility and necessity of a sharp reduction in the U.S. military budget. In fact the United States has confirmed an official military budget for the 1990 fiscal year on the order of $305.5 billion, which is $6.7 billion more than in 1989. On the other hand, the USSR is reducing its military spending for 1990 by R6.3 billion, that is, 8.2 percent.

Further, although the proportion of military spending of the USSR in GNP differs negligibly from that of the United States (in 1990 it constituted 7.5 percent in the USSR, 5.6 percent in the United States), U.S. GNP is at the same time more than five times greater than that of the USSR. Judge for yourselves: $5.5 trillion and R940 billion respectively. In this connection the absolute amounts of military spending also differ considerably: in the United States it will amount in 1990 to $305.5 billion, in the USSR, to R71 billion. The proportion of military spending in 1990 in the U.S. federal budget (26.3 percent) is almost double the proportion of military spending in the USSR state budget (14.5 percent), and the total U.S. federal budget ($1.16 trillion) is more than twice that of the USSR state budget (R488.2 billion).

I hope the readers will forgive me for this plethora of figures, but they can in this way themselves judge the degree of objectiveness of the data addressed at the congress.

And one more thing. While criticizing the Army, none of the people's deputies, for some reason or other, recalled how much effort was expended by the military on the building of roads in the non-Chernozem area and on harvesting and what assistance the Army is rendering in Chernobyl and Armenia, and now we are even employed in unloading railcars to get the necessary produce to the stores on time. Yes, the Army is performing functions outside of its province, but the country and the people need this. Please understand, this is not taking offense at the criticism, it is simply that we need to be objective on any question.

[Correspondent] There has been much talk recently about a professional army. Some economists believe that, following the 500,000-man reduction in the Soviet Armed Forces, its creation would be possible, even given a five- to eight-fold increase in the growth of spending on its upkeep.

[Moiseyev] It is difficult to agree with this assertion in the full sense of this word, although in the Navy, Air Force, and Missile Forces, and the radio-technical units and subunits, even today the bulk of the specialists are professionals. They are entrusted with most intricate combat equipment, which can only be operated by highly trained specialists. But switching now to the principle of army manpower acquisition on a hired basis is not possible. There is a whole number of reasons for this. The main one is that the danger of war exists and that progress toward lasting peace has yet to assume an irreversible nature. And since we live under these conditions, we need a ready body of militarily trained reservists. The Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy of the USSR [DOSAAF] organizations are called upon to render great assistance here. And this can only be done on the basis of the system of general military service which exists currently. As a whole, this question is very complex and does not allow a casual attitude. In my view, the proposals of many of our economists to the effect that, even given a five- to eight-fold increase in the growth of spending on the maintenance of the Army and Navy, it might be possible to have a professional, or as some people say, a hired army, would seem dubious. Such an approach is in the present economic situation unrealistic.

[Correspondent] There is not in the items of expenditure on the USSR's defenses a special item which speaks of the amounts that are spent on satisfaction of the servicemen's social needs.

[Moiseyev] There is indeed no such separate item. However, the amounts that have been spent on satisfaction of the servicemen's social needs are contained in the budget item "Maintenance of the Army and Navy". And a 1.3-percent growth in its proportion of total spending is observed here. What's behind this figure? As of 1 January 1990 it is contemplated increasing officers' pay by an average of R50 per month; it is planned paying servicemen without lodgings cash compensation—R30-90 per month—for rented accommodations; upon discharge from active duty, compulsory service soldiers will be paid R100 instead of R10-40; the officer corps will also be paid an emolument for a proficiency rating of up to R25 per month, and pay in an amount of 30 percent of salary will be tacked on for flight personnel of the Air Force for special conditions of service. Other supplementary payments with regard for the nature and particular features of military service have been determined also. Expenditures to this end will amount to R1.2 billion, which will be obtained from economies in resources and intrinsic potential of the USSR Defense Ministry.

[Correspondent] Some economists are advocating that we continue the manufacture of military equipment in the same volume, but step up sales of it overseas for foreign currency. How do you view such a prospect?

[Moiseyev] I wish to categorically object to such a viewpoint. The Soviet Government has never viewed the sale of weapons as a source of currency proceeds. The Soviet Union supplies weapons and military equipment to other countries on the basis of intergovernmental agreements and only in the interests of assisting the strengthening of their national security. If the combat properties of the equipment which is sold is viewed, it is not difficult to see that defensive weapons constitute a vast quantity of the equipment.

[Correspondent] Attempts have been made at this time within the framework of conversion to sell obsolete hardware and equipment to civilian organizations. How does the Defense Ministry view the prospects of replenishing its budget in this way?

[Moiseyev] First, the sale of military equipment is the result of the reduction in the Armed Forces, a temporary action. Following concordance with the USSR State Planning Committee, it is planned to sell property and equipment that the forces do not need in a total amount of R59.7 million. This property will be sold by the Defense Ministry via the USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply authorities at wholesale prices with regard for its wear and tear. The USSR Finance Ministry will, by the sum total of resources received from the sale of this property, reduce the budget of appropriations for the USSR Defense Ministry. Therefore, the Defense Ministry will not acquire additional resources from this sale, and this will not increase the military budget. But the Defense Ministry takes a positive view of the sale of equipment, on the whole.

[Correspondent] There has been frequent talk recently of alternative service. What is your attitude toward this issue?

[Moiseyev] It needs to be clarified first of all what kind of service this is. Alternative service, that is, "service without weapons," substitutes for active compulsory military service or duty and is put on a par with it. It is introduced for persons refusing from religious or other beliefs to serve with weapons. The introduction of alternative service for all members of the United Nations is recommended by decisions of the conference on the human dimension (1989 Paris meeting). In accordance with the recommendations of this conference, the various forms of alternative service should not be associated with service in military units and should be of a civilian nature and be socially useful and not be employed as a form of punishment.

Such service is already being implemented in practice in a number of countries. Thus in the FRG, where the number of people refusing military service annually constitutes 60,000-70,000 men, over 90,000 jobs, mainly low-income and unpresitigious and which are filled by such persons, have been created.

A plan for the introduction of "peaceful social" service for those who refuse military service has been drawn up in the GDR. The plan provides for the introduction of two types of alternatives: Service in work subunits per the military principle for a term of 18 months (like active duty) with military clothing, barracks regulations and pay, food and equipment as for servicemen of the National People's Army; or civilian service in the social sphere for a term of 24 months with civilian clothing and accommodation in quarters of the enterprises and establishments where the service is being performed. The material and monetary support of such persons is contemplated in amounts which do not create advantages in relation to the servicemen.

The question of the introduction of alternative service in our country is to a certain extent contrived, in my opinion. A desire for the legalized opportunity to avoid general military service and to evade active duty in any way may be discerned in its formulation by certain citizens and informal associations.

Going by the figures, there is no need for the introduction of alternative service here. In the last five years less than 500 people annually have refused to take the military oath in respect of the USSR Armed Forces (255 in 1984, 301 in 1985, 466 in 1986, 298 in 1987, and 398 in 1988). That is, the number of people is negligible, and the majority of them did not refuse military service altogether, what is more, but were unwilling to on religious grounds to handle weapons.

These figures simply do not compare with the data on "refusals" in other countries. If religious or other beliefs prevent a young man in our country from performing active duty, he is afforded an opportunity to perform his constitutional duty by serving in military construction detachments. Incidentally, measures of punishment under criminal procedure have not been applied in respect to such conscripts. However, in order that service in military construction detachments be legally of the nature of alternative service it is necessary to revise a number of legislative instruments. And this work is being done.

[Correspondents] Mikhail Alekseyevich, thank you for the interview and until we meet again in our newspaper.

[Moiseyev] I know that as of the new year the paper will become a weekly. I hope that it will not forfeit its traditions and will contribute in every possible way to the cause of the patriotic education of the youth.

Akhromeyev Interviewed on Military Doctrine

WA2601204790 Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in Russian No 24, 1989 pp 2-4

[Interview with Marshal S.F. Akhromeyev by NOVOSTI military commentator V. Pogrebenkov: "Our Military Doctrine"]

[Text] **As requested by the editors of our magazine, an NOVOSTI military commentator, V. Pogrebenkov, interviewed Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev, adviser to the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.**

[Pogrebenkov] Sergey Fedorovich, you participated directly in drafting the new Soviet defense doctrine. Would the doctrine have been possible without the new political thinking?

[Akhromeyev] The new political thinking and the defense doctrine are most inseparably connected. A country begins to experience the need for a new military doctrine when it introduces new foreign and domestic policies. Until there is a new policy there can be no new military doctrine, since practically nobody needs it. After 1985 when the new CPSU and government leaders came to power in our country, from 1985-87 they worked on the new foreign and internal policy which received the approval of our society. An objective need arose to work out a new military doctrine also.

[Pogrebenkov] What is the essence of the new foreign policy?

[Akhromeyev] To put it very briefly, if not incompletely, the essence of this policy can be defined by three characteristics. First, demilitarization, i.e. exclusion of force from the foreign policy weaponry. This fundamental concept has been proven true in reality through our relations with every country of any social structure. This concept resulted in major positive changes in the international situation. It goes without saying that we act in such a way only if nobody else is conducting his foreign policy towards us from a position of strength either. Second, democratization—creating a basis of equality in our relationship with any country, whether big or small. Third, deideologizing, i.e. removal of ideological aspects from relations between countries; these relations should be based on international law.

These fundamental decisions radically changed our foreign policy and the military doctrine we had been following in the mid-1980's ceased to conform in any way to the new policy. For that reason a new military doctrine was being designed both in the Soviet Union and in the Warsaw Pact countries in the period from 1985-87. It was published in May of 1987 and has since become the guide to action for the USSR Armed Forces.

[Pogrebenkov] The doctrine has been in effect for over two years. Have you discovered any drawbacks in it during this time?

[Akhromeyev] I do not see any shortcomings in it. The theoretical basis of the doctrine has been well conceived and its military and political part is rooted in our foreign policy. Everybody knows its basic provisions: The Soviet Union will never start a war under any conditions; it will never be the first to deploy nuclear weapons; it does not consider any government or any nation as an enemy. The USSR does not have any territorial claims to anyone else.

Of course, some new problems do arise. But basically these are the very provisions that constitute the essence of our foreign policy and of the military and political part of the doctrine.

If we mention the military-technological side of the doctrine, it is more flexible because it directly depends on the concrete military and political situation. So far we have not found any drawbacks in this area either. This aspect of the doctrine should provide answers to four basic questions: Who is a possible adversary of the country that designed the doctrine? What kind of aggression should the country be ready to repel? What kind of armed forces should it have? How should they be trained to repel the aggression? Our doctrine answers all four of these questions.

Some foreign countries often express their doubts about the contents of the doctrine. But they do not reproach us for lack of details in it; they claim that we say one thing and do something else. But statements of this nature have nothing to do with reality as the Soviet Union does exactly what it says. At the same time the Soviet Union does a lot more to decrease the military tensions than other countries.

[Pogrebenkov] Going back to the definition of a possible adversary of our country, could you present him as more concrete? Who is he, our possible adversary?

[Akhromeyev] This should not be answered by us but by those who call us a possible enemy. Look at the speeches made by the leaders of some NATO countries and you can start with those of U.S. President G. Bush, Secretary of State J. Baker, and Secretary of Defense R. Cheney. The leaders of the NATO military bloc speak the same language: They all call the Soviet Union their enemy. For that reason we do not have to select a possible adversary. He declares himself—the United States and the NATO military bloc.

[Pogrebenkov] Does the Soviet military doctrine include combat operations outside its national borders?

[Akhromeyev] Soviet troops are located on the territories of Hungary, the GDR, Poland, and the CSSR in accordance with the postwar decisions of the USSR, the United States, and Great Britain, and also in accordance with the Warsaw Pact and bilateral agreements. The military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact countries specifies that the first major operations of both our strategic and tactical forces will be entirely defensive in character and meant to repel an aggression. In our view such operations can be long lasting, they might go on for several weeks. During that time the political leaders of the Warsaw Pact will, as we think, take measures to confine the ongoing conflict and to prevent the expansion of war. If political means prove inadequate in eliminating the conflict then it is totally impossible for us to predict now what direction events might follow from then on. The sides would deploy their military forces according to war-time plans.

[Pogrebenkov] From your experience in speaking to foreign audiences do you think that the people of the Western countries have reason to be concerned about the application of our defensive doctrine?

[Akhromeyev] The problem is that the NATO countries are still guided by the outdated military doctrines of "flexible response" and "nuclear deterrence" and the leaders of those countries do not want to change them. So they are trying to compromise our doctrine in order to justify their own actions. And these are intentional moves since the words of the North Atlantic bloc are at considerable variance with its actions. The major political figures of the leading NATO countries praise the Soviet Union for its democracy, for glasnost, and for its foreign policy. They insist that this policy is correct and enjoys their support. But when it comes to considering problems of military policy those same leaders claim that the Soviet Union in reality is not reducing its armaments, that it preserves its enormous military power in a volume considerably larger than NATO's. All this allows for an essentially incorrect conclusion: The NATO armed forces should not be reduced but developed further.

Why do they act like this? Don't they know what we are really doing to reduce our armed forces and to stabilize the international situation? Yes, they do. But the thing is that they would have to undertake similar actions to respond to ours and there may be many reasons why they do not want to do this. Maybe it is worthwhile to name the main one. Why, for instance, does the West not wish to compare military docrines?

If one openly compares in full detail the military doctrines of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and at the same time looks at the actions of both sides in practice, then the picture would seem unfavorable for the North Atlantic Treaty. It would become obvious that NATO continues to escalate its military effort while the Warsaw Pact is diminishing it. That must be the gist of the matter.

[Pogrebenkov] On one hand, we adopted a defensive doctrine and now we transfer the Soviet Armed Forces to new quality characteristics of military structure. That is quite necessary as the military threat for the USSR has not disappeared. On the other hand, we heard it announced at the 2d Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet that our military expenditures will be cut. Isn't there a contradiction?

[Akhromeyev] Contradictions exist always and everywhere in life. What is important, is to take them into account when making decisions. True, the military threat has declined in the last four years and this is a fact. In all fairness I must say that the effort was made by both sides: the USSR and the United States, the Warsaw Pact and NATO. This made it possible to cut the armed forces and armaments. We need it even more now because of the complex economic situation in our country. However, we should be realistic when considering the international situation. As you correctly noticed, the military threat for the Soviet Union is still there. So far the United States and the NATO countries preserve strength as the basis of their foreign policy. When we negotiate with a partner who is guided in his relations with us by a policy which operates from a position of strength we can feel equal only if we are sufficiently strong ourselves. At first glance, this contradicts my earlier statement about demilitarizing our foreign policy, but it does not. We excluded use of force from our intergovernmental relations with any country that would not use force in its relations with us. But we have to act correspondingly with those who base their foreign policy on force. Therefore, we have to maintain the defense capabilities of our country at the necessary level.

Discussion on Discharged Servicemen's Complaints

PM3001141390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jan 90 First Edition p 2

[Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel O. Falichev article: "'I Write in Anguish and Hope...' Reflections on Readers' Letters About Reduction of USSR Armed Forces"]

[Text] **The year 1989, which is already part of history, will remain memorable for the military. The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree "On the Reduction of the USSR Armed Forces and Defense Expenditure in 1989-90" was published 22 March. Let me remind readers that it provides for a reduction of the USSR Armed Forces by**

500,000 servicemen, and also for a reduction of conventional arms and expenditure on defense needs. How is this process developing? What effect has it had on the lives of people in uniform?

The editorial office received 1,045 letters directly touching on questions of the reduction of the Armed Forces. On reading them, you realize that the majority of Army and Navy units and combined units have approached this problem with care. They have elaborated plans and determined the order of reductions. Servicemen and members of their families were notified of organizational measures being implemented in units of the former Central Asian and Urals Military Districts and the groups of forces... Staffers of cadre organs, political workers, and officers from financial organs talked to those due to be discharged.

Nonetheless, it must be bluntly said: Quite a few letters express anguish, alarm, and requests for assistance. Why is this? Initially, many units received orders to discharge all who wished to be discharged. I was shown telegrams to this effect in the Air Defense Forces, in units of the former Central Asian Military District... The press also wrote about the possibility that all who so wished could be discharged. It later became evident that the situation had been incorrectly appraised: There were many more people wishing to be discharged than had been assumed, especially among junior officers. For example, about 40 percent of officers applied in just one regiment of the Moscow Military District Air Defense Forces. And that was happening in the Moscow region! Consequently, numerous conflict situations developed in units, and the editorial office was swamped by a flood of letters from people asking for help with their discharge.

This flood peaked in the summer and fall last year. It appeared that people had not been flatly refused a discharge, as the letters reported, but all possible means were being used to retard the processing of documents. A typical letter in this regard was written by Senior Lieutenant I. Vengrus, commander of a motorized rifle company. "I am striving to get discharged. All command personnel, from unit commander to combined unit commander, tell me that I will be discharged. But my documents have been returned to me three times. The first time because two or three words had not been properly entered on some piece of paper. The second time because there was no explanatory note about the reason for discharge. The third time it appeared that I had not completed the requisite period in service by some 1.5-2 months. This meant that I could be discharged only... for reasons of professional unfitness. I ask you to help..."

The same problem was raised in letters from officers Yu. Rudenko, V. Lukyanov, G. Salun, M. Shmayser, V. Kavkayev, I. Gurinets, R. Abdrakhmanov, V. Zorikov, and many others. Almost all letter writers are young and capable officers. One automatically wondered: Why do they want to be discharged into the reserve, what is it that does not suit them in the Army? The genuine motives behind these decisions were not always apparent in the letters. Many letters resulted in local visits. A sizeable proportion of letters were sent to the appropriate cadre organs. What transpired?

The Moscow region, Central Asia, the Transcaucasus... People everywhere said more or less the same thing. It is not service hardships as such that intimidate officers, but the lack of opportunities to perform their direct duties. People actually want to serve, and not to deal with economic affairs, construction matters, or feed procurement instead of serving...

There is the acute question of officers' social and legal protection. The workday is not subject to any norms, days off are irregular, there are no jobs for wives, children have to be driven to schools dozens of kilometers away... Spending their days wandering around the barren wastes, officers are no better off when they are off duty, they are forced to rent private accommodations to provide amenities for their families and have to "fight" the local authorities for the benefits due to them.

People are no longer willing to put up with disorganization, economic mismanagement, and indifference toward their needs and problems. They are unwilling to put up with everything that was formerly considered nonessential and secondary and was subject to the so-called residual principle of financing. And it is young officers who perhaps object more strongly than anyone else to these principles. They draw comparisons with the life led by their contemporaries in the "civilian world," the money they earn and the advantages and benefits they enjoy given a conscientious attitude toward their work. Alas, this comparison is often disadvantageous to the Army. "As long as the chief of a public toilet cooperative earns more than a submarine commander," Major I. Starisinskiy wrote, for example, "submarines will sink and officers will leave the Army."

There are, of course, occasions when an application for discharge has been prompted by relatively minor considerations. For example, an officer might have been unfairly treated, promotion might have been unjustifiably delayed, offense might have been taken...

It must be said that numerous normative documents expanding officers' rights and benefits have recently appeared, but people simply do not know about them. Their provisions include increasing the number of regions where service is subject to preferential conditions, upgrading posts, and raising pay by R40-50... It is intended to boost the importance and prestige of combat alert duty, to make leave entitlement dependent on length of service, to introduce mandatory service rotation between different geographic regions, and to institute the right to be put on the housing waiting list of the soviet executive committee in the chosen place of residence (subject to current residence permit regulations) 3 years prior to being discharged into the reserve... A Law on the Defense of the USSR is being prepared, which will provide the basis of all Soviet legislation on questions of defense and military building. The USSR defense minister issued an order constituting a standing nonstaff military-legislative commission. I think that to a certain extent all these measures will ease tension in the forces. But the tension still remains.

Complex situations develop at times. "Blatant violators of military discipline enjoy preferential treatment," Lieutenant G. Sokolov writes, "since they are the first to be discharged, and even the rules are bent at times. And yet conscientious officers are doomed to spend long years running from office to office." "Two men were recently discharged 'due to staff cuts,' and they were ones whose service was really slipshod," Captain G. Kostyuchenko seconds him. "It appears that a good provision is being used to get rid of bad people, while people like me who have earned awards rather than reprimands are being offered a discharge only for reasons of professional unfitness."

One can understand the writers of such letters: Indeed, why should a sloppy and unconscientious officer unwittingly find himself in a better position when it comes to being discharged into the reserve? Yes, our Armed Forces have taken a course of attaining high-quality parameters in combat training. This means that the Army ought to be reduced at the expense of those who do not live up to the lofty title of Soviet officers. This is so. But what about the good officers who might have decided to take a different path?

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already written that this question is being decided in the Ministry of Defense Main Personnel Directorate. The elaboration of new regulations governing service by officers is in its final stages, ensuring the possibility of officers being discharged into the reserve after a few years of service. Fresh questions connected with military building were raised at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. We hope that all this will clarify officers' service activity. For the time being, the situation is this: The most unforeseen situations might develop in the absence of clear-cut legal guarantees regulating officers' service activity and relations with the command. Lieutenant I. Filatov, a young officer of the Moscow Military District Air Defense Forces, puts it frankly: "Having enrolled in military school on my parents' insistence, I soon realized that this work was not for me. I cannot work with people, I find it hard to perform functional duties... When I applied for discharge after long deliberation, I was given to understand that I would be discharged only subject to mandatory expulsion from the CPSU." When numerous such letters start arriving, you begin to think: It is impossible for all letter writers to exaggerate at the same time. It appears that some senior officers lack spiritual tact, warmth, and concern in relations with their subordinates. Evidently, they still live with the old dogmas, forgetting that the time of voluntarist decisions and pressure methods of leadership is receding into the past.

The editorial office mailbag includes quite a few letters from people who, having given the Army the best years of their lives and their health, either have already been or are being discharged into the reserve and are encountering bureaucratic red tape and being forced to fight for the benefits to which they are entitled. "You write that 'the party and the government are taking specific measures testifying to their solicitous attitude toward each serviceman being discharged into the reserve,'" Major V. Chuprina wrote to us. "Allow me to disagree, seeing that I personally found out that this is not so. Judge for yourselves. I have served for more than 25 years in the Armed Forces and now have to be discharged into the reserve. While serving I of course gave no thought to personal benefits..." But now, the officer goes on to say, he has come up against callousness and indifference in solving his housing problem both in the unit and in the rural soviet where he applied. Nobody wishes to understand his position or help in any way. "And so I ask you, dear editorial office," he concludes, "where is the solicitous attitude toward me and others like me?" Officer of the Reserve V. Taznev was forced to become altogether dependent on his pensioner parents for several months, since his unit took several months to release his personal file. "How much humiliation and oppression do I have to suffer?" he exclaims. "Now, to all intents and purposes, I am a person with no fixed abode." Officer of the Reserve S. Ivanov had similar experiences which lasted about 1 year. Only our newspaper's intervention helped to solve his problem.

Yes, it often happens that a problem which has awaited solution for a long time proves perfectly soluble once the editorial office decides to help. For example, Senior Lieutenant A. Zhilenkov reported to the editorial office his experiences of formalism and indifference by officials when moving to other duties, and the red tape which delayed for several years the payment of a special money award. He failed to obtain justice either in the unit or the military district. He was forced to write an application for discharge into the reserve and a letter to the editorial office. Following an approach by the editorial office, Major General A. Mitrofanov, deputy chief of the Ground Forces Personnel Directorate, reported: "In line with the results of an inspection, Sr. Lt. of the Reserve A. Zhilenkov will be given a money award for 1986 and November and December 1987, as well as a money allowance for the period 12 July-18 August 1989. Disciplinary proceedings have been instituted against the persons guilty of his illegal detachment and other violations—Colonel L. Sokolovskiy (Transcaucasus Military District) and Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Muratov and Major O. Romanov (Baltic Military District)."

People have to fight for what they are entitled to by law. USSR people's deputies have already raised the question of young men's call-up for active service being effected not by an order of the USSR minister of defense but by a decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. Could this also be extended to cover officers being discharged into the reserve? Maybe then they will have fewer problems with residence permits, jobs, and housing.

Defense Ministry Views Officers Assemblies

PM3001134390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jan 90 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "Landmarks of Renewal. Results of All-Army Officers Assembly Examined in USSR Ministry of Defense Collegium"]

[Text] The USSR Ministry of Defense Collegium has examined the results of the All-Army Officers Assembly and practical measures to further improve work with officer cadres and to implement the submitted proposals. Reports were delivered by Army General D. Sukhorukov, USSR deputy defense minister for cadres, and Lieutenant General N. Shlyaga, first deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate.

The All-Army Officers Assembly demonstrated that military cadres are profoundly aware of their role and responsibility in implementing the defensive military doctrine and ensuring the efficiency of military building primarily in terms of qualitative parameters. It affirmed the Soviet officer corps' readiness to deepen perestroyka processes in the Army and Navy by practical deeds and their loyalty to the traditions of selfless service to the socialist motherland.

It was noted during the discussion on the reports that society's growing politicization and the development of the processes of democratization and glasnost are naturally reflected within officer collectives. Officers assemblies in units, on ships, and in military districts, groups of forces, and fleets, followed by the All-Army Officers Assembly, presented a broad spectrum of opinions and produced numerous constructive proposals on ways to deepen perestroyka in the Army and Navy. It is important to take these proposals into account in daily practical work and to actively support creativity and initiative.

Army and Navy command and political cadres welcomed with satisfaction the decision to give the Officers Assembly the status of a permanent democratic institution in the Armed Forces. The collegium comprehensively analyzed proposals to expand the rights of the Officers Assembly and to boost its role and influence in the fair solution of questions concerning service conditions, social, cultural, and daily life problems, and the maintenance of officers' dignity and honor at the proper level. Different viewpoints were expressed as regards the position of the regiment or ship commander in the Officers Assembly structure. The majority inclined toward the view that he ought to be the one to head the assembly. Differences of opinion also emerged on the question of where it would be expedient to set up Officers Assemblies—at regiment, brigade, and ship level or maybe in some other links of the Army and Navy structure. Much attention was paid to deepening collaboration between Officers Assemblies and other public organizations within the Armed Forces.

The collegium sitting noted that Communists make up the nucleus of officer collectives. It is very important to ensure that Army and Navy party organizations exert a constant rallying and cementing influence on these collectives, introducing into them a spirit of party-mindedness and comradeship and showing concern for the maintenance of a healthy moral and political atmosphere.

Fundamental importance attaches to the objective solution of social and everyday problems in an atmosphere of glasnost. Taking into account the proposals made by participants in Officers Assemblies, measures have been planned and are being implemented to improve the provision of industrial goods, foodstuffs, and various types of services to servicemen and members of their families.

The results of the discussion were summed up by Army General D. Yazov, USSR minister of defense. He emphasized that the holding of the All-Army Officers Assembly is a landmark in the major work being done on the perestroyka and democratization of Army and Navy life within the general mainstream of our society's renewal. One of the most important military traditions associated with many pages of our fatherland's military history is being revived. The Officers Assembly is called upon to become an effective instrument for implementing the professional and creative potential of our cadres in the interests of enhancing combat readiness, improving the quality of combat training, and strengthening military discipline. One of the fundamental spheres of its activity is to cultivate pride and responsibility for the officer's honor and dignity among people who have chosen the motherland's defense as their vocation.

The Officers Assembly has an important role to play in ensuring effective interaction between one-man command and democracy and establishing genuine military order everywhere in the Armed Forces. This is the point of view from which we can examine the question of including chairmen of courts of honor, certification commissions, and people's control organs on Officers Assembly Councils. While showing concern for rallying the officers' family in regiments and on ships, the Officers Assembly is called upon to help shape every officer as a professional man and an educator and to strengthen his spiritual closeness to his subordinates. Inestimable importance in this regard attaches to the mastery and creative application of the extremely rich experience of our officer corps, including the experience of the Great Patriotic War years. In the context of preparations for the 45th anniversary of victory in that war, Officers Assemblies must actively join in work to educate officers and all personnel in the spirit of heroic traditions.

By way of implementing the results of the All-Army Officers Assembly, the Ministry of Defense Collegium drew special attention to the need to consistently pursue a cadre policy based on the principles of social justice and active participation by the officer community.

A series of specific instructions were issued to relevant command organs and officials in the Armed Forces regarding the practical implementation of conclusions from the results of the All-Army Officers Assembly and the proposals made there, specifically those concerning the implementation of military reform. It was recommended that people's deputies who are in the Armed Forces be involved in this work subject to agreement with the relevant USSR Supreme Soviet organs. It is necessary to ensure that military scientists and generals and officers from the troops play an active part in it.

Taking into account proposals and remarks made at the All-Army Officers Assembly and in the course of discussions in the press, it was deemed expedient to complete the elaboration of Regulations on Officers Assemblies in the Armed Forces by 1 November 1990.